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ABSTRACT 
THE CORRUPTION ENIGMA: UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 
CORRUPTION REFORM PROGRAMS IN HIGHLY CORRUPT COUNTRIES 
Matthew T. Hall 
Old Dominion University, 2009 
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz 
There exists a corruption enigma. Experts and analysts largely agree on the 
institutional reforms that constitute successful corruption reform programs-this is the 
'Corruption Consensus.' Unfortunately, the well-designed and resourced reform 
programs created from this consensus and intended to improve national institutional 
capabilities rarely work. Yet the reform programs patterned on the Corruption Consensus 
continue on. Everyone agrees what to do in order to reform corruption but everyone also 
agrees that it will not work. This is the Corruption Enigma. 
This dissertation employs a structured, focused analysis to determine the reasons 
for varying success levels between otherwise similar countries in order to establish that 
the Corruption Consensus does not in fact result in tangible progress when implemented. 
I have carefully chosen three paired cases-Malawi and Tanzania, Peru and Columbia, and 
Thailand and the Philippines-each consisting of one country with a worsening corruption 
score and one with an improving corruption score. I then undertake a detailed qualitative 
analysis of each country of eight variables thought to be vital in corruption reform that 
confirms my hypothesis that successful corruption reform in highly corrupt countries is 
primarily a function of the idiosyncratic particulars of each country, rather than 
preordained institutional reform. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION: THE CORRUPTION ENIGMA 
Why is corruption reform that on the surface looks very well imagined, financed, and, 
at least on paper, well developed, executed so routinely unsuccessfully in practice? Tolstoy 
famously suggested in the opening sentence of Anna Karenina that "Happy families are all 
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." It is my suspicion that corruption 
reform and nations are like families and happiness in reverse: unsuccessful nations are all 
alike; each successful nation is successful in its own way. The world is full of highly corrupt 
nations trying to become less corrupt yet doing a rather rotten job of it. I call this the Reverse 
Karenina argument. 
After a few decades of often contentious, uncoordinated trial-and-error reform efforts, 
the international donor community, scholars, and leaders of developing countries have come 
to a general agreement that corruption reform is necessary and that successful corruption 
reform requires extensive, lasting political, social and economic institutional reform. It has 
also become apparent to scholars and analysts alike that development generally has not 
worked well and that the noxious nature of corruption is a factor in continued 
underdevelopment. This has not gone entirely unnoticed by analysts and international 
development professionals who are, after all, familiar with these events. Recognizing the 
importance of corruption in continuing underdevelopment, international donors have 
This dissertation follows the format requirements of A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and 
Dissertations 7* edition by Kate L. Turabian. 
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increased funding for corruption reforms per se and increased the number of anticorruption 
planks and conditions within development programs generally.1 
The corruption reform movement is in surprisingly broad agreement as to many of the 
specific institutional changes needed-most experts' lists of reforms look remarkably alike. In 
addition, multiple well-coordinated, well-staffed, well-funded, well-intentioned, and well-
planned reform efforts based upon these lists have been implemented globally from Asuncion 
to Jakarta. Yet reform effort after reform effort disappoints and the developing world appears 
just as corrupt now as ever. Interested parties everywhere are left scratching their heads, 
wondering what has gone wrong. What remains, then, is the following puzzling practical and 
theoretical contradiction: Experts generally agree what constitutes successful corruption 
reform and support development programs that attempt to institute such changes. Yet these 
same experts also generally agree on what these recent reform programs designed to do just 
this generally fail. I refer to this puzzle as 'the Corruption Enigma.' This dissertation is a 
systematic attempt to investigate, understand and draw useful practical lessons from this 
enigma. 
This practical impasse led to the recent 'Spence Report.' Nobel laureate economist 
Michael Spence was tasked by the World Bank to head up the Spence Commission on 
Growth and Development to determine international development strategy going forward; the 
commission's report was released in May 2008. The Spence report concluded that broadly 
designed, 'presumptive' institutional reform-that which prescribed laundry list-style 
institutional reforms-should be replaced with 'diagnostic' programs tailored to the 
11 will refer to the former as 'direct corruption reform and the latter as 'indirect corruption 
reform.' In this dissertation, the term "corruption reform" will generally be used to refer to both the indirect 
and direct types. Where the distinction is warranted, more specific terms will be used. 
2
 Dani Rodrik, "Spense Christens a New Washington Consensus," Economists'Voice, Issue 3, 
Article 4 (July 2008): 1-3. <http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss3/art4> (accessed March 17, 2009). 
3 
idiosyncratic characteristics of individual countries. But how much of a change is this? For 
Rodrik, this distinction between 'presumptive' and 'diagnostic' approaches is a clean, clear 
and significant break with the past. Presumption leads to one-size-fits-all, big and clunky 
programs whipped up in the lab by egghead international technocrats while diagnosis leads to 
tailored, specific and gradual approaches. Diagnostics, on the other hand, lead to tailored, 
agile and appropriate programs.3 
We can see this report as a strong first attempt at recognizing and moving beyond the 
Corruption Enigma. It is clear from the report, unfortunately, that this effort is something of a 
patchwork. It contains typical, broad institutionalist and good governance prescriptive 
advice- the exact type of advice that the report is purporting to be moving away from. For 
example, in the 'Effective Government' section of the report, after all this talk of shying 
away from broadly prescriptive programs in favor of tailoring, we are told that it is important 
to alter the incentive structure on civil service compensation.4 We are then told that 
corruption requires strong political leadership, which is an essential element of the very good 
governance programs the report seeks to improve upon.5 This type of having-it-all-ways 
prescriptive advice is nothing new. It is quite common to find laundry lists lumped together 
with calls for tailored reform programs. Way back in 1998, Stapenhurst and Kpundeh led off 
their prescriptive conclusions on how best to curb corruption with a paragraph on diagnostics 
that calls for the usual institutional reforms to be performed by carefully chosen local experts 
3
 Rodrik, 2. 
4
 Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth 
and Inclusive Development (Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development / The World Bank, 2008), 66. 
5
 Ibid. 
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because the typical set of reforms "need considerable tailoring to fit specific political, 
economic, and cultural circumstances."6 
This shows that this seemingly evolutionary, if not revolutionary, attempt to move 
away from the stifling incapability of the institutionalist/good governance movement is 
almost as old as the institutionalist/good governance movement itself. The Corruption 
Enigma has been, it seems, the cliched elephant in the room for quite some time. More 
importantly, it is a fresh, vivid indicator of the maddening dilemma academics, analysts, and 
stakeholders find themselves in. So this is where we find ourselves: in recognition that 
programs designed to increase institutionalist capabilities are not working, we have decided 
that we should create programs tailored to a country's specific needs, which will be designed 
to increase institutionalist capabilities. And for all any of us know, this will be just the 
adjustment we have been needing. 
This current puzzle no doubt presents challenges to the researcher: information on 
such a recent subject must be gleaned significantly from journalistic as opposed to scholarly 
sources. Furthermore, it is difficult to find reform programs recent enough to represent the 
time period I am interested in yet complete enough to allow for reliable conclusions. 
On the other hand, the potential for new, relevant findings with such a study is high. 
The academic obstacles faced currently by scholars and policy makers and leaders alike are 
formidable. First, nothing much seems to work despite the enormous resources being given 
to this subject. Second, stemming from the first, the current impasse over what this means 
and what should be done about it is formidable. There has been a recent move toward 
6
 Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh, eds. Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for 
Building National Integrity (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), 238. 
5 
isolationist surrender, most famously expressed by William Easterly7 on the one hand or on 
the other extreme a return to the beneficent Santa Claus mentality of decades ago, most 
Q 
vividly and famously represented by Jeffrey Sachs. Isolationists admire the goals of 
development programs but conclude that development is more likely when leaders are cut off 
from development funding and left to fend for themselves. The Sachs of the world see 
continued underdevelopment as a symptom of underfunding. This policy and analytical 
divide closely mirrors that found throughout the social sciences: where to draw the line 
between descriptive details and generalizable theory. 
Yet anti-corruption programs have worked over time. Hong Kong and Singapore are 
the most famous of the modern anti-corruption movements. Both nations went from being 
nearly thoroughly and seemingly hopelessly corrupt to where they stand today, which is to 
say nearly lacking in corruption. So, real, positive change is in fact possible. Yet more recent 
corruption reform efforts-of which there are many-do not yield such positive results. 
Today's success stories exist but are hidden in the shadows. They are more modest, fragile 
and ugly. Any light that can be shed on our current murky and complex incapability vis-a-vis 
corruption reform could be truly beneficial and progressive. 
This lack of attention to current or recent change from a specifically comparative 
sense is true generally as well. It is common to see case studies with prescriptive conclusions 
but very little empirical research has been done into recent global trends. All of which leaves 
us with some significant, unanswered questions. Which types of nations are improving and 
7
 William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the 
Tropics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). 
8
 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2005). 
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why? Little has been done to address this question, leaving important gaps in the scholarly 
research and a potential leverage point for future research. 
DISSERTATION EXEC SUMMARY 
There exists a corruption reform enigma: on paper, corruption reform appears 
straightforward but in practice it is rarely successful. There is a Corruption Consensus in 
which agreement about what corruption reform should consist of results in the Laundry List 
of mostly institutional reform items deemed by just about everyone to be essential 
components of successful reform. Everyone agrees what to do and yet everyone also agrees 
that it won't work. This is the enigma. The following is clear: that corruption is a problem; of 
what successful corruption reform consists; that recent attempts at corruption reform have 
been generally unsuccessful. The compelling unanswered question becomes the following: 
how to explain success. Under what conditions do highly corrupt nations become less 
corrupt? It is largely agreed what successful corruption reform should consist of but it is 
entirely unclear why some nations succeed where most do not. It is not even terribly clear 
which nations are succeeding. In a world full of people both worried about corruption and 
actively seeking to reform it and political scientists trained in the comparative method, there 
seems to have been little scholarly comparison derived from the now ubiquitously referenced 
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) rankings. 
This dissertation will attempt to fill in some of these gaps by examining the relative 
success of recent corruption reform. It will also seek to tear down the rather unstable 
foundation that is the Corruption Consensus. It will test my hypothesis-that this consensus is 
off target-by using first a statistical large-N analysis of aggregate national corruption data, 
7 
which suggests that there is no relationship between the Corruption Consensus and real 
reform success. I will then undertake a largely qualitative examination of three paired cases: 
Tanzania and Malawi, Thailand and the Philippines, and Colombia and Peru. This qualitative 
study represents the bulk of the dissertation and is designed to confirm the results of the 
preliminary quantitative analysis by digging a bit deeper-it is simply not sufficient to rely on 
the results of the quantitative examination, which could be flawed by some unknown 
measurement error. These cases were chosen carefully. In each case, two otherwise similar 
nations with relatively high levels of corruption and low levels of development were chosen. 
One of the two had recently become more corrupt while the other had improved. The 
dissertation will seek to explain the reasons for the apparent varying success levels of these 
otherwise similar countries. 
STRUCTURED, FOCUSED COMPARISON 
This dissertation will use a structured, focused comparison, as pioneered by 
Alexander George in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy9 According to George, the structure 
comes from systematically asking the same carefully crafted research questions of each case 
and the focus comes by narrowing the scope down to specific aspects of the cases.10 This 
approach was later explained further and promoted by George, et al.11 In The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy, George designed and implemented a qualitative methodological case 
study framework designed both to straddle the divide between historical specificity and 
generalizability of theory and to bridge the gap between the needs of policy and academia. 
9
 Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971). 
10
 Ibid, 67. 
1
' Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72. 
8 
This was done, according to George, in order to add necessary descriptive detail that 
distinguishes between cases to broad, generalizable theories. 
He sought to avoid the trap of drawing the wrong policy implications from 
deceptively dissimilar cases. He accomplished this by taking U.S. foreign policy cases that 
were substantively similar on the surface but with varying results. He then identified factors 
thought to play a role in foreign policy crises by analysts and used these as his independent 
variables. This type of approach is ideally suited for my needs. As I have already touched 
upon and will discuss in full below, international development policy professionals largely 
agree on the ingredients that should constitute a successful corruption reform program yet 
results to date are weak. Using George's framework allows me to hone in on these factors, 
examining them against each other. While this approach is especially suitable for my 
research, this dissertation's structure may be said to have two extra advantages. First, I 
preface my structured, focus comparison with a limited quantitative analysis that, essentially, 
establishes the murkiness of what is known. Second, I am using three paired cases. These 
paired cases allow comparison of similar cases, which is followed by comparison among the 
three cases. There is then an added layer of comparison. 
HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis to be tested here-derived from the logic of my Reverse Karenina 
argument-is that there is no systematic knowledge of or relationship between the factors 
normally thought to constitute successful corruption reform and real corruption reform 
efforts. The first test of this hypothesis will consist of a limited quantitative analysis. The 
dependent variable will be improvement in Transparency International CPI scores over time 
12
 George, 1971, xvi. 
9 
and will be matched against a wide variety of independent variables such as GDP per capita, 
political, democratic freedom, and economic freedom. I expect there to be no large-N 
evidence that this laundry list approach works. I will then see if there is qualitative evidence 
at the paired case level to explain variation in corruption reform success. I will choose, set 
up, analyze, and explain three paired cases. After all, if the Corruption Consensus is correct, 
then there ought to be some evidence for it somewhere. If, on the other hand, my Reverse 
Karenina argument is correct, we should find the answers to our research questions in the 
idiosyncratic details of each country. 
On first glance, this would appear just another way of saying the devil is in the 
details. However, what has really happened is that we have turned the implicit and explicit 
assumptions on their heads. Rather than viewing institutional foundations as prerequisites for 
development and corruption reform, it may be that each country has its own set of 
prerequisites needed for these same institutional reforms to be effective. Much research to 
date has focused on how to transfer success. To the extent that this has proven to be 
problematic, analysts and policy implementers have gone back to the original success stories 
to look for missing ingredients. This paper assumes that the answers are to be found in the 
specifics of cases with differing degrees of success but similar, non-enviable starting points. 
Historically, this understandable desire to transfer what works to highly corrupt nations has 
resulted in three waves of research. Yet, it is not enough to tear down the foundation of the 
Corruption Consensus. This would leave a gaping hole for which the only viable solution 
would be to fill in gaps with description. This dissertation will suggest some possible 
theoretical leverage points for future research. 
10 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Broadly speaking, the research questions to be asked in this dissertation include the 
following: First, does this Corruption Enigma exist? I will make the case that it does in 
Chapter 2. Second, given this Corruption Enigma-this consensus about what to do but also a 
consensus that it will not work -how can we understand corruption in a more effective 
manner? What differentiates successful and unsuccessful corruption reform in highly corrupt 
countries? Which of the several factors often argued to be essential in effective corruption 
reform actually work and under what circumstances? In other words, what causes a few 
'lucky' nations to become somewhat less corrupt while most others lag behind? Are these 
successful methods generalizable and transferable or are they specific to the unique 
circumstances of place and time? If so, what does this imply for policy makers and theorists 
alike? 
More specifically, I will be asking several underlying, specific research questions to 
assess the reasons for varying levels of success. This is necessary in order to make sense of, 
in a scientifically rigorous method, these complex cases. In other words, these research 
questions are the basic foundational blocks of both my structure and focus. These questions 
include the following: what corruption reform programs did a country implement during the 
time period in question; which laundry list items were included or affected by the programs; 
how broad and deep was the program; how successful was the program; and what factors 
contributed to the level of success. This approach allows me to isolate only those factors that 
are normally thought to affect corruption reform and examine their real effectiveness in 
practice. 
11 
METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter 3 a limited statistical analysis of the aggregate data will be performed and 
analyzed. The TI CPI data wall be used as the basis of a basic regression analysis. Chapters 4 
to 6 will consist of the three separate paired cases; these paired cases will rely on largely 
qualitative data and the comparative method shall be employed. Because of the current nature 
of the evidence being examined, sources will largely be drawn from contemporary 
journalistic sources more so than academic ones. 
A NOTE ON ACADEMIC CULTURE WARS 
This dissertation is designed intentionally to avoid the drawn-out, bloody, and boggy 
debate between culturalists and rational choice proponents. To lay my cards on the table, I 
believe culture can be a pretty good starting point in explaining inter-group variation but is of 
little use with intra-group variation and not much better-and often exceedingly frustrating-
for policy prescription. By focusing on countries that are reasonably similar in everything 
except recent levels of success in corruption reform, I am able to, somewhat roughly and 
generally, begin from a reasonably level cultural playing field-these varying cases are, more 
or less, intra-group. This was the single-most important factor in choosing my cases. None of 
which is to equate Tanzania and Malawi, for example, historically and culturally. It is, 
however, the assumption of this paper that Tanzania and Malawi have enough in common 
historically and culturally to allow us to view their differing levels of success in recent years 
as a function of the choices made during those years rather than the historical-cultural factors 
that led through time to those choices. 
12 
One particular challenge that remains, however, is how to distinguish between 
national cultural traits and national idiosyncrasies. It is tempting to here to pull out Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart's oft-quoted response to the question of how to define 
pornography-"I know it when I see it." As a working guideline, though, an idiosyncrasy will 
be defined here as some particular aspect of the reform that appears unique to the specific 
time and place. 
WHAT AFFECTS CORRUPTION REFORM 
Scholars and analysts largely agree on what affects corruption reform. There are 
several items-some specific, some general-that are on most experts' lists. Having read 
through many of these lists, I have chosen to examine the seven most uncontroversial and 
commonly found items: national anti-corruption organizations, civil service reform, judicial 
reform, civil society, media freedom, political leadership, and openness to trade. This is what 
I refer to as the Laundry List. Five of these are institutional by nature-national anti-
corruption organizations, civil service reform, judicial reform, civil society, and media 
freedom. Openness to trade would more comfortably fall under the old Washington 
Consensus format. All seven of these those would certainly fall under the 'presumptive' 
model vis-a-vis the Spence Report. Political leadership falls squarely under the 
idiosyncratic/diagnostic paradigm and will be used as something of a stand-in to test the 
Spenseian Consensus. As an additional, non-Laundry List item, I have chosen to also 
examine external influence. It is something of a one-off in relation to my thesis-it is neither a 
laundry list item or idiosyncratic by nature. However, it is no doubt important. The case for 
the acceptance of these variables by scholars will be made in full in Chapter Two. 
13 
While there is much agreement over missing requirements and capabilities, there are 
significant differences in theories to explain these gaps and, subsequently, what to do about 
them. Generally, there are three competing camps of experts who seek to explain corruption 
and prescribe effective change. From left to right and using my terminology, they are the 
Revolutionaries, the Moderates and the Isolationists/Alternatives. 
The Revolutionaries see this failure as a direct function of the nature of the 
international organizations in charge and their systemic relationships with other relevant 
actors, particularly domestic actors. They prescribe dramatically less influence on the part of 
international organizations such as the World Bank and dramatically more influence for local 
stakeholders. Critics of capitalism argue that corruption reform is either a smokescreen for 
political economic hegemonic misbehavior, ineffective because it comes from international 
rather than local sources, or secondary to issues of economic and political exploitation by 
local and international elites.13 Culturalists argue on the one extreme that cultures are all 
legitimate, thereby legitimizing corruption as just another way of living and on the other 
extreme that fundamental differences between cultures make reform impossible. Of course, 
there is another group fully supportive of reform that simply argues culture must be taken 
into account for reform to be effective.14 
The Moderates see the failure as a fixable equation: plug in the right values 
(resources, methods, relationships between actors) and all will be better, eventually. The 
Moderates are the main players in this game in both numbers and influence. Whereas the 
Moderates see the problem in the equation itself, the Revolutionaries see it in the 
13
 Maria Eriksson Baaz, The Paternalism of Partnership: A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in 
Development Aid (London: Zed Books, 2005). 
14
 See for example Bryan W. Husted, "Wealth, Culture, and Corruption," Journal of International 
Business Studies 30, no.2 (2nd Quarter, 1999): 339-359. 
14 
mathematicians and the power structures that gave the mathematicians their positions of 
power. The vast majority of policy professionals and, thus, many scholars consulted and cited 
here, fall into this category. The Moderates move often from one paradigm to the next in the 
search for pragmatic solutions. The current paradigm is that of the institutionalists. 
Then there are the Isolationists and Alternatives, on the other hand. The Isolationists 
view the equation as inherently unsolvable and can correctly cite a litany of examples in 
evidence of their claim. They view development from the outside as a waste of resources. As 
can be seen, these competing camps are analytically and prescriptively radically different. 
From the isolationists, we get what can be called a cut and run philosophy. After all, there is 
no shortage of evidence of corruption reform failure despite the immense level of resources 
that have been given to these issues. Recently, Easterly's argument for a tactical surrender 
has gained considerable attention.15 A quick Google Scholar search reveals 700-plus cites of 
his work, an impressive number for a development-related scholarly source. The Alternatives 
consists of people who view corruption reform as more of an effect than cause. There are 
some democratizationists who argue that focusing on very strictly-defined issues of good 
governance should take priority over specific institutional reforms. Nations need healthy, 
functioning democratic institutions as a prerequisite for institutional reform.16 And then there 
are the neoliberals, always with us, everywhere. Neoliberals see neoliberal economic reform 
as the prerequisite for political institutional reform and an instigator for positive change.17 
However, their influence is particularly light due to the requisite regulations for effective 
15
 Easterly, 2002. Also, see Thomas W. Dichter, Despite Good Intentions: Why Development 
Assistance to the Third World Has Failed (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). 
16
 H.E. Sung, "Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison," Crime, 
Law and Social Change 41 (2004): 179-194. Also, see Jean-Francois Arvis and Ronald E. Berenbeim, 
Fighting Corruption in East Asia: Solutions from the Private Sector (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2003) 
for a discussion of effective corruption reform initiated by the private sector. 
17
 See Mario Vargas Llosa, "Why Does Latin America Fail," Cato Policy Report 25, no. 1 
(Jan/Feb 2003). 
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corruption reform. Rose-Ackerman, for example, argues persuasively that a strengthened 
state, with the ability to raise taxes and regulate against corruption, is key to successful 
corruption reform. Like atheists in foxholes, there are no true libertarians in corruption 
reform. There are also "neoliberal lights": those, like Kaufmann, who favor neoliberal 
reforms but see them as part of an overall strategic package, who, obviously, should not be 
included as 'holdouts.'19 
MODERN CORRUPTION REFORM 
First, the success stories of Hong Kong and Singapore were analyzed and set forth as 
templates for reform. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, both former 
colonial nations instituted extremely complex and layered yet successful institutionally-
focused anti-corruption reform programs decades ago and subsequently and in time went 
from being highly corrupt to relatively corruption-free. Then the highly corrupt countries 
were 'discovered' and analyzed and the Hong Kong and Singapore models were applied as 
prescriptive templates. Then, after realizing that these efforts were not working as planned, 
other success stories were 'discovered', analyzed, and applied as templates to still struggling 
nations. Failed cases were examined to determine what was missing. A typical examination 
of a failed program will end with prescriptive conclusions informing the reader of all the 
deficiencies of the program. The solutions and prescriptive advice became repetitive and 
predictable. But in many ways this is a circular non-answer: deficient corruption reform 
programs fail to adequately improve institutional capabilities because they fail to adequately 
18
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption and Development," Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics—1997, ed. Joseph Stiglitz and Boris Pleskovic (Washington DC: World Bank 
1998) 149-171. 
19
 See for example Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," Foreign Policy, no. 101 (Summer 
1997): 114-131. 
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improve institutional capabilities. But we know that was the intention. So we have the 
working, bottom-line answer-in short, corruption reform is a tough slog, especially in 
countries relatively deficient in institutional capabilities. 
Now we need a new question-since there are no examples of clearly successful 
examples like Hong Kong and Singapore, we must train our sights on the relatively 
successful nations. By 'relatively' I really mean marginally, at least in comparison to the 
smashing success of Hong Kong and Singapore. If this is so problematic, why are some 
countries relatively successful? What is different? What does this relative success look like? 
For Hong Kong and Singapore, this question is easier to answer because the success was on 
such a large scale and the events were adequately recorded. For other countries, the events 
are recent, murky, and the successes are tougher to pin down, at least on the surface. 
Something has gone right but we are not quite sure what it is and why it is, apparently, 
working. Let me be specific and clear here: I am talking about focusing in on the details of 
highly corrupt countries that became less highly corrupt. They are, by definition, still highly 
corrupt. 'Success' defined in such relative terms will likely not look very successful. Yet this 
is exactly where the distinction must be drawn if we ever hope to make progress in such 
Hobbesian circumstances. Looking at it in smaller chunks of time and on a more granular 
level begins to make sense, then. 
WHAT'S IMPORTANT 
As mentioned above, the political and economic stakes are immense. Real gaps exist 
between what we need to know and what we know and between our goals and our success 
levels. We are at once, in some significant ways, ignorant and impotent. It is almost 
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universally agreed that corruption negatively affects development in a variety of ways. It is 
also generally agreed that corruption reform in the developing world is not working. The 
relative success of corruption reform in the developed world has the potential to increase the 
growing divide between the North and South. The North has made a large financial 
commitment to reducing corruption in the South but these efforts are not working. 
The recent trend away from conditionality stipulations and toward up-front good 
governance restrictions to aid has the potential to all but end aid to corrupt countries by 
making the vast majority of them ineligible for aid. Yet to leave the status quo as is would be 
to sanction enormously ineffective spending at copious levels, continued underdevelopment 
and the arguably widening gap between the so-called North and South. An enormous amount 
of resources has been, and is being, spent on the reform of corruption, especially in the 
developing world, over the last few decades as corruption has become public enemy number 
one to many scholars and government leaders alike. Despite the considerable level of 
resources and attention being devoted to corruption reform in the developing world, 
corruption does not appear to be lessening. 
WHAT'S NEW 
This dissertation seeks to fill in five separate but related gaps in the literature 
regarding corruption reform. I refer to these gaps as 'Corruption Research as Misfit', 
'Descriptive Polities', 'Bridging the Policy and Academic Divide', 'Missing Puzzle Pieces', 
and 'Little Victories.' 
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Corruption research as misfit 
Research regarding corruption is something of a misfit subject-where does it belong, 
in theory and in practice? In theory, it's anyone's guess as it seems to reach across 
substantive and analytical disciplines including Comparative Politics, IPE, International 
Development, International Organizations, International Relations, Political Science 
generally, Economics, Public Administration, Business Management, and Criminology. In 
practice, useful information regarding corruption is found here and there throughout 
scholarly research, advocacy groups, government publications, international organization 
publications, newspapers, online sources and, of course, search engines. As such, the 
analytical lenses through which corruption-related information is seen and discussed vary 
widely. This dissertation pulls existing research from various disciplines and sources while 
using the comparative method for analysis. 
Descriptive politics 
Simply put, there just is not much comparison in Comparative Politics. This is 
particularly true in the sub discipline of corruption-related research. This is not an original 
observation. In fact, the description versus comparison debates is the essence of what is the 
field's most vibrant debate and is somewhat related to the larger culturalists v. rationalist 
debate addressed above. It is my view that there is a nice, but as yet insufficient, amount of 
description in comparative politics generally and corruption-related research specifically but 
an alarming deficiency in truly comparative studies. There are some, for sure, but not nearly 
enough. The typical corruption-related piece discusses in detail the specifics of a nation's 
efforts to reform corruption. It may detail one particular program. This information has been 
20
 For a good discussion of comparative theory, see Atul Kohli, "The Role of Theory in 
Comparative Politics: A Symposium, " World Politics 48: 1-49. 
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extremely useful-I have relied on this type of study extensively and am grateful for it. Then 
there are many studies that detail the efforts of multiple countries but in a decidedly non-
systematic manner. Then there are the edited collections, which are somewhat more 
systematic but still lacking in scientific rigor. And then there are the small handful of studies 
that are scientifically designed and implemented. My dissertation is designed to fit into this 
latter category. 
Bridging the policy and academic divide 
The above problem is further magnified in corruption-related research because the 
field is dominated by policy people. Most articles in the literature are written by technical 
professionals who tend to err on the side of description. Again, the typical article will 
describe a country's efforts to reform, provide a lessons learned section but will fail to 
address the theoretical implications. Comparison is often done in a somewhat sloppy fashion, 
if at all. One of my goals is to effectively bridge this gap. 
Missing puzzle pieces 
Combining the above two problems with the enigmatic nature of corruption reform, 
we find ourselves trying to solve a puzzle with many missing pieces. In fact, it seems that we 
are dealing with Rumsfeldian 'unknown unknowns.' Another of my goals is to determine 
which pieces are missing and take a shot at filling some of them in. 
Little victories 
The final gap that my dissertation seeks to fill is the near absence of research 
regarding modern, modest reform successes, or 'little victories.' We know a lot about the 
past major success stories-the Hong Kongs and Singapores and, even New York Cities-but 
very little about recent, modest progress. But it is likely that this type of modest success is far 
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more common and indicative of corruption reform specifically and development work 
generally. 
DISSENTERS 
There exist dissenters on some of my assumptions. As alluded to above, the "grease 
the wheels" theory posited that in underdeveloped societies corruption sometimes serves as 
the best method of increasing efficiency in a bureaucratically inept society. Scott made a 
similar argument regarding corruption as a benign force in developing nations. This theory, 
however, has come under significant and effective criticism and has been countered with a 
"sand the wheels" theory, which posits that rather than decreasing inefficiency, corruption 
increases it.22 A milder version of this response is that the number of people harmed by 
corruption is vastly greater than the number of those who benefit from it.23 According to this 
argument, corruption benefits elites only 24 
A second, more recent argument is that, by over regulating public and private 
transactions, too much corruption reform is a bad thing. A strong version of this argument 
was made by Anechiarico and Jacobs. They argued that the obsession in America with anti-
corruption regulation increases bureaucracy and inefficiency. This strong version seems most 
applicable to developed, relatively non-corrupt nations where the benefits of adding more 
21
 James C Scott, "The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 11, no. 3 (June 1969): 315-341. 
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 See Pierre-Guillaume Meon and Khalid Sekkat, "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of 
Growth?" Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (January 2005): 65-97. See also Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin 
Wei, "Does 'Grease-Money' Speed up the Wheels of Commerce?" IMF Working Paper, no. 00/64 (March 
2000). 
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2, 259-273. 
24
 Miriam A. Golden and Eric C.C. Chang, "Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and 
Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy," World Politics 53 (July 2001): 588-622. 
25
 Frank Anecchiarico and James B. Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption 
Control Makes Government Ineffective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
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anticorruption regulations do not necessarily outweigh the costs of burdening transactions 
with said regulations. This is, as the saying goes, a nice problem to have. I would add that we 
should be careful when scaling back regulations given everything we have learned about the 
negative effects of corruption and the difficulty of getting rid of the deep, systemic type. It is 
likely better, in the end, to be over-regulated than overly corrupt. 
More current controversies come from the more radical edges of scholarship. Leftists, 
culturalists and postmodernists, for example, argue, very roughly, that corruption in the 
developing world is either not really corruption according to the cultural worldview of those 
nations26; or a function of international capitalism27; or important but greatly exaggerated for 
political, economic purposes ; or downright racist. Or some or all of the above. I think 
these arguments, while raising valid concerns, ultimately fall short for two general reasons. 
First, the evidence that corruption is other than negative across cultures is scant. Second, 
non-Western cultures appear to have bought into the political philosophy of the anti-
corruption crusade. Citizens of highly corrupt countries are well aware of the negative effects 
of corruption. Western academics and activists, on the other hand, having spent their free 
time on deconstructionist reasoning rather than, say, bribing customs officials to get their 
luggage out of customs, may tend to underestimate the real-life negative impact of 
corruption. Finally, while culturalist explanations can shed some light on the reasons for 
success between cultures they are wholly inadequate at explaining varying levels of success 
within cultures. What cultural explanations are there for the relative successes of Botswana, 
lb
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 Ed Brown and Jonathan Cloke, "Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South: 
Assessing the International Anti-Corruption Crusade," Antipode 36, no. 2 (March 2004): 272-294. 
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Chile, and Hong Kong, for examples. Institutionalists, on the other hand, are well prepared 
for this.30 Some of this overlaps with the issue of the widespread nature of corruption. If 
something viewed as corruption by "Otherizing" Anglo know-it-alls is not really corruption 
within the ethical and moral systems of certain so-called developing countries, then 
corruption is not nearly as widespread as commonly argued. 
Kaufmann's essay on the six myths of corruption provides a strong counterattack to 
these arguments in general. These six myths, which Kaufmann, et al, set down and then 
effectively refute are: 
"Corruption cannot be measured; Subjective data reflect vague and generic 
perceptions of corruption rather than specific objective realities; Subjective data is too 
unreliable for use in measuring corruption; We need hard objective measures of 
corruption in order to progress in the fight against corruption; Subjective measures of 
corruption are not "actionable" and so cannot guide policymakers in the fight against 
corruption; Monitoring corruption closely is not a priority since many countries with 
high corruption have also had fast growth."31 
A quick look through the 2007 CPI rankings shows 149 out of 180 of ranked 
countries have scores of 6.0 and under. 135 countries have scores of 5.0 and under 114 
countries have scores of 4.0 and under; and a shocking 82 countries have scores of 3.0 and 
under. The rankings show a strong tendency. It seems exceedingly improbable that, given 
these and other statistics and the enormity of attention paid to the issue both domestically and 
internationally, that corruption is some kind of phantom menace cooked up by scholars, 
capitalists, or the media. 
See for example, Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland 
China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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OUTLINE OF REMAINDER OF DISSERTATION 
Chapter II, The Corruption Enigma, will cover the following: Introduce, explain and 
detail the agreement on the negative effects of corruption, the need for corruption reform, and 
the limited agreement on what that reform should consist of; introduce, explain and detail the 
history of corruption reform including the relative early successes of Singapore and Hong 
Kong v. the recent general failure in the highly-corrupt world using both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence; and the relative success in the relatively non-corrupt world v. the 
highly-corrupt world; a summary of the major agreements and disagreements within the field 
as they apply to this study; and an introduction and detailed analysis of the Laundry List 
phenomenon. 
Chapter III will include: an introduction including a summary and defense of the data 
selection and a restatement of the hypothesis; an explanation of the operationalization of the 
Laundry List; a detailed analysis of the aggregate data; and a summary and conclusion, 
especially regarding the hypothesis. I will then introduce my three paired cases-Tanzania and 
Malawi, Thailand and the Philippines, and Colombia and Peru-and explain and defend my 
case selection and my paired-case methodology. 
Chapter IV, my paired case study of Tanzania and Malawi, will include: an 
introduction including a summary and defense of the case selection and a restatement of all 
applicable hypotheses; a detailed description of the evidence regarding the two nations in 
regard to their relative success in reforming corruption; and a summary and conclusion. 
Chapter V, my paired case study of Colombia and Peru, will include: an introduction 
including a summary and defense of the case selection and a restatement of all applicable 
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hypotheses; a detailed description of the evidence regarding the two nations in regard to their 
relative success in reforming corruption; and a summary. 
Chapter VI, my paired case study of Thailand and the Philippines, will include: an 
introduction including a summary and defense of the case selection and a restatement of all 
applicable hypotheses; a detailed description of the evidence regarding the two nations in 
regard to their relative success in reforming corruption; and a summary. 
Chapter VII, my conclusions, will consist of: a summary and case comparison of the 
research and findings; the implications of the research and findings (both academic and 
policy-based); the limitations of the research and findings; and notes on future research. 
25 
CHAPTER II 
THE CORRUPTION ENIGMA 
INTRODUCTION 
There exists a corruption reform enigma: everyone agrees what to do and everyone 
agrees it doesn't work. The following is clear: that corruption is a problem; of what 
successful corruption reform consists; and that recent attempts at corruption reform have 
been generally unsuccessful. And the following is unclear: what to do about this generally 
unsuccessful corruption reform movement. Why does the Corruption Consensus continue to 
exist given its lousy track record? That is the enigma in short and this chapter seeks to flesh 
out the relevant details of what is known about corruption reform. 
A recent controversy concerning the World Bank, corruption and Paul Wolfowitz 
serves to highlight the increasingly prominent yet puzzling role that corruption plays in 
development programs. It can be both a focus of reform, as Wolfowitz made it, or a 
hindrance to development work, as it apparently was for several months. It is also enigmatic 
and controversial-Wolfowitz' strict focus on corruption was to many a well-deserved and 
long-awaited focus and to many others a smokescreen designed, intentionally or not, to limit 
the scope and pace of the "real" work of development. And it certainly did not help matters 
that Wolfowitz himself turned out to be corrupt in some sense of the term. How one defines 
and reacts to corruption is just as controversial and subjective as virtually anything else of 
importance in the academic and policy arenas. Yet, broad practical agreement exists. Few 
argue any mpfe that corruption is not a bad thing, as was the case with the once-popular 
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"greased wheels" theory of corruption.1 As will be detailed below, Kaufmann and others 
have conclusively shown any limited benefit from greased wheels is overwhelmingly negated 
by the overall noxious, corrosive nature of corruption.2 
In this chapter the issue of corruption will be examined in detail, primarily relying 
upon existing scholarship.3 First, a working definition of'corruption' will be identified. Next, 
it will be established that, with very few dissenting voices, corruption has been found to be 
widespread and harmful. Next the specific negative relationship between corruption and 
development will be introduced and examined. In the following section, the history of 
corruption reform-with a focus on the early few successes and numerous more recent failures 
and also on the success differential in corruption reform between the developed and 
developing worlds-will be introduced, detailed and examined. I will then make the case that 
there is something of a scholarly consensus as to what is needed to successfully reform 
corruption. This consensus-and its institutional components and the Laundry List 
phenomenon that accompanies it- will be detailed. Next, the holdouts against the consensus 
will be introduced and discussed. Then, it will be demonstrated that this academic consensus 
has taken root within policy circles, which has resulted in the practical application of 
theoretical prescriptive advice. Finally, in the conclusions the evidence and arguments 
regarding corruption will be summed up and the implications will be discussed. 
1
 See for example Colin Leys, "What is the Problem About Corruption?" The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 3, no. 2 (1965): 215-230. 
2
 Kaufinann, 1997. 
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 Pranab Bardhan "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of 
Economic Literature 35, no. 3 (September 1997): 1320-1346. For an annotated bibliography, see 
"Annotated Bibliography of the Anti-Corruption Knowledge Center of the World Bank," < 
http://web. worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOV ANTCOR/0„contentMDK:2070850 
8~menuPK:1742397~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html > (accessed March 
17,2009). See also Vito Tanzi, "Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," 
IMF Staff Papers 45, no. 4 (December 1998): 559-594. 
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WHAT EXACTLY IS 'CORRUPTION'? 
Like anything of import in the social sciences, 'corruption' is a contested term. But it 
is, I will argue here, contested only around the edges. There is a widely used definition, 
formulated by Palmer, which defines corruption as, "The misuse of public power for private 
and personal gain."4 It has a parsimonious, commonsense, 'good enough for government 
work' feel to it that encourages practicality at the expense of unanimity. The primary dissent 
is part philosophical, part political and stems largely from the sociological/postmodern 
tradition that asks, "Who are 'we' to define 'corruption'?" While there may be some validity 
to concerns of cultural bias, this version has been widely accepted and conforms to policy 
being proposed internationally, including from within non-western cultures. 
To some extent, corruption is in the eye of the beholder, which is to say 
unscientifically defined. And to some extent it has been used by people in different places on 
the political spectrum. Ravi Batra, to take one of the most extreme examples, defines the 
term very broadly so as to be able to blame all global poverty on corruption. It is clear that 
this is just a political swipe designed to allow him to blame the usual suspects: Bush, Cheney, 
U.S. corporations-for all the world's ills and many rather conspiratorially-imagined future 
ones. In so doing, however, he weakens down the term to mean, apparently, any political or 
economic activity the author is opposed to.5 A less extreme and therefore more serious 
version of this argument is the argument of how do we expect other nations' citizens to 
eliminate corrupt practices if those same practices are not considered corrupt within the 
4
 M. Palmer, "Controlling Corruption," in Policing Australia: Old Issues, New Perspectives, ed. P. 
Moir and H. Eijkman (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1992) 128. 
Ravi Batra, The New Golden Age: The Coming Revolution against Political Corruption and 
Economic Chaos (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 
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cultures of those nations. But this argument can be the starting point for different, right-wing 
and isolationist arguments-these differences make reform nearly impossible. 
CORRUPTION IS WIDESPREAD AND HARMFUL 
There is strong agreement that corruption is widespread and harmful. Corruption has 
been shown by Mauro to deter growth by decreasing foreign investment and to have a clear 
and strong negative correlation with development.7 Elsewhere he shows that corruption 
leads to loss of tax revenues, lower levels of foreign aid, and reduced government 
Q
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efficiency. This is just a small sample of the many scholarly works showing corruption to 
be widespread and harmful. Fisman and Gatti have shown that corruption and fiscal 
decentralization are negatively correlated.9 In a more qualitative manner, journalist Robert 
Guest has detailed the negative effects corruption has had throughout Africa.10 
Looking more specifically at the relationship between corruption and development, 
there exists convincing evidence of a negative, two-way relationship. Corruption and 
development are certainly strongly negatively correlated. There are exceptions, however, 
that are important to note and explain-some countries, in particular China, are managing to 
develop just fine with high levels of corruption. Li and Wu argue that how trusting a country 
is can explain this discrepancy.11 On the surface, one can readily see the general correlation 
by looking through the CPI data-while there are countries like China that are developing 
6
 For a useful summary, see Bardhan. 
7
 Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3 (August 
1995): 681-71. 
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 Paolo Mauro, "Why Worry About Corruption?" Economic Issues no. 6 (1997). 
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quickly, there is not one single clearly corrupt yet fully developed country; neither does the 
reverse exist-there are no clearly undeveloped and non-corrupt countries, although in this 
formulation there are some close calls (Chile has corruption rankings comparable to the U.S. 
and is clearly much more developed than most of Latin America but not quite yet a 
developed country. Botswana is clearly not developed but not quite non-corrupt. ) 
There is evidence as well of cause: development can help reduce corruption as 
• 1 ^ 
institutional capability, for example, increases with development and vice versa. This 
shows that corruption may be worsening (or could expect to continue worsening) the 
growing gap between the North and the South. Also, it points to the relative difficulty 
underdeveloped countries face in enacting effective corruption reform. This is consistent with 
current international development policy, which by and large seeks to decrease corruption as 
one part of an overall development strategy. 
THE HISTORY OF CORRUPTION REFORM 
Successes in the developed world 
Corruption reform in the developed world stands in stark contrast to that in the 
developing world. Within developed nations it sometimes seems to individuals that corrupt 
forces are in control and that high-level corruption is alive and well. Examples abound: the 
French scandals of the 80s and 90s and Wolfowitz' ouster from the World Bank over charges 
of nepotism highlight ongoing problems in the developed world well. 
12
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But appearances are indeed deceiving for a few reasons. First, the scale of the 
problem is different. While many Western citizens can point to a famous high-level example 
or two of corruption at home, citizens of highly corrupt nations see it on a near daily basis. 
Corruption scandals for most of the world are run of the mill. Second, well-publicized 
scandals, such as the Wolfowitz firing, are partially a function of a free and transparent 
media.14 In this scenario in order for dirty laundry to be cleaned, it must first be aired. Third, 
and closely related to the second, is that these scandals often result in some kind of real 
punishment in the relatively non-corrupt world, at least much more so than in the highly 
corrupt world. Finally, In fact, the "glass houses" argument is sometimes made in reaction to 
the Western world's focus on reforming corruption in the developing world: the West would 
be better served to go after their own corrupt entities and individuals than obsessing about 
corruption elsewhere. But the good news and bad news is that the truth is almost the 
opposite. The developed world is, relative to the developing world in particular, functionally 
closer to being corruption-free than horribly corrupt. This is the good news. The bad news is 
that this implies a continued, perhaps growing, divide between the developed and developing 
worlds. 
This is not intended to excuse or downplay the importance of existing corruption in 
the developed world; corruption matters everywhere and differences in scale are important. 
But the problems faced by the developed nations are arguably different in kind rather than 
scale from the problems faced in the developing world. Developed nations benefit from being 
in a virtuous cycle: lower levels of corruption make institutional reform and response to 
14
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption," International Social Science 
Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies 149 (September 1996) 365-380. 
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corruption more manageable and thus effective; effective anticorruption institutions keep 
corruption levels low. 
Successes: Hong Kong, Singapore, and the rest 
In the developing world, Singapore and Hong Kong were famously (at least within 
the relevant scholarship) home to two success stories. Both nations were at the time of reform 
decidedly developing nations, as opposed to developed. In both nations there existed 
widespread institutional corruption and in both nations there existed a reasonable assumption 
of a cultural tendency toward corruption. Hong Kong and Singapore, for the official and 
unofficial culturalists of the day, were unreformable. And in both cases, corruption reform 
was eventually very successful: today Singapore and Hong Kong are both highly developed 
and relatively non-corrupt, two attributes that are no doubt decidedly related. They stand out 
to such an extent that they are used almost ubiquitously in the policy and academic literature 
as models to be followed. Much has thus been written of them. This is the good news but, 
very unfortunately, there is bad news to go with it as these successes, despite much 
exhortation and many attempts, have been exceedingly difficult to replicate. They at once, 
then, can serve to illustrate the need to reform, how that reform should look, and the 
difficulty of achieving this. As such, it is necessary here to provide a brief sketch of these 
programs. 
The Hong Kong reform of its police and judicial system are justly famous. They were 
most famously chronicled by a former Commissioner of the Independent Commission 
against Corruption (ICAC), Bertrand De Speville.15 Having made their initial, successful 
corruption reform efforts decades ago, Hong Kong has scored well on the CPI from its 
15
 Bertrand DeSpeville, Hong Kong: Policy Initiatives against Corruption (Paris: OECD Development 
Centre, 1997). 
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inception: they've never been lower than 7.01 and most recently at 8.3.16 Hong Kong's 
success has served as a model for many scholars, analysts and technical practitioners for a 
long time.17 It will be useful then to summarize the evolution and constitution of this 
successful model. 
Hong Kong's reforms consisted of two main components: the Independent 
Commission against Corruption, or ICAC, and the 1971 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, or 
PBO. ICAC was created in February of 1974 in response to previous failed reform attempts, 
especially regarding the police force. It was designed primarily to root out police corruption. 
It was first and foremost to be independent. The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance was the 
centerpiece of an extensive, long-running, dynamic effort to enact effective anti-corruption 
laws. By and large, these two reforms worked in conjunction to drastically reduce corruption 
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throughout Hong Kong. 
From the perspective of this current study, it is clear from De Speville's account that 
these wildly successful reforms were focused on enforceable legal reforms, enlisted and 
strengthened civil society, had strong, sustained political leadership, strengthened the police, 
encouraged a free press (at least within this narrow scope), and valued independence above 
all. They also took into account cultural considerations by outlawing guanxi. Three points to 
be pulled from this are that this reform was ongoing, dynamic, and comprehensive. It also 
shows the ability to overcome cultural limitations. And, most importantly here, it clearly 
serves as a guide to recent reform efforts in the particular details. 
16
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But it is Harris who brings to the discussion some particularly important critical 
points: 
"(I)ts greatest triumphs have been against bureaucratic and private sector corruption 
rather than against political corruption per se; and ... its logic and structure are 
colonial, and hence no more replicable than the British case study."19 
Hong Kong and Singapore were beneficiaries in the particular matter of corruption 
reform; which is not, of course, to say that colonialism was a good thing. Nor is it to say that 
all nations with a colonial past are generally less corrupt than those with a non-colonial past 
but rather that Hong Kong and Singapore's successes were partially but significantly a 
function of their colonial traditions. And this has certainly turned out to have been more true 
than false, more often than not, in practical application. Knowingly or not, they were 
institutionally prepared for the success that followed. Hong Kong's successful reform, for all 
of its impressive accomplishments, has proven difficult to replicate, despite its transparent, 
well documented nature. This is in part due to its particular circumstances, one of which was 
the extensive, positive external yet in-touch influence. 
The particulars of the Singaporean example differ somewhat from Hong Kong but the 
bottom line is nearly identical-all efforts to replicate the success that this ex-colonial city 
state have proven difficult. According to Quah, it is one of the most successful anti-
corruption programs in Asia. Like Hong Kong, Singapore's reforms came long before TI's 
CPI began; they consistently rank among the least corrupt countries, never falling below 9.1 
Robert Harris, Political Corruption: In and beyond the State (London: Routledge, 2003), 213. 
20
 Jon S.T Quah, "Comparing Anti-corruption Measures in Asian Countries: Lessons to be 
Learnt," Asian Review of Public Administration, XI, no. 2 (July-December 1999): 71-90. 
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and currently at 9.3. And as with the case of Hong Kong, Singapore's success has been 
• ~) 1 
widely discussed and exemplified. 
Singapore's modern reforms began with the gaining of full internal rule in 1959. 
Leaders of the newly elected People's Action Party (PAP) wanted to overhaul th^tamer, 
more piecemeal British anti-corruption laws-derived with deeper, systemic changes. 
According to Quah, "In 1960, a comprehensive anticorruption strategy was introduced with 
the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the strengthening of the Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB)." The POCA worked for five reasons, according to 
Quah, four of which would qualify here as 'legal strengthening' and the fifth as institutional 
independence. The POCA was amended no less than three times over three decades. 
Additionally, a new, separate anti-corruption commission was created in 1989. And finally, 
civil service wage protections were enacted on two occasions, and wages were increased in 
the 70s and 80s on five occasions. 
There are a few points to be made about this. First, the success of Singapore's 
program did not happen overnight. The change was arguably more evolutionary than 
revolutionary. Second, as Quah himself points out, transferring this success could prove 
problematic in practice due to Singapore's unique, particular circumstances.24 Also, as with 
Hong Kong, the institutional particulars serve as a model for modern reform. And, finally, 
21
 See Klitgaard, 1998; Tan Ah Leak, "The Experience of Singapore in Combatting Corruption," 
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Fight Against Corruption, ed. Petter Langseth and Fiona Simpkins (Washington: The World Bank, 1996) 
151-158; and John S.T. Quah, "Singapore's Experience in Curbing Corruption," in Political Corruption: A 
Handbook, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. Le Vine (New Brunswich, NJ: 
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22
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Review 59, no. 6 (Nov- Dec, 1999): 483-494, 491. 
23
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24
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Singapore's success was clearly cumulative; thus, again, we see a positive feedback 
mechanism at work in a no-longer highly corrupt, partially developed nation. 
There have been several more recent success stories but none nearly as impressive as 
those in Hong Kong and Singapore. For the most part, these cases involve less drastic and 
systemic changes that amounted to still significant advances in corruption reform due to pre-
existing institutional capabilities. Chile and France are just two other relatively developed, 
relatively non-corrupt countries that have shown significant improvement. In both cases, 
relatively non-corrupt nations with pre-existing institutional capabilities were able to further 
reduce their corruption levels via deeper institutional reform. In Chile, for example, 
reformers have countered scandals by using existing institutional capabilities. Thus we see 
a positive feedback mechanism at work. What this shows is that out of a relatively small 
group of countries with already strong corruption ratings and relatively developed, that 
significant reductions in corruption are not at all unusual. And, more pessimistically, out of 
the vast majority of nations with low scores, in both an absolute and relative sense, that 
significant improvement is seldom seen. 
CONTEMPORARY CORRUPTION REFORM 
Failures 
We have now seen the best of the good news. These cases represent the promise of 
reform and offer ready-made templates for reform. Now it is time to examine the bad news 
and, unfortunately, in this category there are many cases from which to choose. The reasons 
for these failures are fairly clear. The highly corrupt, underdeveloped world finds itself in a 
25
 See Luis Pinto, "Chile Uses Institutional Strength to Counter Corruption Scandals," Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Hemisphere Focus XI, Issue 15 (April 30, 2003). 
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Catch-22 in which deep-rooted corruption requires greater pre-existing institutional 
capability to solve, which in turn requires lower pre-existing levels of corruption. This is true 
in part because the elites who benefit from corrupt practices in underdeveloped countries are 
able to form informal networks to resist reform. The resulting picture of corruption reform 
in highly corrupt countries is chaotic and ugly. 
Roderic Ai Camp has shown the cyclical, cynically political, and futile nature of 
corruption reform in the Mexican case. According to Camp, Mexican politicians routinely 
run on anti-corruption platforms and upon taking office new presidents routinely use their 
newfound power to purge opposition party politicians in the name of corruption. Often, of 
course, many of those purged were corrupt but real institutional reform is rarely attempted 
and more rarely enacted. Not surprisingly, this is unfortunately a common practice 
throughout the developing world.28 Although some claim that these reforms are positive, 
most disagree. Larmour argues that institutional transfer can be inherently difficult. 
Mbaku argues that corruption cleanups are inherently problematic due to the rent-seeking 
nature of bureaucrats and argues that free market-oriented public policy approaches are 
essential.31 Nickson and Lambert have an interesting discussion of the failure of a carefully 
prepared and well funded governance agenda in Paraguay. According to the authors, 
Paraguayan institutional deficiency due to the 'privatized' nature of the state made true 
26Kliitgard, 1998. 
27
 Robert Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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 From my somewhat anecdotal personal experience of living in Quito, Ecuador during the 
presidential campaign that resulted in the election of Lucio Gutierrez, Camp's argument rings all too true. 
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in part on an anticorruption platform, only to be forced out of office (and Ecuador in a helicopter) in part 
due to seemingly credible charges of corruption vis-a-vis his handling of judicial reform. 
29
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30
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reforms problematic; in addition, the American insistence on neoliberal reforms made proper 
regulation required to get and keep corruption levels in check nearly impossible. Khan et al, 
have examined the failure of Pakistan's National Accountability Bureau. There are many 
other examples of descriptive works on failed reform efforts.34 Having taken a quick tour of 
the back end of the Corruption Enigma-the basically botched job that is recent corruption 
reform-it is time to delve into the front end of the Corruption Enigma: the Corruption 
Consensus. 
THE CORRUPTION CONSENSUS 
The foundation of the Corruption Enigma is the Corruption Consensus: experts-
policy professionals and academics alike—by and large agree on both likely positive causes of 
effective corruption reform and, more importantly, of what this reform should consist. One 
result of this consensus is the Laundry List. The Laundry List consists mostly of institutional 
reform items and this makes sense as the current dominant analytical school within the 
corruption reform movement is Institutionalism. Highly corrupt nations need to improve their 
basic institutional capabilities in order to be able to more effectively prevent, police and 
prosecute corruption. I will next discuss in detail the Laundry List, which will be followed a 
discussion of Institutionalism. 
Andrew Nickson and Peter Lambert, "State Reform and the 'Privatized State' in 
Paraguay," Public Administration and Development, 22 (2002): 163-174. 
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March, Portland, Oregon). 
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 For examples, see Kemp Ronald Hope, Sr. and Bornwell C. Chikulo, eds. Corruption and 
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THE LAUNDRY LIST 
The literature on corruption reform is full of reform laundry lists. Sometimes the lists 
are literal-prescribed items are listed in order. Common items abound-it is not uncommon to 
find lists that look practically the same. This is a function of the consensus posited here. The 
Laundry List-the most commonly found items-is the institutionalist' response to the 
Corruption Consensus, as described above. It is important to note that most analysts agree 
that corruption reform programs should be broadly designed. Case-by-case reforms are much 
more likely to fail. The following paragraph from Kpundeh's discussion of corruption in 
Sierra Leone is indicative of the institutional consensus: 
"Effective and sustainable reform strategies are complex measures that draw upon the 
manpower and resources of all institutions. Investigation, prosecution, research and 
prevention must be integral elements of a single, efficiently coordinated, strategy that 
has strong support from the leadership and the public. Systematic and systemic 
changes are central to the development of a government that is accountable and 
transparent. It employs, trains, and adequately pays workers to serve the public and 
carry out the duties and responsibilities of the government as legislated by the 
democratically elected Parliament. Most important, the public through the parliament 
must create and support and independent entity, free from all extraneous and political 
•y/r 
pressures, that oversees prevention, investigation and penalties." 
These issues can be divided into groups, again, most of which are institutional by 
nature, as follows: transparency and media, executive, judicial, legislative, and bureaucratic 
and administrative. It might be instructive to look at some examples of this commonality. 
De Speville offers up something of a laundry list in his much cited work regarding 
Hong Kong's ICAC program. The similarities between De Speville's list often items that 
under girded Hong Kong's success (published way back in 1977) and the standard 
prescriptive advice offered up in typical laundry lists is striking. Most of the items are 
See for example "Corruption and Good Governance," United Nations Development Programme, 
Discussion Paper 3, (New York: UNDP Management Development and Governance Division, July 1997). 
36Kpundeh, 1999,217. 
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generally thought to be essential requisite components of corruption reform programs. No 
doubt this is not coincidental. Items common to modern anti-corruption laundry lists included 
here are: political will, an independent anti-corruption policy agency, adequate funding, legal 
strengthening, involvement and strengthening of civil society, transparency, and 
conditionality. 
Karklins devotes two chapters to the role of institutions and institutional reform in 
T O 
corruption and corruption reform in her work on corruption in post-Communist societies. In 
her prescriptive conclusions, she posits "four phases in the development of anti-corruption 
policies", the second of which is, ".. .to put in place the legal and institutional mechanisms of 
accountability..." 
For its part, the World Bank has repeatedly focused on the need to strengthen 
institutions. In a 2000 study of anticorruption, when the term "institutional" is narrowly 
defined, institutional reforms account for one of five prongs of their proposed multi-prong 
approach. Using a broader, Northian definition of institutions, all five prongs could 
potentially be considered institutional by nature, at least indirectly.40 
Here is what I have deemed the most common and essential items of the Laundry 
List, with brief descriptions of each. 
De Speville, 77. For another, more detailed but indicative laundry list, see Hossain Mollah, Md. 
Awal and Md. Nizam Uddin, "Combating Corruption in Bangladesh: Some Strategies," Undated. 
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Independent anti-corruption organization or ombudsman 
Obviously here we see some overlap with the institutional independence category. 
But this was mentioned enough on its own as to warrant its own laundry list item. The 
popularity of this item stems in part from the successful role played by the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong.41 Many scholars see this as a 
potentially powerful tool in the fight against corruption.42 
Judicial institutional strength 
Weak judiciaries are seen as complicit in keeping corruption levels high. Buscaglia 
has written extensively about judicial corruption and the need to reform judicial branches in 
order to effectively reduce corruption.43 Hammergren has argued that judicial councils can 
be an important part of judicial institutional strengthening, which should take precedence 
over judicial independence, in Latin America at least.44 Schwenke identifies several 
subcomponents of judicial reform necessary for corruption reform. Many scholars have 
argued for the need for judicial independence.46 Ayittey lists judicial independence as one of 
41
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his four components.47 Included in this category will be law enforcement reforms, such as 
those having to do with police forces, as they result ultimately in higher rates of prosecution. 
Civil service reform 
Many scholars and policy makers have advocated bureaucratic reduction or civil 
service reform as an essential component in corruption reform.48 Dele Olowu has argued that 
an overgrown state causes African corruption.4 Several people have asserted the need to 
include civil service pay increases as a component in corruption reform. As shown above, 
both Hong Kong and Singapore made this a central component of their successful programs. 
Mauro has shown that low civil service pay leads to higher corruption.51 Academics argue 
that increasing pay to a living wage reduces the incentive to act corruptly. 
Media freedom 
Most scholars view a free press as playing a vital role in any corruption reform 
program.53 Adut, for example, gives the media much credit for keeping the French corruption 
scandals, and subsequently their prosecution, alive.54 In a statistical evaluation of the CPI, 
Lederman, et al, found that a free press is one key factor in lower corruption ratings.55 
47
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Ayittey identifies a free press as the first of four requirements of successful corruption 
reform.56 Djankov, et al, have argued that there is a negative relationship between freedom of 
the press and governance, generally. Brunett and Weder have found a negative relationship 
between freedom of the press and corruption, specifically. Freedom and transparency of the 
media has been widely argued to play a vital role in taming corruption. Not everyone agrees, 
however; Weyland, for example, has argued that Latin American neopopulists have greater 
incentive to 'resort to corruption because modern mass media has allowed populists to 
bypass traditional political methods.5 
Civil society 
The term 'civil society' can mean different of things to many different people. I will 
employ an intentionally broad definition here as I think it is warranted. By 'civil society' I 
mean anything that is designed, intentionally or otherwise, to increase access to individual 
stakeholders. I will include, then, programs that are not expressly, explicitly designed to have 
effects on civil society, such as some decentralization programs. Johnston and Kpundeh 
argue for 'social action coalitions' as the key to enhancing civil society and, thereby, 
reducing corruption, particularly in highly-corrupt developing nations.60 Smulovitz and 
Peruzzotti argue that civil society can be used to create 'social accountability' in Latin 
56
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America.61 The strengthening of civil society is, according to Ayittey, the fourth of four key 
elements in corruption reform success. 
Political leadership 
Leadership, in various forms, has been identified as potentially crucial in successful 
corruption reform, particularly in the underdeveloped world. This type of leadership has been 
referred to as 'political entrepreunerialism.' This leadership can be political. The support of 
a president or prime minister in anticorruption efforts can be a significant, if not sufficient, 
factor in implementing and maintaining effective anticorruption institutional provisions. 
Leadership can come from other sources, often in the judicial and legal settings. Although the 
example comes from the developed world, Eva Jolyee's tireless role as an Investigative 
Magistrate in pursuing high-level French corruption scandals provides a vivid example of 
this type of importance.64 
It is widely understood that political leadership is absolutely essential in effective 
corruption reform. As noted above, Quah argues that ongoing buy-in from leaders was a key 
component in Singaporean success.65 Riley focuses on political leadership as the primary 
cause of African corruption, rather than culture.66 Ruzindana argues, based on research 
61
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regarding Uganda's National Integrity System, that political leadership is the key to anti-
corruption success.67 
Openness to trade 
It must be pointed out, that this is the trickiest, most contentious item in the Laundry 
List. While there are some neoliberals who argue for full-scale privatization and deregulation 
as the primary source of effective corruption reform, there is considerable evidence to 
dispute this. Too much privatization too soon can actually increase corruption and 
deregulation is a double-edged sword as effective regulation is a central component of 
successful corruption reform and prevention. Kaufmann might be the most famous supporter 
of this type of approach: a supporter of free markets but one who recognizes both the need 
for simultaneous governance improvement and the short-term negative tumult wholesale 
privatization brings.69 Ayittey pegs liberalization as one of his four components of successful 
corruption reform. For all of these reasons, I have chosen to examine the very narrow area 
of openness to trade, which is much easier to argue is negatively correlated to corruption 
levels. 
External influence 
This item is particularly controversial and, relatedly, problematic. It is controversial 
in that control by international actors, such as the World Bank, inevitably brings with it 
prickly issues such as sovereignty, Northern/Western/Anglo/Developed/Capitalist 
67
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domination and exploitation. Certainly outside actors have, at best, a spotty track record in 
this regard. Because corruption reform specifically and development generally are low odds 
ventures, finding the right kinds of control can be problematic. Yet asking something in 
return for one's money is more than understandable and, more germane to my study, 
effectively changing the incentive structure would no doubt be a positive step toward 
obtaining better results in general in corruption reform programs. It is no wonder, despite all 
of the usually well-deserved criticism of various types of conditionality, that external actors 
continue to look for ways to impose some kind of conditionality or other. I have specifically 
chosen 'external influence' as a means of narrowing in on a potential factor in corruption 
reform success-to leave it at 'conditionality' of any type would include very weakly 
designed or poorly enforced conditionality that few think has any real chance of working as 
hoped. 
Not making the cut: decentralization, privatization, and deregulation 
As discussed above, privatization and deregulation are far too controversial to 
consider part of the Corruption Consensus; as such, I have left them out here. Whether or not 
to add 'decentralization' as an extra variable was somewhat of a difficult call. On the one 
hand, moving power from nationalized bureaucrats to local stakeholders is a good way of 
reducing corruption in theory at least. Decentralization is not such a non-controversial good 
as it turns out, on the other hand. Shah, for example, argues that what is good in theory 
breaks down in practice in underdeveloped nations as local areas have just as entrenched 
corruption networks as do national bureaucracies. However, as we will see below, some 
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types of decentralization may legitimately fall under some of my chosen categories, 
especially civil society (when local stakeholders are empowered as part of a broader 
decentralization program) and civil service reform (when local municipalities are reformed.) 
THE INSTITUTIONALISTS 
The largest functional part of this consensus concerns institutional reform. There is an 
overwhelming consensus that strengthening domestic institutions is the best strategy for 
success. There is some dissent but it is minor, especially when compared to academic 
disputes generally. This dissent is discussed below; this institutionalist agreement will be 
examined here. It is commonplace to see discussions of institutionalism prefaced with a nod 
to Douglass North, and rightly so. North's application of path dependency to political 
economy was a milestone achievement; it showed at once both the difficulty and necessity of 
institutional change in achieving development. Often North's definition of "institutions" is 
cited. North defines institutions simply as " the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."72 As such, rules 
can be either formal or informal. 
This definition is open to broad interpretation and application. North has included 
informal rules for very good reasons. In his work on development and the rule of law, Dam 
focuses on North's omission of the "groups" from the "rules of the game".73 But once one 
begins to discuss "informal rules" then the possibility of over generalizing the concept arises. 
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Indicative of the everything-is-institutional category is an article by Gylfason and Zoega 
from a collection on institutionalism that never appears to mention institutions. The reader is 
left to decide whether the article was improperly included in the collection or rather this is, as 
seems at least plausible, a function of the vague, poorly defined nature of "institutions".74 
The difference between "institutional" and "cultural" explanations would cease to 
exist were we to follow North's definition to its logical conclusion. If informal rules, for 
example, include, say, Confucian deference to authority, then creating a free and open media 
becomes inherently and thoroughly an institutional task as opposed to just liberal democratic 
or economic or cultural. Or to take a more extreme example, societies might (and no doubt 
do by the scores), have "informal rules" that implicitly okay the offering and taking of bribes. 
The Chinese practice ofguanxi serves as an illuminating example of a practice that would 
fall easily into both cultural and institutional categories.75 Or how about "social capital"? 
Stephen Knowles has argued that social capital both is and is not part of the institutional 
continuum.76 This indeterminable overlap between cultural and institutional approaches is 
well illustrated by Haller and Shores' collection of "anthropological perspectives" on 
corruption, within which an entire section is devoted to institutions and institutionalism.77 In 
this particular instance, any and all corruption reform would be institutional at its core. 
Similarly, neoliberal economic reforms would be institutional in nature-after all, what part of 
changing formal and informal rules would neoliberal reforms not apply to? If any informal or 
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formal rule becomes an institution then any reform becomes institutional in nature. Most to 
all reforms per se would arguably be institutional by definition. And it becomes difficult to 
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tell the difference between an institutional and a cultural argument. 
In addition to the difficulty of effectively and accurately distinguishing between 
institutions and culture, there is the similarly difficult task of distinguishing among types of 
institutional changes. Are all institutional changes equal? If not, which seems probable given 
the broad nature of the common usage of the term, what are the practical implications? 
Recognizing this dilemma, Iyigun and Rodrik usefully divide changes into a "tinkering v. 
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institutional" dichotomy. Institutional changes are deeper, structural changes, according to 
the authors, while tinkering is as it sounds-change around the edges, short of actual 
institutional change. They find, among other things, that "tinkering works best when existing 
policies are demonstrably poor and the productivity of modern sector activities is extremely 
low."80 This would mean that-assuming the validity of the authors' empirical results and 
their definition of the terms-for the vast majority of the underdeveloped world, institutional 
change is decidedly not the best advice for kick starting development because tinkering is the 
default choice given their limited capabilities. 
Policy makers at all levels have recently converged toward the institutionalist 
approach. The Corruption Consensus has made the switch from thinkers to doers as 
corruption reform programs designed to reform various domestic institutions have become 
the norm in development programs. Sometimes these programs are stand-alone but many 
78
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other times the corruption reform takes the form of planks within an overall policy platform. 
The World Bank has gone through significant shifts its strategic approach to development 
projects. The changes during James Wolfensohn's ten-year reign as president from 1995-
2005 were profound.81 This focus only strengthened under Wolfowitz, with Daniel 
Kaufmann at the head of its anti-corruption division. Kaufmann has long argued for the need 
for the World Bank to take on corruption. This new consensus on the need to reduce 
corruption and the most effective methods of doing so is at once heartening and worrisome. It 
is heartening because international development officials have hit on something important 
and worrisome in that this mad rush to fix corruption is being led by actors with a bad track 
record using methods with similarly bad track records. 
THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 
There are other factors outside of the institutional consensus that demand discussion. 
No examination of corruption reform programs would be complete without looking at the 
following: the role of external actors, especially the World Bank; conditionality, and 
influence. The issues of corruption, development, and external actors have moved to center 
stage. Open up any newspaper and one is likely to find stories about corruption or 
development or any number of external actors or organizations, such as the World Bank. The 
same applies to websites, blogs, and scholarly books and journals. The three subjects 
separately demand high levels of resources and attention. The relationships between them, in 
varying alignments, have recently received increasing attention. On the surface we can see 
that development is a hard slog at best. It appears from the preponderance of evidence 
81
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presented to date that corruption has a significantly negative effect on development. It is also 
clear on the surface that external actors play a significant role via their active involvement in 
development projects. 
Yet beyond this the topic of conditionality is an academic and practical minefield. 
First, there exists enormous discord over what these roles should be. Far rightists worry that 
IGOs, such as the World Bank, are becoming the foundation of a one-world governmental 
system. Less dramatically, Conservatives worry that sovereignty is being eroded. Leftists 
worry that groups like the World Bank and USAID defend corporate and great state power 
interests (not necessarily respectively) at the expense of the very people-the billions of 
impoverished citizens of the underdeveloped world-the organizations have been empowered 
to help. Meanwhile, many in the middle complain about the seemingly casual yet systematic 
and gargantuan waste of hard-earned taxpayer money. 
Who should control corruption reform projects and what conditions should be 
attached to them? Much has been written concerning corruption reform projects 
specifically; much has also been written about the role of external actors (such as the World 
Bank), which are normally in charge of reform projects.83 The World Bank itself, for 
example, in the face of enormous criticism and robust evidence of failure, has gone through 
an evolution from big, strictly economic projects to smaller, more diverse projects and from 
loaning money with few strings attached, to loaning money based on strict economic 
conditionality ("structural conditionality" or "the old conditionality"), to loaning money 
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based on looser, more stakeholder-friendly political conditionality ("good governance" 
conditionality or vis-a-vis levels of success.) 
Corruption and governance are complexly interrelated. This makes sense if we look at 
corruption as a disease; in this case, good governance would be akin to health care. It would 
not make much sense to discuss disease control separately from the health care system. Good 
governance agendas often include anti-corruption planks while anti-corruption strategies 
often rely on improving governance. The World Bank and US AID, for their part, clearly 
recognize this relationship. The World Bank argues that in order to create lasting corruption 
reform, "It is import to go beyond the symptoms to tackle the causes of corruption." They 
list five key elements of corruption reform: 
1. Increasing Political Accountability 
2. Strengthening Civil Society Participation 
3. Creating a Competitive Private Sector 
4. Institutional Restraints on Power 
5. Improving Public Sector Management 
It is clear from this list, that the World Bank's anti-corruption strategy relies upon 
quite a broad approach including among another aspects, neoliberal economics and 
democratization. This is somewhat ironic since the recent focus on anti-corruption was 
supported by the argument that corruption, as a root cause of failure to democratize or 
develop, needed to be dealt with head on. 
The debate about, and research regarding, World Bank conditionality specifically and 
conditionality in general is vibrant, complex and fascinating. According to Collier, it is one 
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of the three most important currently relevant debates concerning the Bank, with dependence 
and coordination.86 Santiso provides a very enlightening review of World Bank 
0*7 
conditionality for those interested in the subject. Many policy and academic analysts take 
extremely critical stances on World Bank conditionality. Ratynska, for example, has argued 
that conditionality is unfair, harms local ownership of programs, and too one-size-fits-all to 
be effective.88 Even more negatively, Cooksey has argued that the World Bank is responsible 
for corruption increases for two reasons: they fund corrupt agents and they themselves are on 
occasion corrupt.89One of the most interesting aspects of conditionality is the EU for two 
reasons: first, it has proven highly successful, at least on the surface and to most analysts and, 
second, the apparent problematic nature of replicating this success given the one-off, 
idiosyncratic nature of the EU. As with most academic subjects, the surface argument is not 
universally accepted. Some, for example, have argued that contrary to conventional wisdom 
EU entrance conditionality was much less evenly successful as normally assumed-the devil 
is in the details.90 Poleshchuk has shown that Estonia and Latvia were able to technically 
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comply with the EU's pre-entrance demands regarding minority ethnic group rights while 
substantively ignoring them.91 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have introduced and examined in detail what I call the Corruption 
Enigma. I have argued that there is much agreement about what constitutes successful 
corruption reform programs despite the limited success in implementing programs based on 
this agreement. It is now time to turn the introduction of my quantitative analysis of recent 
change in global corruption rankings, which is designed to determine what, if any, effects 
implementation of laundry list items have on relative corruption reform success. 
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CHAPTER III 
EVALUATING RECENT CORRUPTION REFORM EFFORTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed corruption and its negative effects, the history of corruption reform, 
including successes and failures, and the relevant scholarship and policy foci vis-a-vis 
corruption reform, it is time to start filling in some of the gaps and testing my hypothesis. My 
expectation is that there is no Large-N aggregate evidence to explain variation in corruption 
reform success. If the 'Reverse Karenina' effect is applicable (that improving corrupt nations 
are improving in their own particular ways), then we should expect no conclusive links 
between any of our variables and corruption reform success. In this chapter I will introduce 
and discuss the TI rankings, which the quantitative examination section of this paper uses as 
a basis. I will then discuss my methodological approach to this quantitative examination. 
In short, I divide the 1998-2008 CPI data into an early and late period, eliminate 
certain countries by applying some minimal but important criteria to individual country data, 
and then run a multivariate regression to determine what, if any, factors correlate with 
corruption reform success. Next, I describe the results and pull from this some observations. 
This quantitative approach serves only to set the table for the qualitative approach-it is not 
intended to disprove the Corruption Consensus but rather to see if there is any overarching 
evidence that the Laundry List items work. The logic of my hypothesis is that the ideal goal 
of having a large-N global study that will point to determining factors in corruption reform 
success in highly corrupt countries is not likely doable at this point given the apparent 
shakiness of the Corruption Consensus. The qualitative analysis serves to indicate that the 
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findings of the quantitative examination were not due to just a measurement issue. 
Accordingly, I will next introduce my case studies, which will be followed by a full 
explanation of my case study methodology. Finally, I will summarize my findings thus far. 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL'S CPI EXPLAINED 
Recently the work of Transparency International has become increasingly famous. 
This work can be divided into several categories. First, and arguably most visibly, TI has 
conducted, published, and publicized important research. The most famous of these is the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, which TI has been conducting on a yearly basis since 1995. 
Next is TI's direct involvement in corruption reform programs. The international 
headquarters works via global and regional conferences and by working with various IGOs 
and NGOs, TI supports anti-corruption efforts from a global position. Additionally, they have 
also fostered anti-corruption programs throughout the world via TI chapters, which serve to 
leverage local capabilities and talent in the effort to publicize the importance of corruption 
reform and foster reform itself. Through the work of TI, there now exists significant, robust 
quantitative evidence of the widespread nature of corruption. As some significant criticism 
has been aimed at the CPI ratings of Transparency International, it is necessary to introduce 
and review the CPI here in some detail. The quantitative evidence is derived entirely from 
TI's CPI. A 0-10 rating is created with a 10 signifying a complete lack of corruption and a 0 
signifying a perfectly corrupt nation. A high CPI score, then, is good. Contrary to what some 
might believe, the CPI is created using sound methodology. At least three and as many as 
sixteen surveys are used for each country. According to their website, "The CPI ranks more 
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than 150 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys."1 
It should be pointed out that the perceptions are not just internal public perceptions 
but also external sources of a variety of types. In the end, though, I think this criticism is not 
nearly as strong or valid as it first appears. While ideally it would be preferable to have 
evidence of actual corruption, TI's measurements of perceptions of corruption are 
sufficiently reliable. There is some evidence that perceptions of corruption actually 
accurately parallel actual levels of corruption. According to Lambsdorff, TI's reliance on 
multiple types of respondents-foreign experts, foreign businesspeople, local citizens, local 
foreign residents-provides some balance, and therefore, confidence in the results. 
Lamsdorff continues, arguing that the data correlates well together and that concerns that the 
CPI would become self-reinforcing as bad scores, for example, encourage respondents to 
give bad scores have proven, via statistical examination, to be unfounded. 
What is needed is a method of leveraging the observations by identifying, isolating, 
and measuring the relatively larger and longer lasting changes. The second reason for the 
under usage of this data is that it simply hasn't been around that long. But after ten-plus years 
of data collection, it is not at all unreasonable to assume that many of the changes suggested 
in this data are in fact real. With this in mind, in Chapter 3 I will introduce my quantitative 
method for distinguishing change over time. Transparency International has been estimating 
and ranking countries according to their perceived levels of corruption since 1995. As such, 
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the rankings are both global and domestic in scope. They can be of use (in theory and 
assuming their validity) as informative data for both individual countries and regionally and 
globally as well. 
These rankings are not without their own controversy. The biggest concerns the 
inherent limitations of measuring perception, which to many involves excessive subjectivity. 
Measuring perceptions, to many, seems prone to errors caused by the political, economic, 
and social differences between nations and the unscientific, subjective interests of individual 
perceptions. 
The CPI data has been used in a variety of research. Hisamatsu has used it to examine 
the relationship between corruption and foreign demand5; Sakar and Hassan have used the 
CPI in their investigation of links between corruption and investment efficiency6; Habib and 
Zurawicki have employed the CPI to test the relationship between FDI and corruption7; as 
have Robertson and Watson.8 
However, there has been little research into changes within the rankings through time. 
This is for two reasons. First, and most importantly here, Transparency International 
themselves have warned against cross-year comparisons of the data.9 Because of the 
changing nature of the TI's methodological approach, there is much volatility between years 
that is likely not attributable to any real change in corruption perceptions. And a quick 
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perusal of the rankings through the years seems to indicate just that-larger jumps back and 
forth are more likely in the early years. This makes sense: Transparency International's data 
and methods have become more stable and sound. This is best evidenced in the dramatic 
increase in the number of surveys undertaken per country. TI has cautioned strongly against 
making conclusions regarding their data through time.10 However, as Lambsdorff notes, 
larger changes that occur over longer periods of time-as opposed to changes literally from 
year to year-are more likely valid.11 
QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Before launching into the empirical study, it might be useful to first have a look at the 
data on a surface-level basis, which yields interesting, intriguing results. Several nations 
gained or lost at least one full point. Belarus, Namibia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe 
each lost more than one point and it is immediately interesting to note that two of these 
nations-Belarus and Zimbabwe-are arguably cult-of-personality dictatorships. Belgium and 
Uruguay each gained more than one point while Colombia, Japan, and Latvia each gained 
between .75 and .99. Of course, it is difficult to say with any confidence what it means to 
gain a full point (more on this below.) More modestly, there were 8 countries that gained 
between .5 and .74 and another 6 that lost a corresponding amount. It is interesting to note 
that some of the starkest increases occurred in relatively uncorrupt nations, such as Belgium 
and Japan. 
At first glance, it appears that the relatively uncorrupt nations have had an easier time 
implementing successful anti-corruption reforms. Out of 12 gainers, 3 of them are decidedly 
10
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developed-Japan, South Korea and Belgium; none of the decliners are developed. This is 
deceptively impressive for a couple reasons. First, there are not nearly as many relatively 
non-corrupt countries as corrupt. Second, non-corrupt countries have less room for 
improvement so significant jumps should, everything else equal, be fewer. Given their 
presumed superior institutional capabilities, this should come as no surprise. When we take 
out the relatively non-corrupt nations (defined here as those above 6.0 in the first observed 
year), we get the following results, shown in Table 1: 
Table 1. Countries on the move 
Countries on the 
Move 
Improving countries 
Declining countries 
0.35-0.74 (+/-) 
South Korea (.66) 
Slovak Republic (.62) 
Tanzania (.62) 
Slovenia (.52) 
Estonia (.50) 
Jordan (.5) 
Armenia (.48) 
Bulgaria (.48) 
Cameroon (.42) 
Nigeria (.40) 
Paraguay (.39) 
Thailand (.36) 
Lithuania (.36) 
Cote d'lvoire 
(-0.64) 
Morocco (-.57) 
Zambia. (-.54) 
Philippines (-.52) 
Poland (-.52) 
Argentina (-.44) 
Guatemala (-.40) 
0.75-0.99 (+/-) 
Latvia (.98) 
Bangladesh (.9) 
Colombia (.78) 
Japan (.78) 
Ethiopia (-.99) 
Malawi (-.92) 
Peru (-0.8) 
1.0O(+/-) 
Uruguay (1.41) 
Belgium (1.18) 
Trinidad and Tobago 
(-1.26) 
Belarus (-1.12) 
Namibia (-1.08) 
Zimbabwe (-1.04) 
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On the surface, this is an interesting list. There are nineteen gainers and fourteen 
decliners. The distribution appears reasonable on the surface: There are 13 modestly 
improved countries, four moderately improved countries and just two highly improved 
countries. Six European nations make the list. Tanzania, Nigeria and Cameroon represent the 
only African nations to have improved under the above conditions and all only modestly. 
There are seven modestly lowered countries, three moderately lowered countries, and four 
highly lowered countries. Predictably yet depressingly, seven of these fourteen are African. 
OPERATIONALIZING THE LAUNDRY LIST 
I have identified 8 variables that are common items in corruption reform laundry lists. 
The next step in conducting a statistical examination of the CPI was to operationalize the 
Laundry List items. I found that data was not readily available for every individual laundry 
list item but was available for broader thematic categories. This is one way in which the 
quantitative approach in this case is inherently limited, thereby necessitating a more in-depth 
qualitative examination. Accordingly, I relied instead on these broad data categories, such as 
'rule of law.' Below I briefly discuss the data and variables I chose to examine. 
With 'rule of law' I am making the rather obvious assumption that individual laundry 
list items-such as police force, civil service reform and judicial strengthening-are more 
granular items of an overall rule of law approach. This variable was included for obvious 
reasons. Effective, robust rule of law institutions are almost universally understood to be one 
of, if not the, most important planks of the anti-corruption platform. This data was obtained 
from the World Bank Governance Survey. 
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EU entrant: This appeared to be a good test of a specific type of conditionality in part 
because on the surface this appeared to be a successful group. Of the 10 countries, only 
Poland declined significantly (Hungary had a smaller decline of-.18). And even they have 
improved significantly over the last two years. But, of course, statistical significance is 
another matter with only 10 observations. EU entrants of the last two rounds have been 
required to implement significant anti-corruption reforms as a prerequisite for acceptance. I 
limited these to countries in the two rounds of accession (2004 and 2007) that took place 
within the time period studied, but, significantly, after it had begun. This would allow for a 
necessary time lag for the carrots and sticks of the EU entrance process to be known and 
attempted. 
International Aid: This was included to test the role of external actors in a very 
general sense-does aid work? In some ways, it might even be said to be a test of 
institutionalism in that international aid programs over the last ten years have been largely 
designed to affect institutions. This of course is just guess work but finding that international 
aid is correlated with corruption reform success would be an indication that institutional 
reforms of some sort might be working as planned. And it would be a good jumping off point 
for testing conditionality as well. The amount of international aid data was obtained from the 
World Bank.13 
For economic freedom I used data from the Heritage Foundation for the years 1998 
and 2008 to measure change over my time period.14 This is a very general category that, like 
international aid, might indicate the need for more robust analysis given a correlation one 
way or the other. 
13
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For political freedom, I used data from Freedom House for the same two years. 
Freedom House.15 As with the previous two variables, we are not expecting here any 
conclusive findings but rather indications of whether or not we should be digging further. 
RESULTS 
The results of this multivariate regression are fairly shockingly inconclusive and, 
therefore, strongly supportive of the Reverse Karenina argument. In short, what we learn 
from this is how much we have yet to learn. First and foremost, our variables explain next to 
nothing of the variance. The R Square was .122 and the Adjusted R Square was a trifling 
.037. This is a surprisingly low result given the fact that reliable data representing a number 
of items from the Corruption Consensus were available; it is also strong early support of my 
Reverse Karenina argument. As can be seen in Table 2, only EU Entrant was significant, 
with a T score of 2.588 and significance of .012. Thus we can say with some confidence that 
the most recent EU entrants were relatively successful in reforming corruption in the time 
period under consideration. Of course, we cannot assume causation but a strong case can be 
made that the specific conditionality conditions imposed by the EU in general made an 
important, positive contribution. The results are summarized in Table 2. 
15Freedom House data. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw081aunch/FIW08Tables.pdf> 
and <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAHScores.xls> (accessed October 21, 2008). 
63 
Table 2. Regression results 
Model 
Constant 
GDP per 
Capita 
Democratic 
Freedoms 
International 
Aid per capita 
Economic 
Freedom 
Rule of Law 
EU Entrant 
B 
— 
5.081E-6 
.011 
.001 
.010 
-.273 
.603 
Std. Error 
-.849 
.000 
.059 
.003 
.009 
.171 
.233 
Beta 
.640 
.019 
.033 
.072 
.183 
-.305 
.409 
T-score 
-1.328 
.111 
.191 
.547 
1.135 
-1.597 
2.588 
Significance 
.189 
.912 
.849 
.586 
.261 
.115 
.012 
Other than EU entrance, however, nothing was significant. In fact, nothing really was 
even close. And the adjusted R Square was a mere .036, meaning we have accounted for 
essentially none of the difference between nations. It appears from these results that 
democratic and economic freedoms, GDP per capita, the amount of international aid 
received, and even governance have not had any influence on the relative recent success in 
corruption reform programs among highly corrupt nations as a whole. This suggests that the 
answers to these questions will be in the details, necessitating a detailed qualitative approach 
may be necessary. 
It might be helpful here, given this statistical significance and the small number of 
cases, to take a quick look at the details. The twelve nations that entered the EU in 2004 and 
2007 were the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta (2004); and Romania and Bulgaria (2007). Of these, only Malta and 
Cyprus did not make the final cut down of 77 countries. Of these ten, eight had positive 
deltas: Czech Republic (.18), Romania (.18), Lithuania (.36), Bulgaria (.48), Estonia (.5), 
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Slovenia (.52), Slovakia (.62), and Latvia (.98). Only Hungary (-.16) and Poland (-.52) 
dropped. 
There is good news and bad news here. The good news is that, arguably, 
conditionality in this case worked, providing some reason for optimism for future corruption 
reform efforts. The bad news is that this type of conditionality might involve enough unique 
circumstances as to make transferability overly problematic. This remains to be seen. Perhaps 
strict conditionality in general will tend to be more successful than an absence of strict 
conditionality-this is one of the reasons I have included this as one of my independent 
variables. Finally, to the extent that EU entrants have been relatively successful at reforming 
corruption, why is this? Was it something particular to entrance and therefore, presumably, 
not transferable, or was there something generally applicable about the process that would be 
transferable, at least in theory? Or are we left to advise all non-European, highly corrupt 
nations seeking to reform themselves to move to Europe? 
Summary of quantitative results 
This examination has shed some limited light on this murky issue of success and 
failure vis-a-vis corruption reform. The data suggests that EU entrants were much more 
likely to improve than non-EU entrants. This should not be surprising to anyone familiar with 
the anti-corruption requirements for the new entrants of 2004 and especially 2007. It is 
probably not too presumptuous to argue that this strict entrance conditionality had something 
to do with these nations' apparent relative success in lowering corruption levels. How to 
duplicate this conditionality outside of these seemingly one-off conditions and how to 
continue the incentive structure now that entrance has been achieved are two remaining 
puzzles to be dealt with by policy makers and scholars from here out. 
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Unanswered questions and the next step 
What does it mean to improve in these rankings? From this limited statistical 
examination it is well nigh impossible to say. There appears on the surface to have been 
significant volatility but this examination has revealed very little in terms of correlation. 
European entrants appear to have fared better than non-European entrants and that is just 
about all. We can see from this, then, that beyond European entrants, there is some 
preliminary large-N evidence for my hypothesis. But this is has been a very limited study that 
has served to indicate the need for a finer-grain approach. 
It is time, then, to move on to the extensive qualitative test of my hypothesis, which is 
that there is no qualitative evidence at the paired case level to explain variation in corruption 
reform success. In other words, if this hypothesis is true, we will not be able to generalize 
from these results to highly corrupt nations. If it were not, we would expect to find results 
confirming that the relatively successful countries implemented enough items from the 
Laundry List well enough to improve and vice versa for the relatively unsuccessful countries. 
And we should be able to glean which independent variables were most important. This 
brings us back to the proposed reversal of Anna Karenina-aW. corrupt nations are corrupt for 
the same reasons; all non-corrupt nations are non-corrupt in their own ways. This is the 
expectation of this research. But in order to reach any conclusions at all with any confidence, 
we must begin by carefully setting up our case study. 
CASE STUDY SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Paired cases as the focus of this dissertation were chosen for a few reasons. First, my 
initial large-N analysis of TFs CPI data reveals no clearly decisive factors from the Laundry 
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List, a more detailed, qualitative examination as a way of confirming these initial results. 
Performing a comparative study became the obvious next step. As Lipjhardt has argued, 
comparative case studies, while not ideal, are certainly on many occasions the best available 
choice in the social sciences.16 More importantly as evidence of the novelty of this 
dissertation is Lijphart's scale under which paired cases are rated as more desirable than 
single-country cases, due to the ability to actually compare countries and draw general 
conclusions. And done with care, qualitative studies can be just as scientifically valid as 
quantitative studies.17 Furthermore, paired cases offered the best method of limiting to the 
greatest extent feasible the number of competing independent variables, especially, in this 
case, those having to do with culture and development. 
The data was divided into two five-year periods: 1998-2002 and 2003 to 2007.18 
While TI has been measuring corruption perceptions since 1995, there is a big jump in 
apparent reliability from 1998 on. In the earliest years, there were many fewer nations tested 
and much more volatility in the data, suggesting that measurement capabilities increased over 
time as TI gained legitimacy and experience. These five-year periods were averaged, 
resulting in the Early Corruption Average (ECA) and Later Corruption Average (LCA). I did 
this to reduce some of the early-year volatility. In order to be included, a nation had to have 
at least two years of data per five-year period. Since what I am concerned with is corruption 
reform in relatively corrupt nations, I excluded all countries with an ECA of higher than 6.0. 
This was done to weed out the relatively non-corrupt countries. 6.0 was chosen as the 
dividing line because it appeared on the surface that countries higher than 6.0 had a tendency 
16
 Arendt Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political 
Science Review 65, no. 3, 682-693. 
17
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
18
 See Appendix G. 
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to not fall back. While this meant that a couple decidedly developed countries (Japan and 
Belgium) it allowed for the inclusion of several countries in a more hazardous stage, vis-a-vis 
development (such as the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, etc.) This left me with 71 nations for 
the large-N examination. The EC A was then subtracted from the LC A, which resulted in the 
Delta. This delta represents the dependent variable. 
Having already eliminated countries with fewer than 2 observations per period and all 
countries with beginning corruption scores of above 6.0,1 applied a few more criteria. First, 
there had to have been a delta of, plus or minus, at least .35. This eliminated most countries 
but left enough remaining as to be able to make a selection. After applying my requirements 
to the 71 countries, I was left with 33 countries -with 19 gainers and 14 decliners (see Table 
1). 
To this remaining pool I applied the following guidelines. First, they had to be 
geographically similar. This was a big factor in eliminating Trinidad and Tobago from 
consideration with its continental neighbors. This also eliminated Jordan, Bangladesh, and 
South Korea; though they are all Asian, they were mostly from clearly different parts of Asia 
and had no corresponding partners in their respective regions. This also led me to choose 
Malawi over Morocco, Cote d'lvoire, Namibia and Ethiopia as partners for Tanzania. 
Next, I eliminated Japan and Belgium as I'm interested in comparing non-developed 
countries for reasons described above and Japan and Belgium are clearly developed nations. 
This was also a factor in eliminating South Korea. Third, the countries must be as 
comparable as possible other than geographically. I wanted in particular similar jumping off 
points culturally and developmentally and I wanted similar beginning CPI scores. This 
helped eliminate Uruguay in favor of Colombia as a partner to Peru. 
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Next, I resolved the bigger the change the better, which was a factor in choosing 
Malawi over Cote d'lvoire, for example. Finally, I wanted to avoid choosing easy cases, 
which were clearly idiosyncratic on the surface. This helped me eliminate Belarus and 
Zimbabwe; while the no doubt large, negative influence of Mugabe on Zimbabwean 
corruption reform would be useful for many reasons to research, its unique nature would 
confirm my hypothesis on the surface. Finally, an added benefit of my selections was that 
they were all observed in every year between 1998 and 2007. 
The particular pairs were chosen carefully. Each pair was selected based on 
having a strong distinction in terms of the dependent variable, i.e., recent change in 
corruption scores. It was deemed imperative that each pair would have one 'gainer' and one 
'decliner', and the gainer would not have a higher EC A (or any other obvious built-in 
advantages.) Additionally, these scores should be relatively low-no countries with CPI 
rankings of higher than 6.0 were considered. I assume here that corruption reform is much 
more difficult in highly corrupt countries.19 Secondly, each pair needed geographic and 
cultural similarity. And, third, each pair should be close to each other in terms of 
development, with no truly developed countries eligible. Much of corruption reform requires 
institutional change and developed nations have, almost by definition, a great advantage in 
this respect. 
As can be seen from Table 3, Colombia's beginning average was significantly worse 
than Peru's: 3.06 and 4.3, respectively. Colombia improved to 3.84 while Peru dropped to 
3.5, providing a distinct difference in terms of the dependant variable: clearly Colombia has 
19
 Robert Klitgaard, "Leadership under Systemic Corruption," Presentation to the six Mekong 
Delta countries a summit meeting in Vientiane, Laos, December 2004. 
<http://www.cgu.edu/include/Leadership_Under_System_Corruption_12-04.pdf> (accessed October 20, 
2008). 
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improved while Peru has declined. Peru and Colombia are otherwise comparable. Peru and 
Colombia are both South American, Spanish-speaking nations with similarly turbulent 
historical paths. Peru has in its recent history the violence of the Shining Path and the 
turbulence and oppressiveness of the Fujimori era. Colombia has drug trade-related violence 
and the ongoing civil war, especially against the FARC. Developmental^, they are similarly 
underdeveloped. Colombia's 1998 GDP per capita was $2088 while Peru's was $2043-
essentially the same. It will be interesting to see why, with such otherwise similar countries, 
one was so clearly more successful in reducing corruption than the other. 
Tanzania and Malawi provide another clean paired case. Tanzania had an EGA of 
2.24 while Malawi's was 3.68. While this seems like a significant difference, the lower 
ranking country, Tanzania, is the improving case, which reduces the possibility that they 
strengthened due to their beginning anti-corruption capabilities. Tanzania's GDP per capita is 
$251 while that of Malawi $153, putting them both very near the bottom of the development 
ladder. 
Thailand and the Philippines are mostly 'clean.' Thailand's ECA is 3.16 while the 
Philippines' is 3.14, giving them almost identical starting points. The former has a per capita 
GDP of $1,862 while the latter's is $945. It is true, then, that Thailand's per capita GDP is 
reasonably higher than that of the Philippines and Thailand's improvement is the most 
modest of all six countries. 
WHAT WAS LEFT OUT 
I have tried to take a global approach to this project. Latin America, Africa and Southeast 
Asia are represented in the paired cases. An examination of Latin American cases may teach 
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us something about how to avoid the pitfalls of deeply entrenched clientelistic networks, 
among other things. In Africa, we will have a chance to look at what is possible in very 
deeply corrupt and underdeveloped nations. And in Southeast Asia we can look at a different 
region that is perhaps underdeveloped and corrupt for different reasons than Latin America. 
In Table 3 below we see the range of cases under scrutiny. In terms of corruption, all 
six countries have ECAs between 2.24 and 4.3, which is the range I am most interested in. 
And it's a broadly indicative range-almost half of all ranked countries scored within this 
on 
range in the most recent rankings. Scoring lower than this makes improvement, ironically, 
relatively likely since countries have (almost) nowhere to go but up-the lessons of how to 
move from implausibly to plausibly corrupt may not be very broadly transferable. Scoring 
higher than 4.3 increases the chances a country will already have some or even much of the 
prerequisite capabilities of successful corruption reform. This dissertation is most interested 
in how those capabilities are built from scratch. Thailand and the Philippines and Peru and 
Colombia are similar to each other in terms of development-they would all certainly qualify 
as 'underdeveloped' but not desperately so. As such, they are very typically underdeveloped. 
In contrast, Tanzania and Malawi, to put it bluntly, are typical Sub-Saharan basketcases. 
They are among the poorest of the poor and therefore should prove useful as examples of 
how (not) to go about corruption reform in the most dire of circumstances. 
Transparency International 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, 
<http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table> (accessed January 21, 
2009). 
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Table 3. Case comparison 
Country 
Tanzania 
Malawi 
Colombia 
Peru 
Thailand 
Philippines 
ECA 
2.24 
3.68 
3.06 
4.3 
3.16 
3.04 
LCA 
2.86 
2.76 
3.84 
3.5 
3.52 
2.52 
Delta 
0.62 
-0.92 
0.78 
-0.8 
0.36 
-.52 
1998 GDP Per 
Capita21 
$251 
$153 
$2088 
$2043 
$1862 
$945 
As can be seen from Table 4, the system I have used to calculate change may actually 
be underestimating any real change for some of my cases. The paired cases of Tanzania and 
Malawi, in particular, stand out as an example of this. Tanzania's delta is 0.62 while 
Malawi's is -0.92. This is a considerable difference. But looking at the year-to-year data we 
can see the real change may actually be quite linear. In 1998, Tanzania scored a 1.9 but in 
2007 they scored at 3.2, a difference of a full 1.3 points. They declined from year to year 
only twice—between 2000 and 2001 and then again from 2002 to 2003. Every other year they 
stayed the same or improved. Malawi's situation was reversed. In 1998 they scored a 
respectable 4.1 but in 2007 were down to 2.7, a drop of-1.4. Malawi never improved from 
year to year. 
21
 Anonymous. NationMaster.com Economy Statistics > GDP > constant 2000 US$ (per capita) 
(1998) by country. < http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_con_2000_us_percap-constant-2000-
us-per-capita&date=1998> (accessed March 18, 2009). 
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Thailand scored 3.16 in 1998 but 3.52 in 2007, a modest change of 0.36 points. This 
was, frankly, a borderline case. One reason I chose Thailand, in the end, was its trendline in 
combination with the fact that its 2008 score rose again to 3.5. The Philippines started off 
rather high in the mid-3 s, dropped quickly into the high 2s and then settled into the mid-2s. 
Colombia went from 2.2 in 1998 to 3.06 in 2007, a change of .86, which is quite close to 
their delta of 0.78. Peru dropped from 4.5 in 1998 to 3.5 in 2007. It remains to be seen of 
course to what extent these trends will continue or reverse themselves. It is important to keep 
in mind the reservations expressed above about the assumptions of my model. However, it 
seems reasonable to conclude from the data in this table that the countries assumed to have 
improved have indeed improved and vice versa. 
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Table 4. Case study CPI scores 
Country 
Tanzania 
Malawi 
Thailand 
Country 
Philippin 
Colombi; 
Peru 
CPI 
98 
1.9 
4.1 
3.0 
CPI 
98 
3.5 
2.2 
4.5 
CPI 
99 
1.9 
4.1 
3.2 
CPI 
99 
3.6 
2.9 
4.5 
CPI 
00 
2.5 
4.1 
3.2 
CPI 
00 
2.8 
3.2 
4.4 
CPI 
01 
2.2 
3.2 
3.2 
CPI 
01 
2.9 
3.8 
4.1 
CPI 
02 
2.7 
2.9 
3.2 
CPI 
02 
2.6 
3.6 
4 
CPI 
03 
2.5 
2.8 
3.3 
CPI 
03 
2.5 
3.7 
3.7 
CPI 
04 
2.8 
2.8 
3.6 
CPI 
04 
2.6 
3.8 
3.5 
CPI 
05 
2.9 
2.8 
3.8 
CPI 
05 
2.5 
4 
3.5 
CPI 
06 
2.9 
2.7 
3.6 
CPI 
06 
2.5 
3.9 
3.3 
CPI 
07 
3.2 
2.7 
3.3 
CPI 
07 
2.5 
3.8 
3.5 
98-02 
avg 
2.24 
3.68 
3.16 
98-02 
avg 
3.04 
3.06 
4.3 
03-07 
avg 
2.86 
2.76 
3.52 
03-07 
avg 
2.52 
3.84 
3.5 
delta 
0.62 
0.92 
0.36 
delta 
-.52 
0.78 
-0.8 
Independent variable explanation 
Again, my eight independent variables are civil service reform, media freedom, civil society, 
judicial capabilities, national anti-corruption organizations, political leadership, openness to 
trade, and external influence. 
With all of these variables, one paramount aspect will be in making sure not to 
confuse cause and effect. We must keep in mind that we are not testing the original national 
capabilities (i.e., those of 1998), but rather increased capabilities. We are looking very 
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specifically and exclusively at implemented laundry list items to avoid confusing pre-existing 
institutional capabilities with freshly instituted institutional capabilities. 
WHAT SHOULD WE BE LOOKING FOR? 
There is one remaining item to be addressed before moving on to our case studies: 
What exactly are we looking for and what do we expect to find in the successful countries? 
Consistent with my argument, the unsuccessful cases should not yield too many surprises-we 
know all too well what failed corruption reform looks like so I do not expect too many 
surprises. In short, we should not expect to find large-scale transparently successful 
programs. I have made a conscious decision to move from the seemingly hopeless attempt to 
find high-level, lasting success, a la Hong Kong and Singapore, to a more achievable target 
of modest and fragile success. I think I have found several cases that meet these criteria. That 
is the good news. The bad news is this type of limited change taking place in highly corrupt 
countries will likely look on the surface at least largely unsuccessful. And, as Adut has 
persuasively argued about the not-so-modest case of France, even clearly successful reform 
can be mistaken for just more of the same, the closer we are to the events. 
So, successful corruption reform can look very unsuccessful at first and on the 
surface. Perhaps this means we need to be skeptical of the skeptics. Certainly there is always 
a risk that, especially in highly corrupt countries with systemic corruption, any particular 
piece of corruption reform could quickly and thoroughly run aground. This has happened 
time and time again. But there is an opposite danger that is just as real of over-assuming 
failure; combine this with the tendency, as described so vividly by Adut, for successful 
corruption reform to look so ineffective due to increased transparency, and we might just as 
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quickly expect for any limited but real successes to get overlooked or downplayed due to our 
understandable but perhaps overstated skepticism. 
TRAITS OF SUCCESSFUL CORRUPTION REFORM 
Generally, I will be looking for several different traits when analyzing the available evidence. 
I consider these traits general in that they should broadly apply across variables. To the 
extent that a piece of reform contains these traits, it will be deemed successful: items that 
encourage transparency, institutional independence, accountability, the rule of law, 
efficiency, and the creation of new reforms or improvements to existing reforms. 
SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY CHARACTERISTICS 
Taking a more granular approach, I expect each independent variable to have some specific 
characteristics that are not applicable to some or even the rest of the variables. For example, 
we would not necessarily expect civil service reform to lead clearly and directly to an 
increase in successful prosecutions; however, this is exactly the type of evidence we should 
be looking for injudicial reform. Even more clearly, openness to trade and external influence 
should have mutually exclusive and unique characteristics that are wholly inapplicable to my 
other variables. This type of granular approach will be necessary when diving into the weeds 
of the corruption reform programs themselves. Table 5 contains a list of my eight 
independent variables and the specific categories of evidence I am expecting to find. 
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Table 5. Independent variable characteristics 
Independent 
Variable 
Nat'l Anti-
Corruption 
Organization 
Civil Service 
Reform 
Media Freedom 
Civil Society 
Judicial 
Capabilities 
Political 
Leadership 
Openness to Trade 
External Influence 
Specific Evidentiary Characteristics 
Creation or revision of agency; increase in prosecutions 
Pay increases; staff reductions; efficiency increases 
Restrictions lifted; laws passed or rescinded; increase in coverage 
Iincrease in number, size, activity or effectiveness of groups or 
individuals; public education programs 
Passage of laws to increase capabilities; increase in successful 
prosecutions 
Effective, stubborn, persuasive 
Statistical increases in trade primarily; clear qualitative evidence 
secondarily 
Evidence of change in policy due to external conditions 
The scoring will work as follows and is captured in Table 6. First, each country will 
receive a score of -3 to 3 in each category, with -3 indicating clear and significant regression 
and 3 indicating clear and significant progress. Ideally, reforms will also be broad, deep and 
durable but I am not expecting perfection. A variable will be rated 2 if the evidence is 
probable and modest. A variable will be rated a 1 if the evidence is in doubt and minor. I will 
give a variable a 0 rating if the evidence is neutral, murky or mixed; if the overall evaluation 
is closer to a wash than otherwise. A -1 will be given if the evidence of failure is in doubt and 
minor. A variable will be rated -2 if the evidence of failure is probable and modest. And I 
will rate a variable -3 if the evidence of failure is clear and significant. Finally, the losing 
score will be subtracted from the winning score. If, for example, Tanzania is rated a 'perfect' 
3 in civil service reform, and Malawi gets a -3, then the total score for that variable for that 
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paired case will be 6. If however, for whatever reason, Malawi scores a 3 and Tanzania 
scores a -3, then that variable score for that paired case will be -6. 
Table 6. Independent variable rating explanation 
Rating 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
Meaning 
Improvement in IV clear and significant 
Improvement in IV probable and modest 
Improvement in IV minor and in dispute 
Either no clear evidence of movement one 
way or the other or clear evidence of no 
movement 
Decrease in IV minor and in dispute 
Decrease in IV probable but not large 
Decrease in IV clear and significant 
This negative rating, of course, does not imply that reforms involving civil service reform, to 
use the above example, have a negative effect on corruption reform but rather that they may 
be ineffective, everything else equal. It should be kept in mind that most corruption reform 
efforts in highly corrupt nations are, more or less, doomed to failure. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have introduced and conducted a limited statistical analysis of Transparency 
International's CPI. The aim of this examination was to conduct a limited large-N 
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quantitative test of my hypothesis, which was successful as the only independent variable 
tested was found to be significant was EU entrance. I then introduced and explained the set 
up for my three paired cases, which I will use to test my hypothesis using a more detailed and 
thorough qualitative paired case study. From there I explained what type of general and 
specific evidence I am looking for and how this evidence will be scored and compared. I will 
now turn in Chapter 4 to the first of my paired cases, Tanzania and Malawi. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TANZANIA AND MALAWI 
INTRODUCTION 
The first of my paired cases-Tanzania and Malawi-provides strong support for 
my hypothesis. The story begins and ends with the importance of political leadership, 
which is the only variable in my study that is idiosyncratic by definition. Again and 
again, as I dug deeper and deeper into the details of these two countries, Tanzania's 
success and Malawi's failure proved to be significantly, and at times overwhelmingly, a 
function of political leadership. And again and again several items on the universal 
laundry list turned out to be unimportant; in fact, some of the variables appeared to be 
negatively correlated with success. 
In this chapter I will present the research regarding the first of my three paired 
cases-Tanzania and Malawi. I will first present the Tanzanian case. I will begin with a 
brief summary of the relevant history of Tanzania prior to the period of study. Then I will 
list and briefly introduce, define, and concisely describe the various relevant programs. 
Then I will present my analysis for each of the eight independent variables. Next I will 
conduct the same step-by-step presentation for Malawi. Finally, I will summarize and 
compare these results and make concluding comparative remarks. 
TANZANIA: RELEVANT HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
It is established that Tanzania had one of the most controlled state economies 
under the rule of Julius Nyerere (1964-1985). During his rule, much of the economy was 
under state control. Tanzania has spent a lot of time and effort liberalizing its economy 
since then but it had a very long way to go. No doubt relatedly, it had an enormous 
problem with corruption. It should not come as a surprise, then, that much of Tanzania's 
anti-corruption efforts have been in the civil service reform category. Since the 
replacement of the Nyerere regime with a capitalist democratic system, Tanzania has 
rapidly liberalized its economy and became a relatively stable democracy. Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi was elected after Nyerere and ruled for ten years to 1995. Benjamin Mkapa was 
elected and ruled from 1995-2005. Jakaya Kikwete won election in 2005 and is the 
current president. Since 1977 every President has been a member of the Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi party (CCM). 
RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
Tanzania's relative success is fundamentally due to political leadership, 
particularly that of former president Mkapa and current president Kikwete. I have 
identified 18 programs and incidents relevant to this analysis. Because there are so many 
items to be examined here, many of which are relevant to multiple variables, I have 
aggregated them into Appendix A. For each program I have included the variables 
affected. In this section are descriptions of six of the most prominent and indicative 
projects-the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, the Warioba 
Commission and Report, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
(NACSAP), the Prevention of Corruption Bureau/ Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCB/PCCB), the Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA), and the 
Tanzania Commercial Court (TCC). These descriptions accurately reflect the 
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idiosyncratic plotline of Tanzania's relative success: strong but imperfect leadership 
begat modest and fragile but still important institutional reforms. 
Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact 
According to its website, 
"Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a United States 
Government corporation designed to work with some of the poorest countries in 
the world. Established in January 2004, MCC is based on the principle that aid is 
most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and 
investments in people. MCC's mission is to reduce global poverty through the 
promotion of sustainable economic growth. Before a country can become eligible 
to receive assistance, MCC looks at their performance on independent and 
transparent policy indicators. MCC selects eligible countries for Compact 
Assistance. Countries that have demonstrated significant improvement in policy 
indicators but do not yet qualify for a Compact grant may be eligible for 
Threshold Program assistance."1 
The MCC, then, is a US program begun during the presidency of George W. Bush 
designed to recognize, encourage, reward and build upon institutional capabilities. While 
this is a great example of external influence, it is too early to judge the results of the 
MCC; rather, I am using to what extent a country has managed to satisfy the MCC's rigid 
criteria as indication of progress in the IVs examined here and applicable to the MCC. 
Tanzania became eligible for consideration in fiscal year 2006, has signed the threshold 
agreement and has signed the compact. In fact, Tanzania is the largest recipient of MCC 
funds, at just under $800 million. This means that, in the relatively short period involved, 
Tanzania has been successful at fulfilling the MCC-mandated obligations. In fact, the 
MCC credits Tanzania with being the only candidate country to have improved its 
governance capabilities in 3 separate categories.2 Based on the criteria established by the 
1
 Millenium Challenge Corporation homepage. < http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php> (accessed 
February 15, 2009). 
2
 Millenium Challenge Corporation, "Tanzania Threshold Program." 
<http://www.mcc.gov/countries/tanzania/threshold.php> (accessed February 22,2009). 
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MCC, this item involves the Political Leadership, Judicial Reform, National Anti-
Corruption Agencies, Civil Society, Media Freedom, and Open Trade independent 
variables. 
Warioba Commission and Report 
Ultimately, Tanzania's improvement can be traced back to the Warioba 
Commission. This was the first major act of President Mkapa upon taking office, having 
won election in large part due to strong anti-corruption stances; many of Tanzania's 
corruption reform efforts were born from this commission. In January 1996, President 
Mkapa appointed the 'Anti-Corruption Commission', later renamed the Warioba 
Commission, after its head, the former Prime Minister and first Vice President. This 
Commission's anti-corruption mandate, conclusions, and recommendations were broad, 
bold and deep. Several of the items studied here were created directly from the Warioba 
Report, which was issued in December 1996.4 The Commission was the first sign that 
Mkapa's anti-corruption stance was not just politically motivated. It is clearly true from 
existing scholarship that most of Tanzania corruption reform in recent years would not 
have happened without Mkapa's strong leadership regarding and commitment to 
enactment of the prescriptive findings of the Warioba report. 
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy And Action Plan (NACSAP) 
The NACSAP was the biggest outcome of the Warioba Commission. It lists and 
discusses seven priorities: rule of law and legal framework; financial discipline and 
management; procurement; public education, awareness and sensitization of rights; 
3
 Stephen P. Riley, "Western Policies and African Realities: The New Anti-Corruption Agenda," 
in Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Case Studies, ed. Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., and 
Bornwell C. Chikulo (New York: Palgrave, 2000) 152. 
4
 Ibid. 
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public service reform; whistle blowers and witness protection; and media.5 It is a bold, 
complex plan, designed to broadly address economic, political, and social areas across 
Tanzania. Generally, the NACSAP focuses on fostering institutional changes and raising 
public awareness.6 Several programs were created as a direct response to NACSAP. Like 
the PSRP, NACSAP was linked with the Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP).7 
According to U4 and the World Bank, the Office of Controller and Auditor General 
(OCAG) was made more independent and strengthened as a result of NACSAP. It was 
the strong leadership of Mkapa that allowed for the creation and continued existence of 
NACSAP. While the creation and implementation of NACSAP have been impressive, 
results to date have been spotty and imperfect. Current president Kikwete has continued 
this strategy by mandating a revised version of NACSAP, NACSAP II, which was 
designed to address the limitations of the original and implemented in December 2006.9 
The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)/ Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Bureau (PCCB) 
While Mkapa did enact significant reforms on the PCB, the real story and 
relevance of this item lies in Kikwete's reorganization of the bureau into the PCCB. Here 
5
 Government of Tanzania, The National Anticorruption Strategy and Action Plan for Tanzania, 
(Dares Salaam, November, 1999). 
6
 Ibid, iv. 
7
 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Tanzania. 
http://www.humanrights.dk/intemational/geographical+regions/africa/countries/tanzania (accessed 
February 3,2009). 
8
 Alan Doig, David Watt, and Robert Williams, "Measuring 'Success' in Five African Anti-
Corruption Commissions - The Cases of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda & Zambia," U4 Anti-
Corruption Resource Centre, (May 2005) 71. <http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=100> 
(accessed March 20,2009); and World Bank, "Updated Project Information Document (PID)", Report No: 
AB1135. Undated. < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServerAVDSP/IB/2004/12/14/000104615_20040928093811/Rend 
ered/PDF/PID0P070544.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2009) 11. 
9
 United Nations Development Programme, "Strengthening Transparency, Integrity and the Rule 
of Law in Tanzania," (undated) 1-5. < http://www.tz.undp.org/docs/prodoc%20dg%20stir.pdf> (accessed 
March 26, 2009). 
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we can see both the promise and limits of leadership in a highly corrupt nation attempting 
reform. Originally called an 'Anti-Corruption Squad' when formed in 1975, the PCCB is 
one of the largest and most important anti-corruption programs in Tanzania. It is 
seemingly modeled after the Hong Kong model and designed to prevent, police and 
prosecute corruption. In 1991 it was renamed the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) 
and moved under the President's Office.10 In 2007, under Kikwete, it was reorganized 
and renamed the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB). It is a large 
bureaucracy with many sub-organizations and regional offices. It has multiple duties 
including raising public awareness, advising local and national government, investigating 
corruption cases and prosecuting them with the approval of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP).13 
It has been widely criticized as lacking independence due to this provision and the 
fact that it reports to the President and for being grossly under-resourced.14 Since 
Kikwete took over from Mkapa, the head of the PCCB, Edwin Hosea, has received a lot 
of attention and criticism; it is somewhat unclear whether this is indication of a job well 
or poorly done.15 Primarily, Hosea has been criticized heavily for not investigating 
10
 Doig, etal, 2005, 65. 
11
 Government of Tanzania, "Comments by Development Partners on Prevention and Combating 
of Corruption Bill 2007," Governance Working Group (March 27, 2007) 
<http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:qjwt8IeAkn0J:www.ambdaressalaam.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/F28D878 
C-AC71-4EC4-95A6-
055203417587/0/AntiCBillDPcomment.doc+Comments+by+Development+Partners+on+Prevention+and+ 
Combating+of+Corruption+Bill+2007,+Governance+Working+Group&cd=l&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> 
(accessed March 18,2009). 
12
 Doig, et al, 2005. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Doig, et al, 2005, 69-70. See also Sahr J. Kpundeh, "Corruption and Corruption Control," in 
ed. E. Gyimah-Boadi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004) 135. Kpundeh views the under-resourcing as 
more important than lack of independence from the President. 
15
 See for examples Levina Kato, "Tanzania: PCCB Boss Cornered over Graft Cases," The 
Citizen, September 24,2008. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200809250040.html> (accessed March 18, 
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Mkapa (on the seemingly technically accurate grounds that it is unconstitutional to 
investigate a former president), for his alleged involvement in improperly securing 
contracts for friends and associates.16 It should be reiterated here that in corruption 
reform, no news is bad news. But the allegations that Mkapa himself was corrupt are at 
once unsurprising and a telling indication of the inherent limitations of corruption reform 
in highly corrupt countries. Overall, however, Hosea's attention seems to have come in 
response to his aggressive pursuit of corrupt officials (under Kikwete's urging), rather 
than his neglect. 
The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 
With the TRA we have a clear view at both the promise of the institutional 
changes wrought by strong political leadership and the limits of the leadership. The TRA 
was implemented in 1996 by the government of Tanzania that was to, according to 
Fjeldstad, "limit direct political interference by the Ministry of Finance, and partly to free 
i n 
the tax administration from the constraints of the civil service system." It was a direct 
response to international pressure; much of Tanzania's external funding had been cut off 
and something like the TRA was explicitly required to get the funding tap turned back on. 
This focus on independence was itself designed to "pay rates above the civil service 
regulations to attract and retain quality staff, and to make dismissals easier. Moreover, the 
tax administration's senior management was replaced. It was assumed that these steps 
2009); and Rosemary Mirando,"Keep off Prof Mahalu, Court Orders PCCB,"IPP Media, October 18, 
2007. < http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/guardian/2007/10/18/100685.html> (accessed March 18, 2009). 
16
 See for example, Anonymous, "Fight against Corruption - Allegations," Tanzanian Affairs, Issue 89, 
Politics (January 1, 2008). < http://www.tzaffairs.org/2008/01/fight-against-corruption-allegations/> (accessed 
February 22,2009). 
17
 Odd- Helge Fjeldstad, "Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority," Public Administration and Development'23 (2003): 165. 
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would provide incentives for greater commitment and less corruption."18 Finally, the 
sales tax was replaced with a 20% Value Added Tax (VAT).19 We can see that, on the 
surface, this program was directly and importantly relevant to this study. On the other 
hand, the TRA has come under significant criticism of late as it was the awarding of a 
contract by TRA that is now alleged to have been arranged by former president Mkapa 
and at the center of the criticism of the PCB and Hosea.20 It began quite effectively but 
has tapered off as time has passed. 
The Commercial Division of the High Court of Tanzania, or Tanzania Commercial Court 
(TCC) 
With the TCC, we see in more detail the promise and limitations of institutional 
reform. According to Finnegan, this court was created "in 1999 with the express purpose 
of improving the efficiency and fairness of commercial dispute resolution in the country." 
This puts this reform clearly and squarely within the judicial reform category. The 
Tanzanian judicial system suffered from a typical set of problems common to 
underdeveloped and corrupt nations: lack of fairness, lack of transparency, slowness in 
adjudication, etc. The Commercial Court experiment was designed as a radical, if limited, 
experiment. The business community needed a way to solve disputes and certain 
members of the Tanzanian government and international donors were already familiar 
with and supportive of this as a potential solution. There are three important concepts in 
the design of the Court: financial rationality (designed to avoid bureaucratically derived 
18
 Fjeldstad. 
19
 Andrew E. Temu and Jean M. Due, "The Business Environment in Tanzania after Socialism: 
Challenges of Reforming Banks, Parastatals, Taxation and die Civil Service," The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 38, no. 4 (2000): 700. 
20
 See for example Anonymous, "Fight against Corruption - Allegations." 
21
 John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups (UK: 
Lexington Books, 2000), 201-223. 
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existing funding difficulties), selectivity and independence. In terms of funding 
rationality, revenues from the cases were easier to keep than normally, thereby avoiding 
otherwise inevitable funding problems that of the judicial system as a whole. In terms of 
selectivity, in order for a case to be considered, a high filing fee had to be paid and there 
had to be a relatively high amount of money involved in the dispute. In essence, the Court 
was seen as a way to streamline case loads down to a manageable level of financially 
important cases. And in terms of independence, the court was designed as a stand-alone 
institution.22 
However, the experiment was very narrowly developed. In recent email 
correspondence, Finnegan, who has written extensively on the TCC, confirmed that the 
Commercial Court remains efficient but with a narrow range. He states, 
"My sense is that Tanzania's Commercial Court is still relatively efficient in resolving 
cases. However, for jurisdictional or other reasons, the vast majority of commercial 
disputes litigated in the country are still filed in other courts-either the High Court's 
general division or in the lower Resident Magistrate or District Courts. This is one 
reason it is difficult to assess the impact the Commercial Court has had on 
commercial dispute resolution overall."23 
Russ concurs in that the scope of the experiment is quite narrow.24 
Rating scale 
As a reminder, the independent variable rating scale is shown below in Table 7. 
David Louis Finnegan, "Judicial Reform and Commercial Justice: The Experience of Tanzania's 
Commercial Court," Background paper for the World Development Report 2005, Draft (August 12,2004) 
<http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:UesYyZf8qIQJ:siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resourc 
es/finneganJudicial_reform.pdf+Russ+tanzania+commercial+court&cd=l&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> 
(accessed March 18,2009). 
23
 Email correspondence with author. 
24
 Hagar Russ, "Role of Judicial and Legal Sector Reforms in Business Environment Reform 
Programs: A Tanzanian Case Study." Not dated. 
<http://w^vw.busmessenvironment.org/dyn/be/besearch.details?p_phase_id=152&p_lang=en&p_phase_typ 
e_id=3> (accessed March 23,2009). 
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Table 7. Independent variable rating scale 
Rating 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
Meaning 
Improvement in IV clear and significant 
Improvement in IV probable and modest 
Improvement in IV minor and in dispute 
Either no clear evidence of movement one 
way or the other or clear evidence of no 
movement 
Decrease in IV minor and in dispute 
Decrease in IV probable but not large 
Decrease in IV clear and significant 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Political leadership 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant.' 
This one is clear-Tanzania's political leadership under both Mkapa and Kikwete was 
absolutely vital in its success. Not only did Mkapa talk the talk, he pretty consistently walked 
the walk vis-a-vis anti-corruption reform. Mkapa's leadership shows up early and often in 
evaluations of Tanzanian reform. While most to all reform programs need at least nominal 
presidential approval, be they internationally sourced or otherwise, several of the reform 
programs and improvements were a real, direct function of Mkapa's strong support, 
including the Warioba Commission, NACSAP, ATIP, Code of Ethics, and PCCB/PCB. 
Likewise, several of the over variables examined here and detailed below were positively 
89 
affected by his leadership as well. Mkapa was very active and successful early on in 
instituting civil service reductions.25 Mkapa and Kikwete both aggressively, if imperfectly 
and inconsistently, advanced corruption reform programs.26 The corruption allegations 
against Mkapa are a significant stain on this record and a continuing headache for Kikwete, 
who, upon taking office, responded by dissolving his cabinet.27 The recent allegations of 
corruption while in office are plausible and off-putting but not damning enough to undo the 
good that has been done, especially in light of Kikwete's perseverance in areas other than the 
Mkapa scandal. Additionally, the fact that Tanzania was able to successfully sign the MCC 
compact, speaks well to political leadership. Stevens and Teggemman argue that Tanzania's 
political leadership was clearly, actively supportive of administrative reform.28 While he 
could have been more effective and the recent high-level scandals point to how far Tanzania 
has to go in this area, I'm not sure how much more can be expected given Tanzania's pre-
existing capabilities. International development professionals have generally supported the 
efforts of Mkapa and Kikwete. 
Civil service reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
There are four aspects of civil service reform I am interested in here: reduction, 
25
 See Lydia Shekighenda, "MPs Endorse Revocation of TICTS Contract," IPP Media, April 26,2008. 
< http://www.ippmedia.eom/ipp/guardian/2008/04/26/l 13185.html> (accessed February 19,2009). 
26
 See for example United Nations Development Program, "Tanzania - Democratic Governance." 
<http://www.tz.undp.org/dg_proj_dg_intro.html> (accessed February 22, 2009). 
27
 U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Tanzania" (February 2009). 
<http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm> (accessed February 22, 2009). 
28
 Mike Stevens and Stefanie Teggemann, "Comparative Experience with Public Service Reform," 
in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons, ed. Brian Levy and Sahr 
Kpundeh (Washington D.C.: The World Bank Institute, 2004) 43-86. 
29
 See for examples S.J. Sitta, "Integrity Environment and Investment Promotion: The Case of 
Tanzania," Paper presented to the Alliance for Integrity - Government and Business Roles in Enhancing 
African Standards of Living conference (Addis Ababa, March 7-8, 2005). 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecoVl l/37/34571058.pdf> (accessed February 22, 2009); and Anonymous, 
"National Anti-Corruption Strategy in Tanzania," U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 
< http://www.u4.no/pdf?file=/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/queryl35.pdf> (accessed February 19,2009). 
efficiency, pay and governance. Overall, Tanzania has been able to significantly but not 
-in 
sufficiently reduce the number of civil servants. The evidence for effective pay 
increases suggests modest but real improvements.31 This is also true for efficiency. In 
governance, there have been some notable legal improvements but little to no evidence to 
date that this has had any positive effects. 
Kjaer argues that Tanzania was relatively successful at civil service reform 
compared to Uganda and Kenya. This success took place especially during the second 
regime of Mwinyi, so prior to the period being studied here. But the author notes that this 
progress continues. This occurred despite Mwinyi being a relatively weak leader. 
Because Mwinyi was President prior to the time period I am concerned with, I am only 
considering the ongoing progress here. 
Turning to the specific programs introduced above, the evidence is mixed but 
overall modestly positive. Stevens and Teggemann make the case that the PSRP has been 
quite effective.33 Evans and Ngalwiea agree but are more pessimistic about the ability to 
build on these preliminary successes.34 Caufield argues that the case of executive agency 
reform applied, in part by outside donors, to buy a new air trafficking system, largely 
failed as civil service reform due to Tanzania's relative lack of institutional capabilities. 
The World Bank argues that an automated financial management system designed to 
promote transparency in public financing makes Tanzania "a pace setter in the Sub-
30
 Shekighenda. 
31
 Stevens and Stefanie Teggemann, 45. 
32
 Anne Mette Kjaer, "Old Brooms Can Sweep Too! An Overview of Rulers and Public Sector 
Reforms in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya," Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 3 (2004): 389-413. 
33
 Stevens and Teggemann, 48. 
34
 Alison Evans with Erasto Ngalwea, "Tanzania," Development Policy Review 21, no. 2 (2003): 
271-287. 
35
 Janice Caulfield, "Executive Agencies In Tanzania: Liberalization and Third World Debt," 
Public Administration and Development 22 (2002): 209-220. 
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Saharan Africa region."36 With the TRA, there are multiple, disagreeing accounts. There 
is no disagreement that the experiment was initially successful; however, neither is there 
any disagreement that the experiment's initial success has significantly tapered off. 
Fjeldstad argues that, as of 2002, the Tanzania Revenue Authority was not working as 
intended. Initially, results were positive but they reversed themselves due to a number of 
factors in terms of insufficient design. Among other things, tax collection agents fired for 
corruption were later able to be rehired in the private sector as experts37 Temu and Due 
disagree with this evaluation and state, 
Instead, VAT has improved the tax system in various ways. It has widened the 
coverage of the former sales tax; resolved the tax cascading problem rampant in 
the sales tax method; enforced proper record keeping amongst business 
enterprises; and prevented tax evasion, because it is a self-enforcing system.38 
The franchise bidding tax collection experiment, as evaluated by Kobb, is limited 
but promising. And, according to Vian, the privatization and health care reform results in 
Tanzania have been mixed.39 
Civil society groups 
Rated a 2 for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
Generally, the Tanzanian government has been active in trying to increase the 
presence and activity of Tanzanian civil society. This was, in part, an outcome of the 
Warioba Commission-the government took the specific recommendation to enhance civil 
society to heart.40 However, the tangible results are mixed. As noted above, the LGRP as 
designed appears to be a positive, proactive step toward, among other things, enhancing civil 
36
 World Bank, "Updated Project Information Document (PID)," 5. 
37
 Fjeldstad. 
38
 Temu and Due, 701. 
39
 Taryn Vian, "Health Care," in Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries: Strategies and 
Analysis, ed. Bertram I. Spector (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005) 43-64. 
40
 Riley, 2000, 152. 
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society involvement in local governance; however, it is too early to see results.41 According 
to Kpundeh, civil society was actively involved in the creation of the Tanzania Civic 
Monitor, designed to help with "the implementation of the country's national anticorruption 
action plan."42 But it is unclear what successes, if any, they have had. The Tanzanian chapter 
of Transparency International, actively encouraged by the head of the PCCB, Edward Hosea, 
appears on a relatively vibrant comeback43 after having been deactivated in 2006.44 The 
PSRP appears, on the surface, to have been purposefully constructed with significant help 
from civil society.45Temu and Due argue that while the level of involvement of the business 
community in anti-corruption has grown, its effectiveness certainly has not.46The Tanzanian 
National Malaria Control Program was designed, in part, to strengthen stakeholders and civil 
society. According to Wilson, there were accounting problems, which led to delays in the 
program.47 Finally, the successful signing of the MCC compact indicates improvement in this 
category. 
Media freedom 
Rated a '0 ' for 'Either no clear evidence of movement one way or the other or 
clear evidence of no movement.' 
41
 Hassan Ngwilizi, "The Local Government Reform Programme in Tanzania: Country 
Experience." Paper presented at the Commonwealth Advanced Seminar on Leadership and Change in the 
Public Sector held in Wellington, New Zealand (February 25 to March 8, 2002). 
<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/commonwealthseminar/Papers/2002/Tanzania%20Case%20Study.pdf> 
(accessed March 18,2009). 
42
 Kpundeh, 2004, 130. 
43
 Doig, et al, 2005, 71. 
44
 Brian Cooksey, "Notes on For DIA NACSAP Triangulation Programme (NATPP) 2005 
Annual Progress Report: A critical review, 2005. 
<http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:vLi_XGXx6eUJ:www.partnershipfortransparency.info/uploads/proj 
ect%2520assessment%2520reports/TanzaniaCookseycommentsonFORDIA%252014jan07.doc+cooksey+n 
acsap&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> (accessed March 18, 2009). 
45
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46
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The Freedom House rankings give higher scores to less free countries, with 0 
equaling a perfectly free press and 100 meaning a perfectly 'unfree' press.48 Tanzania began 
with a score of 48 in 1998 and ended 10 years later with a 48. However, during those ten 
years there was some volatility, with the range being from 47-51. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Graph 1. Tanzania Freedom House rankings. 
Given the availability and respectability of the Freedom House data, it is safe to 
conclude from this data alone that increases in media freedom played no factor in Tanzania's 
improvement. The qualitative evidence looks decidedly mixed. There are several instances, 
of attempts by media organizations to become more involved in reporting on and providing 
education regarding corruption.49 Additionally, the signing of the MCC compact indicates 
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16> 
(accessed March 21, 2009). 
49
 See for examples Doig, et al, 2005, 72; Temu and Due, 708; Kpundeh, 2004, 130; and African 
Media Development Initiative, Tanzania Country Report Context, 27-29. 
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMDI/tanzania/amdi_tanzania2_country.pdf> 
(accessed March 18,2009). 
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some possible improvement. On the other hand, there is some qualitative evidence of a 
backtrack.50 As such, this scores a 0. 
Judicial reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
Generally, judicial reform has been aggressively pursued but with limited results. 
Much of this reform, like so much in the highly corrupt world, involves legal reforms that 
provide little to no leverage on their own due to the complexity of the problem and the 
problematic incentive structures involved. Corrupt practices in the judiciary appear to Sedigh 
and Muganda to be just as entrenched as ever.51 Some of this reform, however, has yielded 
positive, if limited, results. 
The Legal Sector Reform Program (LSRP), as noted above, is far-reaching, complex, 
deep and wide, and aggressive. In addition, much of the groundwork seems to have been set 
in place. There is much left to do, however, and there is no empirical evidence to date of 
results. In fact, it appears to be off to a slow start. Finnegan has written extensively 
regarding Tanzania's Commercial Court experiment. Civil Society is one of the IVs that is 
involved, at least indirectly, in the signing of the MCC compact. These impressive but 
limited and narrow results in combination with the broad, promising results of the LSRP, 
account for the 2 rating. 
See Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads 2006 - Tanzania (3 August 
2006). <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4738691dc.html> (accessed 18 March 2009). 
51
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(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), 151-177. 
52See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Embassy of Denmark, Dar es Salaam, "Slow 
Implementation Progress of the Legal Sector Reform Programme." 
<http://www.ambdaressalaam.um.dk/en/menu/AboutUs/News/SlowImplementationProgressOfTheLegalSe 
ctorReformProgramme.htm> (accessed March 18,2009). 
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National anti-corruption organization 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Improvement in IV minor and in dispute. 
On the surface, this appears to be one of Tanzania's strong performances. First, there 
were several programs and program improvements that fell squarely into this category. The 
NACSAP item in particular gave birth to multiple items on our list, such as the GGCU and 
the EID. NACSAP was successfully implemented as were its offshoots. However, this was a 
difficult category to rank. This is something of a mixed bag. There was little evidence for 
improvement from some of the programs and only limited evidence for others. The signing 
of the MCC compact indicates some success here. And there was some indication of failure: 
Cooksey's preliminary report on NACSAP and several of its outgrowth programs was simply 
scathing.54 Doig also views these agencies as having underperformed.55 The sheer number of 
programs instituted and the somewhat promising early results combine contrasted with the 
limited and disputed results to date to merit a ranking of 1. 
External influence 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
As a heavily in debt country (HIDC), Tanzania received a lot of aid from IOs, which 
came primarily in the form of the PRSP, which seems to have been implemented in a very 
flawed fashion. It was also, due to its overall progress, the largest receiver of funding from 
the MCC. There is only one other item of note in this category-the TRA as described above. 
Conditionality was a factor, as it always is, in the IO-funded projects but it was rarely of the 
'persuasive' type. The TRA owes its existence entirely to demands by IGOs. The TRA was 
54
 Cooksey, 2005. 
55
 Alan Doig, David Watt, and Robert Williams,"Why Do Developing Country Anti-Corruption 
Commissions Fail to Deal with Corruption? Understanding the Three Dilemmas of Organisational 
Development, Performance Expectation, and Donor and Government Cycles," Public Administration and 
Development 27, no. 3 (2007): 251-259. 
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created in response to international donors cutting off aid in response to severe problems in 
tax revenue acquisition. This is external influence at its finest and the point seems to be 
undisputed. This is rated a 2 due to the fact that MCC funding success is more an indicator of 
success than a cause and to the limited nature of the other items. 
Openness to trade 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant.' 
There are a number of different types of data, all of which have to do with openness 
to trade. In the end, I chose to use data from the World Bank and WTO. The World Bank 
data covers merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP. Data is available for both the world 
and individual countries, including all six being studied here. This is the exact data I 
preferred to use; unfortunately, it is only available for the years 2000, 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
I supplemented this with World Trade Organization data, which shows absolute amounts of 
merchandise trade for each country being studied here for the years 1998-2007. 
First looking at World Bank data for merchandise trade (imports and exports) as a 
percent of GDP (shown in Graph 2), we see steady, significant improvement during each 
year for which data is available.56 
56
 World Bank data. < http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreportsA^iewSharedReport?&CF=l&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIE 
WADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N> (accessed February 27, 2009). 
97 
O World Merchandise Trade as % of 
Trade 
•Tanzanian Merchandise Trade as 
% of Trade 
2000 2005 2006 2007 
Graph 2. Tanzanian trade. 
Not only only did Tanzania's percentage almost double from 25 to 45 but it 
almost caught up to the world average, which jumped from 41 to 51. This seems an 
exceptional increase for a very underdeveloped Sub-Sahara African nation. Additionally, 
WTO data regarding merchandise imports and exports for each year between 1998 and 
2007 shows that Tanzania's absolute numbers increased greatly.57 Tanzania's exports 
nearly quadrupled from almost U.S. $600 million (at current prices) in 1998 to nearly $2 
billion. Its imports more than tripled from about $1.4 billion to about $5.3 billion. And 
this matches up with the qualitative evidence, which shows Tanzania making efforts by 
joining multiple free trade blocs. All of this together is more than enough to earn a score 
of3. 
MALAWI: RELEVANT HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
Like Tanzania, Malawi had a colonial past followed by one-party dictatorial rule, 
under 'President for Life' Hastings Kamuzu Banda. While some of the specifics differed 
(Nyerere's socialist state v. Banda's more conservative dictatorial state), the general 
WTO data. < http://stat.wto.org> (accessed March 19, 2000). 
effects were the same-Malawi, like Tanzania, entered the modern global capitalist era 
late, underdeveloped, and thoroughly corrupt. Malawi has had two presidents in the post 
Banda era. "President Bahili Muluzi served from 1994-2004 and the efforts of his 
supporters to change the constitution to allow Muluzi to serve a third term caused much 
political controversy. This resulted in the election on a minority vote of Dr. Bingu 
CO 
Muntharika as President with the declared intention of serving only one term in office." 
Both presidents were vocal in making anti-corruption reform as a top priority in their 
respective campaigns and administrations. Yet both presidents achieved very limited 
results. 
RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
Consistent with my Reverse Karenina argument, one does not dig very far below 
the surface of Malawi's recent history of reform before recognizing a familiar, sad story. 
The details are eerily, uncomfortably familiar. Reform efforts small and large have failed 
for the usual reasons: lack of political support, lack of institutional capability, lack of 
funds, lack of transparency and independence between branches of government and 
bureaucracy. If the details of Malawi's failure were not so depressing and important, they 
would be banal. 
For the most part, Malawi's corruption reform efforts are fairly impressive on the 
surface. They are multi-dimensional, well-planned, well-funded and generally aimed in a 
broad, complex and holistic way. They are designed to address multiple areas affected by 
corruption-across the various independent variables addressed here. But the deeper they 
go through the process from planning to implementation to results, the weaker they 
58Doig,etal,2005,61. 
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become. The reforms are clearly well-planned. The enactment is problematic and clunky 
but impressive nonetheless, especially compared with the negative overall results as 
measured by continued drops in the CPI. In terms of our variables, these reforms are a 
decidedly mixed bag with one glaring, important exception-political leadership. With the 
other variables, none stand out really as either fully implemented are truly ignored. They 
combine, however, to make a disappointing stew of not-good-enough. 
For Malawi, I have identified 14 programs and incidents relevant to this analysis. 
These items are listed in Appendix B. For each program I have included the variables 
affected. In this section I will examine in some details five of the programs that show the 
failure in all of its banality. 
Millenium Challenge Corporation Compact 
As described in greater detail above, the MCC is a US government program 
begun in 2004 and designed to give aid to poor countries conditioned on sufficient 
institutional capabilities. Malawi became eligible to be considered in fiscal year 2006, has 
signed the threshhold agreement and is 'compact eligible.' Because it has not yet signed 
the compact, Malawi has not been as successful as Tanzania. This is at once evidence of 
both cause and effect: the fact that Malawi has not yet fully eligible for funding speaks to 
its lack of success prior to 2006 and its lack of progress moving forward. 
The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) 
Overall, the ACB is an illustrative example of well-intended corruption reform 
gone flat. According to the U4 report, "The Anti-Corruption Bureau was established 
under the Corrupt Practices Act, No. 18 of 1995 as an 'independent and autonomous 
government body' with a mandate to "prevent corruption, educate people away from 
corruption, (and) investigate and prosecute offenders." It is the primary, but not sole, 
national anti-corruption agency and, as such, will constitute much of the focus of the 
national anti-corruption agency category. 
The greatest institutional problem with the ACB is its lack of independence. "(I)t 
requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) to send a case for 
prosecution."60 According to Durevall and Erlanddson, the AG's "effectiveness in 
enforcing accountability has also been frustrated by the absence of disciplinary actions, 
follow-up investigations and prosecutions."61 The AG has been largely ineffective 
according to them. There was short-lived success, again according to Durevall and 
Erlanddson; this success was due in part to early support from the President.62 He has 
been able to clear away some of the back log but remains understaffed. Similarly, the 
ACB's civil society approach to increasing public awareness has also been 
understaffed. It is telling that even the Secretary to the Office of the President and the 
Cabinet, the highest civil servant in Malawi, does not bother to respond to AG's enquiries 
about the reasons for excess expenditure."64 Durevall and Erlanddson conclude that 
"(D)uring the two terms, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004, the President did not act as a 
principal for the reform programmes, and there was no other actor who could hold him 
accountable for this."65 There is some dispute on the effectiveness of ACB reform efforts. 
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Madise argues, for example, that the ACB has been largely ineffective due to lack of 
funding, staffing and independence. They have spent too many resources on time-
consuming and often unsuccessful high-level prosecutions, although they have had some 
nice success with mid-level prosecutions. 66The U4 report is markedly more upbeat in its 
analysis. The report notes success in the number of cases investigated, audits conducted, 
monitoring and surveillance exercises, and workshops conducted. They are also involved 
in efforts to strengthen civil society anti-corruption efforts. Their ability, however, to 
obtain convictions due to lack of consent from the DPP has been weak and there is a 
backlog of cases.67 It is also clear that some, if not most, of the high-level anti-corruption 
efforts of the ACB are politically motivated. In all, there is nothing out of the ordinary 
here-reform that looks pretty good up front but never translates into results due to 
institutional resistance and lack of resources. 
Civil Service Action Plan (CSAP) 
The CSAP is a World Bank-derived effort begun in 1994 designed to broadly 
reform civil service in terms of pay increases, reduction of employment, and increasing 
accountability and transparency. Durevall views the CSAP as having been mostly 
ineffective as of 2003. Interestingly, what on the surface appears to amount to significant 
cuts in the number of civil servants in Malawi turns out to be quite limited as those fired 
fro ^ ^ 
were either hired elsewhere or rehired later. This is consistent with other sources that 
state fired employees were rehired later when funding was made available through other 
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means. It is also in contrast to civil service reform in Tanzania. While one finds critics 
of both efforts, the reforms made in Tanzania stand out as relatively successful when 
compared to these in Malawi. Again, we see institutional resistance to reform working to 
water down and impede results. 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
According to Durevall and Erlandsson, "The Implementation of a Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) has become a standard reform to achieve forward 
budgeting within public finances."70 It has become, according to the authors, critical to 
successful implementation of the PRSPs. As such, it qualifies as a program at least 
indirectly affecting corruption reform. Durevall and Erlandsson identify four ongoing 
weaknesses in Malawi's MTEF implementation: a lack of sponsorship by "the President 
and Cabinet" and, due ironically to its bottom-up focused, mid-level technocrats; poor 
"accountability, transparency and auditing"; inadequate effectiveness and cross-agency 
71 
coordination; and inadequate donor funding. Again, the exact type of limited results 
one would, unfortunately, expect. 
Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) 
The MRA was established as a function of a World Bank Structural Review and 
Reform. It was designed to increase efficiency in tax collecting. It began operation in 
2000.72 According to Chiumya, the MRA has been only partially successful-tax 
revenues have gone up significantly but only in the official economy. The parallel black-
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market economy has skyrocketed with no corresponding increase in tax collection 
capacity. In fact, it appears that nothing is being done to assess the parallel economy. 
The MRA is backed up by capable laws and statutes but remains greatly underfunded and 
understaffed, which negatively affects its assessment system. Also, its incentive scheme 
"does not reward compliance."73 The MRA also contains a taxpayer education 
component, which has been only slightly effective.74 This stands in marked contrast to 
the limited, somewhat tainted but still very real success of the TRA in Tanzania. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Political leadership 
Rated a '0 ' for 'Either no clear evidence of movement one way or the other or 
clear evidence of no movement' 
As introduced above, this, our only clearly non-institutional, idiosyncratic-by-nature 
variable, is by far the biggest, most consistent factor in explaining the difference in success 
levels between the two countries. As was shown above, Tanzania's leadership under Mkapa 
was strong and consistent. Malawi's has been consistently but not uniformly weak. Muluzi is 
widely regarded as having been inactive against corruption. Mutharika has been an 
improvement for sure and he has become increasingly active in supporting anti-corruption 
programs as time has gone by. However, if anything, Mutharika's approach, despite (and in 
some ways, because of) its limited success in pursuing corruption charges against political 
rivals, has been even less effective than that of Muluzi. This shows up often and up front in 
several of the programs examined. More specifically, it was deemed to have an important 
Chiumya, 30. 
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negative effect on multiple programs. Additionally, it negatively affected other variable 
performance. Mutharika did resign in early 2005 from the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
"so that he could more effectively pursue an anti-corruption agenda from outside the party."7 
He has pursued corruption cases against Muluzi and members of his administration, in some 
cases successfully. But using anti-corruption as a hammer to bludgeon political opponents 
for political reasons is quite commonplace in highly corrupt countries, especially when these 
political anti-corruption disputes occur alongside of impunity for political allies of the party 
and administration in power, as they appear to have in the case of Malawi. 
Civil service reform 
Rated a ' 1 ' for 'Improvement in IV minor and in dispute' 
On the surface, Malawi, with the help of international donors, has quite aggressively 
pursued civil service reform in recent years. There were five programs applicable to civil 
service reform: the Civil Service Pay and Employment Reform, MTEF, PSIP, IFMIS, and 
MRA. So Malawi deserves credit for this. Unfortunately, there is little evidence of any real 
improvement, anywhere. The MRA provides a very clear alternative to the Tanzanian 
example, the TRA. Whereas in Tanzania the experiment was limited but vital, aimed at both 
estimating and then collecting taxes from the parallel/informal economy, the MRA proved to 
be a very limited experiment, with limited, fragile results, aimed only at the official 
economy. The CSAP was mostly ineffective, according to multiple sources. The twin 
programs of MTEF and PSIP have also been mostly ineffective. IFMIS has been very slowly 
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enacted. Despite all of these criticisms, the number and scope of programs combined with the 
very disappointing progress to date combine to merit a rating of 1. 
Civil society groups 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Improvement in IV minor and in dispute' 
According to the U4 report, Malawi has virtually no anti-corruption civil society 
groups. "The only identifiable NGO in anti-corruption work is TI Malawi which is more a 
collection of individuals than an organization. It lacks the presence, access and resources that 
77 
its Zambian equivalent possesses. In organizational terms, it is, in effect, defunct."" This 
verdict is in agreement with Phiri's prescriptive piece on getting Malawian civil society more 
involved in anti-corruption efforts. The MBAAC shows promise but as yet has yielded 
nothing more than promises. There has been some improvement, particularly with the 
creation of the PRSP (which was influenced by President Mkapa79) and the German OST 
initiative. Local youth groups had both positive and negative effects-they were partially 
responsible for heading off Muluzi's attempts to obtain a third presidential term but they 
were also actively involved in political violence. But this improvement is limited and there 
is no consensus that it has had real effect. 
Media freedom 
Rated a ' -3 ' for 'Decrease in IV clear and significant.' 
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Malawi began with a 40 in 1998 and ended with a 55 in 2008. Malawi's scores 
significantly worsened; this was an increase of a full 15 points. Given the reliability and 
respected status of the Freedom House rankings, this is clear, strong evidence of a significant 
decrease in freedom of the press. 
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Graph 3. Malawi Freedom House rankings. 
Our quantitative evidence tends to support this backtrack. But there is some 
disagreement. Hussein, for one, argues for the effectiveness of Malawi's press. Bauer 
and Taylor give a mixed review-there has been increased reporting on corruption, which 
led to an increase in government repression of the media. Overall, though, it is clear that 
Malawi's media became significantly less free during the time period in question. 
Judicial reform 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Increase in IV minor and in dispute.' 
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There simply was not much going on in this category. There has been some success in 
obtaining convictions. However, this success may be misleading, according to Villalon and 
Von Doepp, because the convictions obtained during the Muluzi regime against high-level 
officials were politically motivated decisions by holdover judges from the Banda regime. 
Hussein has nothing good to say about the current state of the judiciary. Overall, there's 
little indication of progress in this category. 
National anti-corruption agency 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Increase in IV minor and in dispute' 
The reputation of the ACB has fallen significantly over the years from a once 
respected institution willing to and capable of going after corrupt figures to an institution 
severely hamstrung by its lack of political and institutional independence. It is a glaring 
example of the near perfection needed in a highly corrupt country to make significant 
advances against the disease of systemic corruption. The effort in creating a capable ACB 
clearly existed and most of the pieces to the puzzle were either in place or in the process of 
being put in place. But it never happened, largely due to political pushback by those powerful 
and corrupt individuals and groups who stood to lose. The ACB appears inherently limited 
and lacking independence in a way that all but ties its relative success to presidential support. 
According to the U4 Report, it is limited in that it 
narrows the definition of corruption to bribery, provides no protection for 
whistleblowers and imposes minimum prison sentences of five years which 
encourages magistrates to acquit in cases where the sums of money involved are 
84
 Bauer and Taylor, 19-44. 
85
 Peter VonDoepp, "Institutions, Resources and Elite Strategies," in The Fate of Africa's 
Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions, ed. Villalon and VonDoepp (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005) 175-198. 
86
 Hussein, 96-97. 
108 
small. The other major constraint is finance and the limited resources provided by the 
government of Malawi. 7 
Finally, Doig, as with the case of Tanzania, views Malawian anti-corruption 
organizations as having underperformed. Here, again, we see nothing come of serious 
reform efforts for all the usual reasons. 
External influence 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Improvement in IV minor and in dispute.' 
In several instances studied, there was a clear and sophisticated attempt to tinker with 
conditionality, such as with the PSRP. And the MCC represents a new and potentially potent 
use of 'upfront' conditionality. While efforts such as these are worthwhile and intriguing, 
there is little evidence yet of success. 
Openness to trade 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Increase in IV probable and modest.' 
First looking at World Bank data for merchandise trade (imports and exports) as a 
percent of GDP (shown in Graph 4), we see slight, but volatile, improvement during the time 
period.89 
Doig, et al, 2005, 62. 
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Graph 4. Malawian trade. 
Additionally, WTO data regarding merchandise imports and exports for each year 
between 1998 and 2007 shows that Malawi's absolute numbers increased significantly.90 
Malawi's exports rose by nearly 70% from about U.S. $430 (at current prices) in 1998 to 
nearly $710 million. Its imports almost tripled from nearly $515 million to about $1.4 
billion. The increase in imports is modest while the increase in exports in impressive. 
Overall, our quantitative evidence show's Malawi to have made some absolute, if limited 
and volatile, progress but some relative decline. This aligns more or less with the 
qualitative evidence. For these reasons, I have scored this a 2. 
COMPARING TANZANIA AND MALAWI 
Putting these scores into our scoresheet, we get the following results. 
OWorld Merchandise Trade as % of 
Trade 
• Malawian Merchandise Trade as 
% of Trade 
WTO trade data. 
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Table 8. Tanzania and Malawi scoresheet 
Independent Variable 
Political Leadership 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
Media Freedom 
Judicial Capabilities 
Nat'l Anti-Corruption 
Organization 
External influence 
Openness to Trade 
Tanzania 
3 
2 
2 
0 
2 
1 
2 
3 
Malawi 
0 
1 
1 
-3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Difference 
(Tanzania-
Malawi) 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
0 
1 
1 
Two categories stand out: Political Leadership (3), and Media Freedom (3). Nothing 
was clearer in this research than the simple fact that Tanzanian political leadership was a 
crucial aspect of their success. It appears that this strong, at times exceptional, political 
leadership led to modest but real results. And in Malawi all the usual suspects conspired to 
thwart once promising reform efforts. It is also important to note that political leadership as 
a variable often affected the other IVs-making them more or less effective. In other words, I 
found evidence that the respective political leadership, usually the president, was 
instrumental in supporting or limiting progress in one or more programs or items. As for the 
second variable-media freedom-Tanzania did not actually improve. Malawi got much worse. 
Perhaps Tanzania reform was helped by simply not backtracking but it certainly does not 
appear to make any kind of case for the need for improvement per se in media freedom. 
After these two variables, there is quite a step lower in terms of clarity and apparent 
significance. For five variables (Civil Society, Civil Service Reform, Judicial Institutional 
Reform, Openness to Trade, and External influence) there was a difference of one point. For 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies, there was no difference whatsoever. 
I l l 
What is one to make of this? The strong difference in political leadership is strong 
evidence for the Reverse Karenina argument. The smaller differences in several of the 
variables do not in and of themselves mean much but if this trend continues, one might 
conclude that they are worthwhile. Keeping these points in mind, it is time to turn to my 
second paired case-Colombia and Peru. 
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CHAPTER V 
COLOMBIA AND PERU 
INTRODUCTION 
Whereas my first paired case-Tanzania and Malawi-showed the importance of 
strong political leadership in setting the table for modestly successful institutional reform, 
my second paired case supports my argument in an even stronger, more vivid way. As 
will be shown in full here, Colombia's success was clearly and overwhelmingly a 
function of its ongoing civil conflict. Colombia's civil conflict is particularly complicated 
and idiosyncratic. It involves the international war on drugs, drug cartels, and traditional 
leftist revolutionaries who fund their often terrorist attacks with drug profits. 
Interestingly, reforming corruption is not the primary goal of these institutional reforms. 
Rather, Colombia needed stronger institutional capabilities in order to successfully 
prosecute enemies of the state. It is my conclusion that this made for a much more 
amenable-to-reform incentive structure than that which normally exists with elites and 
corruption reform. Combined with the fact that reform efforts attracted significantly more 
U.S. resourcing than is normally the case made the likelihood of success much greater. 
Peru's story begins hopefully and uniquely enough-the quick fall of the Fujimori 
regime on corruption charges created an opportunity for real reform. Reformists were put 
in charge; reforms were promoted, developed and enacted; and then, just a few short 
years later, it became apparent that supporters of real reform were outnumbered and 
outmatched by those opposed. Today, Peru continues to struggle to implement effective 
reform while its corruption level continues to climb. 
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COLOMBIA: RELEVANT HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
Colombia's recent history has been, of course, dominated by the violent civil 
conflict involving drugs, multiple empowered Cold War-era guerilla groups (the FARC 
and ELN), and terrorism. At the same time, and no doubt in significant part due to, 
Colombia underwent a deep economic recession. Andres Pastrana, who served from 
August 1998 to August 2002, came in to office, then, facing considerable challenges. 
Rather than proving too much to overcome, the challenging environment, as it turns out, 
provided the right incentive structure for effective change-Colombia was very much in 
an 'or else' predicament. In 2002, the strongly conservative Alvara Uribe Velez, whose 
father had been killed by the FARC, was elected and has served since. 
RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
I have identified 19 programs and incidents relevant to this analysis. (Appendix 
C) In this section I will provide details for and analysis of five of the most telling and 
important programs. As with my previous cases, a full list of programs and associated 
variables can be found in Appendix C. 
Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact 
In December 2008, the MCC approved Colombia (as well as two other countries) 
for large-scale innovative grants, due to their "commitment to good governance and 
dedication to promoting economic freedom and investing in your people."1 This also 
means, in part, that Colombia has yet to receive any MCC funding. This, then, provides 
1
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some indication of the recent improvement made in Colombia. This also means, in part, 
that Colombia has yet to receive any MCC funding, which puts them well behind the 
curve for countries under consideration. 
Plan Colombia 
Plan Colombia means different things to different people and has been, fairly or 
not, a hot-button issue since its inception. To the United States, it is a tool to gain 
advantage in the war on drugs. To Colombia, it is a means to stabilize its political and 
economic situation. To anti-globalization activists and Latin America graffiti artists it is a 
capitalist Yankee conspiracy to militarily, politically, and economically exploit Colombia 
and its neighbors. It is not within the scope of this dissertation to make judgments 
regarding the primary purposes and effectiveness of Plan Colombia; however, it has been 
instrumental in improving Colombia's institutional capabilities regarding corruption 
reform. It is arguably the driving force behind Colombia's recent anti-corruption reform 
success. 
Plan Colombia was a U.S.-funded and backed Colombian program designed to 
"combat drug trafficking and terrorism and strengthen public institutions." Much of this 
institutional strengthening was directed toward programs that would directly or indirectly 
reduce corruption. The institutional strengthening was seen as a prerequisite component 
of effectively going after drug cartels and terrorists. This is important for two reasons. 
First, reducing corruption was a secondary goal. Second, because U.S. national security 
2
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interests were perceived to be affected, resources were abundant. The U.S. government 
provided billions of dollars in funding for the project over the years, much more than is 
normally found in anti-corruption or governance programs. 
The U.S. involvement in and support of reform is truly impressive. According to 
former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
In addition to providing direct assistance in law enforcement operations, 
we are working to reform the Colombian justice sector. These programs are 
funded by the Department of State and coordinated by the Justice Department. 
Our work in Colombia involves numerous components of the Department of 
Justice, including the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance 
and Training, and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of Prisons also play 
key roles. Through Plan Colombia, the Department is also assisting in ambitious 
legal reforms of the Colombian Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. The 
aim is establishment of an "adversarial" system of criminal justice, which will 
permit trials with open testimony before an impartial court and offer protection 
for the legal rights of the accused.4 
Suffice it to say, this is not the default setting for U.S. resource levels of 
development programs. 
USAID Democratic Governance Program 
The USAID Democratic Governance program is broad, aggressive and extremely 
well-funded. It is a direct function of Plan Colombia. This funding comes, of course, 
primarily from the U.S. interest in curbing Colombian drug production and distribution. 
According to USAID, 
USAID fosters increased participation, representation and accountability 
of democratic institutions and processes. The democracy program seeks to 
modernize the criminal justice system and promote access to justice for 
disenfranchised Colombians; promote and protect human rights; increase 
4
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government transparency and accountability; and strengthen the Government of 
Colombia's (GOC's) ability to develop policy and implement activities supporting 
peace initiatives throughout Colombia. USAID is promoting the 
"Colombianization" of activities within GOC and civil society organizations by 
promoting private sector alliances and local capacity development.5 
The preliminary results are impressive and broadly distributed: multiple judicial 
pilot programs appear to have been effective; civil society private sector programs were 
implemented with apparently promising results and in 2005 President Uribe signed a civil 
service reform regarding conduct of executive officials.6 We can see from this that Civil 
Service Reform, Civil Society, and the Judicial sector are all targets of this program and 
the Political Leadership and External Influence variables are also affected. 
Confecdmaras 
Confecamaras is the Colombian confederation of Chambers of Commerce. As 
such, it is a national civil society group. It was particularly active and successful during 
the time period in question in a variety of corruption-related programs. According to 
Sullivan, it began in the late 1990s in an effort designed to get businesses proactively 
involved in the fight to reduce corruption in Colombia.7 They developed and successfully 
promoted both local ethical codes of conduct and integrity pacts. They have also been 
instrumental in empowering 'citizen oversight bodies' as provided for in the constitution. 
According to Nasiful Islam, Confecamaras "was a leading advocate for the reform of 
Colombia's Procurement LawNo.80 and successfully promoted guidelines that enhanced 
5
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competitiveness and transparency in public procurement."9 This item involves Civil 
Society and Civil Service Reform. 
Defense sector programs 
One idiosyncratic subsection of Colombian anti-corruption reform that has seen 
some results is that associated with defense procurement. This procurement is, not 
surprisingly, a function of Colombia's civil turmoil. As such, we can see a similar 
idiosyncratic incentive structure in place. These reforms, according to Rozo, have 
effectively, if incompletely, made bids on defense contracts public and transparent.10 
Another aspect of defense sector contracting reform has been in the usage and promotion 
of integrity pacts. Colombia's Transparency International chapter was instrumental in 
helping to promote these.11 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Political leadership 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant. 
Colombian political leadership in corruption reform has been strong over the last ten 
years under both Pastrana and Uribe. If anything, this leadership has grown over time-Uribe 
has taken a tougher stance even than Pastrana. Similar to that of the U.S., however, the 
9
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nk&gl=us> (accessed February 25,2009). 
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Colombian government's support of corruption reform was secondary to its fight against 
terrorists and narco-traffickers. The presidential support itself was a function of Plan 
Colombia, rather than the reverse. The primary component of Colombian reform in this area 
has been Plan Colombia to which, conspiracy theories aside, the Colombia government was a 
more-than-willing partner. Pastrana and Uribe, especially, have both issued decrees and 
created programs. Uribe as well created a National Development Plan. Additionally, Uribe 
was actively involved in defense sector reform. All of this adds up to a rating of 3; however, 
it is important to reiterate here that this success was a direct function of Colombia's civil 
conflict. 
Civil service reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
There was a lot of activity in this category during the time period under scrutiny. 
President Uribe's decree of 2005 invoked ethical codes for administration officials. 
Multiple laws regarding procurement policies were enacted. As described above, defense 
sector procurement, specifically, received a lot of attention. And there were many 
integrity pacts created and signed on to by local officials, especially mayors and 
governors.14 However, it is not clear what the practical effects of these actions are. This 
accounts for the rating of 2. And, as with Political Leadership, much of this reform was a 
function of Colombia's civil conflict. 
Shiloh Hoggard, "Preventing Corruption in Colombia: The Need for an Enhanced State-Level 
Approach," Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 21, no. 2 (2004): 577-619. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Anonymous, "Combating Corruption: A Private Sector Approach," Center for International 
Private Enterprise, Reform Tool Kit (March 2008). < http://www.cipe.org/publications/papers/pdf/Anti-
CorruptionToolkit0308.pdf > (accessed March 11, 2009). 
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Civil society groups 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant.' 
Both TI Colombia and Confecamaras were very active and effective during this time 
period. TI Colombia was heavily instrumental in reform of defense procurement. As 
described above, the activities of Confecamaras have been truly impressive. They were 
instrumental in developing, promoting and helping to implement legal reform, ethical codes 
of conduct, integrity pacts, and citizen oversight bodies. TI Colombia was also heavily 
involved, especially with defense sector reform. Again, some, if not the majority, of this 
reform was a function of the civil conflict. 
Media freedom 
Rated a '-2' for 'Decrease in IV probable and modest.' 
The Freedom House rankings for Colombia from 1998-2008 were volatile but overall 
they indicate a significant worsening of media freedom in Colombia, as shown here in Graph 
5.15 
15
 Freedom House, Freedom of Press data for Latin America. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/historical/SSAmericas.xls> (accessed March 9,2009). 
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Graph 5. Colombia Freedom House rankings. 
Keeping in mind that low scores indicate high media freedom, in 1998 Colombia 
scored a 55 and in 2008 a 59. In between they went up and down, scoring either 59 or 60 
from 1999-2002 and 63 from 2003-2005 before dropping back down to 59 in 2008. 
While this recent improvement is somewhat encouraging, the current score is still quite 
bad absolutely and relatively worse than ten years ago. One does not get very far into the 
qualitative details to learn why Colombia scores so poorly in this category. According to 
Freedom House's country report for 2007, "(Journalists have trouble exercising their 
rights in a country racked by a complex armed conflict involving left-wing guerrilla 
organizations, drug traffickers, paramilitary groups, and government security forces."16 As 
such, this receives a -2. 
Judicial reform 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant. 
Freedom House, Colombia Country Report, 2007. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7156&year=2007 (accessed February 26, 
2009). 
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Colombia's general law enforcement capabilities have increased greatly as a result of 
Plan Colombia and, to a lesser extent, other reform efforts. The bulk of this has come, 
though, not in corruption-related areas but rather, predictably, in more serious cases 
involving the civil conflict-those having to do with drug trafficking, money laundering, 
terrorism and kidnapping. United States' aid was critical in this respect, having donated 
billions of dollars to Colombian military and police forces. According to US AID, 
US AID's justice reform program and the new criminal procedure code accusatory 
system reform succeeded in reducing time-to-trial in pilot jurisdictions by up to 90%. 
Similarly, in accusatory system reform pilot jurisdictions, approximately 70% of the 
cases are being plea-bargained and adjudicated within weeks rather than the 
customary wait of several years under the previous system. Demonstrating support for 
building a full time state-funded public defense system, the Colombian Congress and 
the GOC are demonstrating commitment to this crucial service for the poor by 
enacting a Public Defense System Law. They are also doubling the budget for the 
pilot Public Defender program, which was created with USAID assistance.17 
This list is consistent with both the general consensus that Colombian judicial 
capabilities have been significantly improved. These new institutional capabilities no doubt 
have a positive effect on other aspects of law enforcement, such as corruption prevention and 
detection. As such, I have rated this category a 3. 
Anti-corruption organization or ombudsman 
Rated a '0 ' for 'Either no clear evidence of movement one way or the other or 
clear evidence of no movement.' 
The lack of activity within this category is intriguing. It is a very common component 
of the Laundry List and Corruption Consensus. Colombia has both a Controller's Office and 
Auditor General's Office. While these are not specifically anti-corruption organizations, they 
do often function as such in corruption reform. And both of them were subject to 
International Development Bank pilot projects but there is very little available information 
17
 USAID Data Sheet. 
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about these projects and, apparently at least, nothing else to speak of in this category.18 As 
such it receives a rating of 0. 
External influence 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant.' 
When it comes to international aid, it just doesn't get much more extensive and 
influential than Plan Colombia. As shown throughout this section, U.S. aid to Colombia over 
the last ten years as a primary function of the war on drugs has been enormous, in terms of 
scope and funding. And this obviously makes sense from an international relations 
theoretical perspective-it is in the U.S.' best interests for nations to become corrupt but this 
is nothing compared to the perceived national interests involved in stemming the 
international flow of illicit drugs. Most of this aid has been strictly military in nature but 
much still was for reforms that directly and indirectly affect corruption. 
Much of US AID help falls under Plan Colombia but there were other international 
efforts. Most significantly, TI UK was directly involved in defense sector reform, as detailed 
above. The UN conducted a pilot Global Program against Corruption in Colombia-the 
effects of this are unclear, as are those for the World Bank's judicial training program. But 
overall, the aid stemming from Plan Colombia was more than sufficient by itself to merit a 
rating of 3. 
Openness to trade 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
Most evidence indicates Colombia became more open to trade during the time period 
in question. First looking at World Bank data for merchandise trade (imports and exports) as 
a percent of GDP (shown in Graph 6), we see steady, significant improvement during each 
18
 Hoggard. 
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year for which data is available.19 However, Colombian trade did not gain as much as the rest 
of the world on average, suggesting a possible relative disadvantage. 
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Graph 6. Colombian trade. 
Additionally, WTO data regarding merchandise imports and exports for each year 
between 1998 and 2007 shows that Colombia's absolute numbers increased greatly. 
Colombia's exports went from nearly U.S. $11 billion (at current prices) in 1998 to 
nearly $30 billion. Its imports more than doubled from nearly $15 billion to nearly $33 
billion. 
The qualitative evidence suggests improvement in this area. Colombia, under 
both Pastrana and Uribe, has actively pursued an open trade agenda. Plan Colombia, for 
example, states, "The expansion of international trade, accompanied by enhanced access 
to foreign markets and free trade agreements to attract foreign and domestic investment 
19
 World Bank data. < http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreportsA i^ewSharedReport?&CF=l&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIE 
WADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N on> (accessed February 27,2009). 
20
 WTO data, <http://stat.wto.org> (accessed March 19, 2009). 
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are key to the modernization of our economic base and to job creation."21 This was a 
close call. I have chosen to rank it a 2 based on the fact that Colombia's average 
improvements appear to be more modest than both that of the world and most of my other 
cases. 
Having shown how Colombian success was largely a function of its civil conflict, 
it is now time to turn to my Peruvian case. 
PERU: RELEVANT HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
Peru's recent history begins with the end of the Fujimori regime. Known as 'El 
Chino' by friends and enemies alike, Alberto Fujimori was a very strong leader who had 
tremendous influence on Peruvian politics, economics and society. His primary 
accomplishment was to neutralize the Maoist guerilla force, the Shining Path, which had 
caused untold havoc in Peru for decades. The impact of his regime and its unseemly, 
sudden collapse on November 22, 2000 (due in large part to a corruption scandal within 
his administration) continue to affect virtually every aspect of Peruvian life to this day. 
Much of Peruvian reform efforts are aimed at punishing Fujimori and his collaborators, 
alleviating the negative effects of his policies, and deterring 'future Fujimoris.' Fujimori 
was replaced on an interim basis by Valentin Paniagua, who promised and, in part, 
delivered on a reformist regime until Alejandro Toledo was elected and took over less 
than one year later on July 28, 2001. Current President Alan Garcia Perez was elected to 
replace Toledo, which he did on July 28, 2006. 
Like Pastrana in Colombia, Paniagua came into office facing incredible 
21
 Plan Colombia, 
<http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia_101999.html> (accessed February 26, 
2009). 
challenges following a particularly troubling period. But unlike Pastrana and Uribe after 
him, Paniagua, and Toledo after him, failed to turn lemons into lemonade. Garcia, on the 
other hand, has shown some promise of late. 
RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
While researching Peruvian reform efforts in the post-Fujimori effort, two related 
qualities became quickly and vividly apparent: there was much initial potential and the 
reform programs that were enacted were many and far-reaching. There was great 
potential in that Peru as a nation was ready to turn the page on the Fujimori era and eager 
for reform. His interim replacement, Paniagua, was respected for his integrity and spent 
his brief time in office supporting and enacting a variety of reform efforts, which 
stretched across the Laundry List. Additionally, Peru moved strongly toward more open 
trade and the international community was proactively involved in and supportive of 
Peruvian reform. Toledo was subsequently duly elected in large part based on 
expectations he would be able to continue these reform efforts. And, like Paniagua, he 
began well. The list of total reform programs is truly impressive-I have found mention of 
no fewer than 31 separate reform programs, which is by far the most I encountered. 
(Appendix D) Overall, the program was aggressive, far-reaching and broadly designed. 
The plan, such as there was one, looks good on the surface—Peruvian reform 
efforts very well could have been successful. But they decidedly were not; as such, Peru's 
story is the saddest of my six cases. A quick examination of five of the most important, 
indicative reform efforts will help explain just how and why these efforts failed. 
Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact 
As described in greater detail above, the MCC is a US government program 
begun in 2004 and designed to give aid to poor countries conditioned on sufficient 
institutional capabilities. In 2007, the MCC offered US$ 35.6 million for their 
'threshhold' program, which is the MCC's version of limbo, where not-quite-capable-
countries are sent to improve their capabilities. In addition to working to increase 
immunizations in Peru, the program is designed to 
help Peru combat corruption by working with the judicial branch, law 
enforcement, the ombudsman and controller's offices and civil society 
organizations to improve internal controls, as well as analyze and simplify 
administrative processes to reduce opportunities for corruption.23 
It is not at all clear what the real difference is between this type of funding and 
traditional international development funding that the MCC is supposed to be replacing. 
National Anticorruption Commission/Council/Office 
According to the Peruvian government, "In November 2001 the National Anti-
Corruption Commission was created with the objective of proposing a national policy for 
preventing and fighting corruption, and promoting ethics and transparency in public 
management."24 According to U4, a World Bank Country Diagnostic Survey of Peru led 
to the formation of the NACC, after the collapse of the Fujimori regime. This 
commission "devised a strong policy document identifying key anti-corruption measures 
for incoming President Toledo. Unfortunately, follow-up on these policy 
DevEx, "Anticorruption and Immunization Initiatives in Peru: Millenium Challenge 
Corporation." <http://www.devex.com/projects/anti-cormption-and-immunization-initiatives-in-peru-
88657-88657-88657-88657-88657-88657> (accessed March 8,2009). 
23
 Millenium Challenge Corporation, Fact Sheet (January 12, 2009). 
<http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-presskit.pdf> (accessed March 8, 2009). 
24
 Anonymous, "Compact to Promote Transparency and Combat Corruption: A New Partnership 
Between the G8 and Peru," < http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2004/peru-
perou.aspx> (accessed March 7, 2009). 
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recommendations was weak and many recommended actions were not followed 
through."25 Some initiatives were put in place initially including, "an 'anti-corruption 
tsar', the establishment of a special anti-corruption police division, and the introduction of 
an anti-nepotism law for the public service." It was, according to Transparency 
International, too closely tied to the President.27 In fact, the commission appears to have 
been informally shut down by Toledo following the dismissal of its Tsar for investigating 
the Toledo regime.28 When Garcia entered office, the now-defunct organization was 
rechristened the National Anticorruption Council. After failing to get off the ground due 
to a lack of publicity and support, it was again renamed the National Anticorruption 
Office in November 2007. It was mandated to, among things, create a national anti-
corruption plan. 
Here we can see the gradual decline of Peruvian political leadership in the wake 
of the Fujimori collapse as the early action and success of Paniagua gave way to the 
underperformance and then actively oppositional Toledo, which led to the, thus far, 
passiveness of Garcia. Unfortunately, this story is all too familiar, especially in Latin 
America-good intentions lead to ill actions in the face of entrenched opposition. What 
began as a seemingly unique opportunity quickly turned into a cliched Latin American 
political telenovela of tawdry failure. This program shows vividly one side of the Reverse 
25
 U4 Help Desk Query. < http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query57.cfin> (accessed 
March 7,2009). 
26
 Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Peru page. < http://www.business-anti-
coniiption.com/en/country-profiles/latin-america-the-caribbean/peru/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-
initiatives/> (accessed March 7, 2009). 
27
 Jose Ugaz Sanchez Moreno, "New Anticorruption Governments: The Challenge of Delivery. 
Case Study: Peru," Transparency International (October 2004). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 U.S. State Department, "Fifth Report to Congress Pursuant to the International Anticorruption 
and Good Governance Act (Public Law 106-309)" (April 25, 2008). 
<http://www.state.gOv/p/inl/rls/rpt/109571.htm#peru> (accessed March 7, 2009). 
Karenina coin-corrupt nations really are all alike. 
Peruvian police reform 
Similar to other Peruvian institutions, Peruvian police were in particularly great 
need of reform due to the fact that Fujimori had used them to further his corrupt and 
abusive policies. When the regime collapsed, reformists moved in under a climate 
susceptible to reform. In July 2001, Paniagua released a report calling for major reforms 
in the police corps. This report was a creation of the National Anticorruption 
Commission, as noted above. A reform team, headed by Gino Costas, was formed and 
given the mandate for radical reform aimed at reducing corruption, among other things. 
The reform received little international support and was at once both overly independent-
it was a stand-alone team with no useful institutional ties-and overly dependent-it lacked 
certain critical decision-making skills. It was, despite this, initially successful. Among 
other things, an office of Internal Affairs was created. However, it ran into resistance 
from police officers, especially those at high levels, especially against the anti-corruption 
provisions. According to Costas, at crucial moments President Toledo failed to support 
the reform team. It is important to add, however, that Costas was dismissed by Toledo so 
his judgment is somewhat suspect-Costas details, among things, the circumstances 
surrounding his exit from his position. 
It is interesting, and illuminating, that the reform ultimately failed because of its 
anti-corruption provisions. This highlights the difficult, problematic nature of these types 
30
 Gina Costa and Rachel Nield, "Police Reform in Peru," Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 38, no. 5 (216-229), 2005. 
31
 Ibid, 219. 
32
 See "World Leaders 2003 - Peru," Encylopedia of the Nations, 
<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/World-Leaders-2003/Per-DOMESTIC-POLICY.html> (accessed 
March 6, 2009). 
of reforms. The otherwise commendable program failed, apparently, due to lack of 
external and political support. 
G8 Compact to promote transparency and combat corruption 
In 2004 the G8 created a pilot project of four countries, including Peru, designed 
to promote transparency and fight corruption. According to the G8, the goal was to help 
Peru with, "Public budgets and financial management, including revenues and 
expenditures; Government procurement; and Letting of public concessions." The 
Peruvian proposal was more specific and aggressive-several specific reforms affecting 
civil service and civil society in particular were mentioned. Peru was chosen, apparently, 
because its various agencies lacked the independence and capabilities to properly monitor 
and evaluate government activities34 but had recently made significant efforts to address 
the problem. Despite the fact that the cooperative program was first agreed upon in 
2004, there are apparently few tangible results to show, beyond the creation of a national 
i 36 
plan. 
CERIAJUS Judicial Reform Plan 
The Special Commission for the Comprehensive Reform of Justice 
Administration, or CERIAJUS, was formed in October 2003 with the mandate to create a 
national plan for reforming the Peruvian judicial sector. The scope of this reform plan is 
aggressively broad-there are over 200 proposals in the CERIAJUS national judicial 
"Compact to Promote Transparency and Combat Corruption: A New Partnership between the 
G8 and Peru." 
34
 Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Peru page. 
35
 U.S. Department of State, "Four G8 Compact Countries Announce Their Plans to Combat 
Corruption." < http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/36832.htm> (accessed March 8, 2009). 
36
 Ibid. 
reform plan. Yet to date there are few tangible results from any of these programs. Tom 
Pegram of the Peru Support Group explains it well here, 
"The CERIAJUS plan, negotiated with a wide array of governmental and 
civil society institutions, including the judiciary, is impressive in its scope. It 
offers a comprehensive diagnostic of the institution and a blueprint for reform. 
Yet the plan has been met with apparent disinterest on the part of the Executive 
and Congress-and outright hostility from traditionalist quarters within the 
judiciary who claim it is a politically motivated attempt to meddle in its internal 
affairs."38 
Freedom House agrees that, due to a lack of political support from both the 
Presidency and Congress, CERIAJUS showed few results early on. In January 2007, 
however, under new leadership CERIAJUS became more proactively involved. As such 
some limited but impressive results were achieved in 2007. The results appear to be a 
function of political support, very similar to that throughout Peru-Paniagua pushed 
reform hard, Toledo began well but quickly cratered out, and Garcia has shown some 
limited promise. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Political leadership 
Rated a '-2' for 'Decrease in IV probable and modest.' 
Over and over I found during my research one impressive reform effort after 
another that was begun, in some sense, by Paniagua and killed off or muted by Toledo. 
And, as will be argued below, this lack of political support had a strong negative effect on 
Justice Studies Center of the Americas, "Report of Justice", Third Edition (2006-2007). 
<http://www.cejamericas.org/reporte/muestra_pais3.php?idioma=INGLES&pais=PERU&tipreport=REPO 
RTE3&seccion=PROYREFO > (accessed March 8, 2009). 
38
 Tom Pegram, The Peru Support Group, Update 108 ( February/March 2005). 
<http://www.perusupportgroup.org.uk/archive/news_108.html> (accessed March 8, 2009). 
39
 Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads 2007. Country Report - Peru. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=164&section=89&ccrpag 
e=37> (accessed March 8,2009). 
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most of my other seven independent variables. 
While the story surrounding this variable is clear-cut, scoring this variable is 
complicated. How much should Paniagua's early efforts and Garcia's recent promise 
offset Toledo's increasingly miserable performance? Early on there was strong political 
leadership, which steadily declined with time. Paniagua struck the right tone from the 
beginning and worked hard to promote reform. Toledo began well but then fell off-what 
started as a continuation of reform begun under Paniagua, in reaction to the excesses of 
Fujimori, ended in typically Latin American fashion with Toledo being run out of office 
with a tarnished reputation and a mostly failed legacy. To date, Garcia has shown some 
limited promise. It is my judgment that Toledo's incompetency and corrupt practices 
occurred at the crucial moment, which would largely determine Peru's decreases in the TI 
CPI rankings. Therefore these volatile results demand a rating of-2. 
Civil service reform 
Rated a ' 1 ' for 'Improvement in IV minor and in dispute.' 
The number of civil service reforms implemented by the Peruvian government since 
the fall of Fujimori is truly impressive. I have found 17 reform efforts that appear to have 
civil service reform elements. The laws and regulations were varied-dealing with police 
reform, civil service pay, transparency in financial information and procurement, etc. Some 
of them proved effective, at least at first. There were some smaller, limited achievements. For 
example, according to USAID, Proetica, which later became the Peru TI chapter, was very 
successful in implementing a police uniform procurement reform project.40However, most of 
40
 USAID, "Anti-Corruption and Transparency Coalitions: Lessons from Peru, Paraguay, El 
Salvador and Bolivia,." (August 2005). 
<http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:fN0DahQo6EUJ:info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/ 
Country%2520Profiles/Paraguay/USAID_ACTransparencyCoalitons.pdf+Anti-
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these reforms have been largely ineffective. The police reform initiative, detailed above, is 
indicative of this failure in general and perfectly in line with the sad theme of Peruvian 
decline-Paniagua worked hard and achieved impressive results41 only to see it all frittered 
away under Toledo. Because of this, I have given this a rating of 1. 
Civil society groups 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest' 
While the TI chapter of Peru (formerly Proetica) has been active, it does not appear to 
have had many successes. It had solid success with initiating and helping to implement a 
police uniform procurement project.42 It also conducted twin anti-corruption projects in the 
field of education. One was designed as a survey while the other was a pilot program 
intended to allow citizens to more effectively make complaints against corrupt local 
education officials.43 The latter resulted in almost tripling the number of complaints during 
the pilot program.44 Other than Proetica, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) was designed to increase transparency in the mining industry by involving civil 
society. This seems to have worked better than most Peruvian reform programs.45 In the end, 
this ranking was a difficult call but there was just enough certainty of actual reform and just 
enough overall effort to keep this from being a 1. 
Corruption+and+Transparency+Coalitions:+Lessons+from+Peru,+Paraguay,+El+Salvador+and+Bolivia&c 
d=l&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> (accessed March 19,2009). 
41
 See for example, Mariana Felicio and Indu John-Abraham, "Peru: Towards a System of Social 
Accountability," World Bank En Breve, no. 39 (February 2004). 
42
 Anonymous, "Anti-Corruption and Transparency Coalitions: Lessons from Peru, Paraguay, El 
Salvador and Bolivia," USAID (August 2005), 3. < http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNADD813.pdf> 
(accessed March 10,2009). 
43
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Management Workshop (Athens, Greece. November 1,2008). 
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March 10, 2009). 
45
 Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Peru Country Profile. 
133 
Media freedom 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Increase in IV clear and significant.' 
The Freedom House media freedom rankings for Peru are pretty clear-cut-Peru has 
made great strides since 1998.46 Graph 7 shows its year-to-year rankings. 
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Graph 7. Peru Freedom House rankings. 
Keeping in mind that lower scores indicate greater media freedom, we quickly see 
that Peru's media freedom rankings started off bad, at 59; worsened over the next two years; 
began a remarkable improvement all the way down into the 30s; and finally slumped back 
down to 44 over the next couple of years. So there has been volatility but, overall, great 
improvement. This makes sense given the autocratic nature of the Fujimori regime and the 
reaction against it. Clearly, Peru's decline cannot be blamed at all on increasing repression. 
The reverse, in fact, appears to be the case: Peruvian corruption reform failed despite its 
increasing media freedom. 
Freedom House, Freedom of Press data for Latin America. 
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Judicial reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Increase in IV probable and modest.' 
There were many different programs implemented during this time period belonging 
in this category. In fact, 15 of the 31 programs identified concern, in part at least, the 
judiciary. And many of those, as was the case with CERIAJUS, have many judicial 
subcomponents. Clearly there was a lot of effort and resources put into these types of 
programs. And there is some evidence of limited success beyond initial legal changes, similar 
to that mentioned above with CERIAJUS. All in all, however, these reforms have failed to 
register results due largely to a lack of support from the political leadership, especially 
Toledo and the Congress. It is encouraging, though, that since 2007 under Garcia progress 
has been made. Perhaps Peru can use this to build upon going forward. Because of the 
impressive number of programs instituted, and the limited results prior to 2007 combined 
with the promising ones since 2007, this receives a rating of 2. 
Anti-corruption organization or ombudsman 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Increase in IV minor and in dispute.' 
This is arguably the saddest component of Peru's sad tale. As described above, 
the Peruvian government recognized the need for an effective anti-corruption 
organization but set it up poorly, failed to provide the necessary support, and fell into a 
pattern of periodic failed reorganizations. The fact that the organization was created, 
some reform components have emerged from it, and President Garcia has shown some 
promise of late save this from being rated lower than a 1. 
External influence 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
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The international community has been actively involved in the post-Fujimori era. In 
addition to these somewhat typical international programs, Peru, as detailed above, was part 
of an inventive G8 pilot project in which nations that need a lot of help and have made recent 
efforts to improve are supported. On the surface, this speaks well to Peru's efforts but says 
nothing about its accomplishments. Creating the framework for effective reform is actually 
quite commonplace in highly corrupt countries-empowering this framework to create results 
is the trick. And, overall, there is little to show for this influence. The MCC accepted Peru as 
a 'threshhold' nation. This means, among other things, that Peru was not deemed 
institutionally capable enough to extend a compact agreement to. Thus, the new type of 
upfront conditionality that the MCC represents generally is not applicable here-these 
threshold pacts look eerily like traditional 10 funding. All of this combined necessitates a 
rating of 2. 
Openness to trade 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Increase in IV clear and significant.' 
In absolute terms, Peru's world trade figures rose significantly in the post-Fujimori 
period. Peru's 'total merchandise' exports increased almost five-fold between 1998 and 2007 
and its imports increased more than two-fold.47 Looking at merchandise trade as a 
percentage of GDP, we see similar results in Graph 8. Similar to Tanzania, Peru made up 
quite a bit of ground on the world average. Not only do Peru's data indicate strong changes in 
this area but they also are even stronger than Colombia's. This coincides with the available 
qualitative evidence, which indicates Peru moved toward an open economy after Fujimori. It 
47
 WTO trade data. < http://stat.wto.org> (accessed March 19, 2009). 
48
 World Bank data. <http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=l&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VI 
WADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N> (accessed March 5,2009). 
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is overwhelmingly clear that Peru's lack of success was not a function of a closed (or 
closing) economy. As such, this merits a 3. 
2000 2005 2006 
D World Merchandise Trade as % of 
Trade 
• Peruvian Merchandise Trade as % 
of Trade 
2007 
Graph 8. Peruvian trade. 
COMPARING COLOMBIA AND PERU 
Putting these scores into our score sheet, we get the following results. 
Table 9. Colombia and Peru scoresheet 
Independent Variable 
Political Leadership 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
Media Freedom 
Judicial Capabilities 
Nat'l Anti-Corruption 
Organization 
External influence 
Openness to Trade 
Colombia 
3 
2 
3 
-2 
3 
0 
3 
2 
Peru 
-2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
3 
Difference 
(Colombia-
Peru) 
5 
1 
1 
-5 
1 
-1 
1 
-1 
As the millennium came to a close, Colombia and Peru stood at the crossroads, facing 
very daunting but different challenges. Peru's way ahead looked full of promise as it had just 
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got rid of a corrupt, authoritarian president and seemed ready as a nation to embark on a real 
path to reform. Colombia, on the other hand, was mired in a violent civil war and in a severe 
economic recession. It seemed on the verge of collapse. Yet in their efforts to reduce 
corruption, Colombia advanced while Peru backtracked. Colombia succeeded because of its 
civil conflict for two reasons: the U.S. provided a massive level of support for Colombian 
reforms, which were relatively easy to effectively implement due to the unusual (if not 
unique) urgency and incentive structure. Colombia's political leadership was solidly behind 
the reform efforts as well. Whereas in Tanzania, strong political leadership led to real but 
modest institutional gains, in Colombia the necessities of the drug war led to reasonably 
strong political leadership, which led to quite impressive institutional changes in some areas, 
in particular the judiciary. Interestingly, Colombian progress was primarily geographically 
centered in and around the capitol. Corruption may have actually worsened in outlying areas 
as the FARC and others abandoned Bogota. 
Generally, my findings reflect this. The largest effect appears to have been political 
leadership, with Colombia scoring a 3 and Peru a -2, largely due to the effects of Toledo. 
Following political leadership, there are four variables for which Colombia scored one point 
better than Peru (in rough descending order of importance): External Influence, Judicial 
Reform, Civil Service Reform, and Civil Society. While there was just a one-point difference 
for External Influence, in reality this was enormously important, suggesting, not surprisingly, 
that corruption reform per se and development reform more generally are simply on a 
different scale than issues concerning perceived 'hyperpower' national security interests. 
One interesting finding from my first case was that media freedom did not increase in 
Tanzania. It is not entirely clear what to make of this-it's plausible that Tanzania's lack of 
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decline was sufficient to not gum up reform efforts. Here, however, there is no ambiguity-
Peru's media freedom greatly increased (with a rating of 3) and Colombia's worsened (with a 
rating of-2). Thus far, media freedom does not appear to play the beneficial role that it is 
assumed to. 
There are some interesting, no doubt important, differences between my first two 
paired cases. Openness to trade may have been a factor in Tanzania's relative success; 
this is simply not the case here. Both countries became more significantly more open to 
trade, but Peru even more so. And the fact that Peru's national anti-corruption 
organization reform efforts were somewhat better than those of Colombia (which were 
nearly non-existent) lines up somewhat with the findings from Tanzania and Malawi, 
both of which scored a 1 on this independent variable. It will be interesting to keep an eye 
on this beloved component of the Corruption Consensus crowd as we move into my third 
and final case-Thailand and the Philippines. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES 
INTRODUCTION 
After one paired case showing the importance of political leadership and another 
showing the importance of a complicated domestic civil conflict, my third case also 
highlights the importance of local, idiosyncratic characteristics. Whereas Colombia 
benefitted from an otherwise disastrous civil conflict, Thailand benefitted from an 
otherwise disastrous economic collapse. Let's call it the Silver Lining Clause: corruption 
reform in both of these countries is 'success' you might wish on your enemies. And it is 
hard to imagine how this would be transferable. The Thai case also shows the inherently 
fragile nature of the modest success stories under study here. The coup was, in some 
significant part, aimed at turning back these reforms. It is not surprising that Thailand's 
improving scores have given way to decreases since the coup of 2006. The Philippines, 
on the other hand, brings us a stark and simple (if sleazy) example of a country seemingly 
doing everything right without results. Hicken's comparison of the respective Thai and 
Philippine response to the economic crisis captures perfectly this crucial difference and 
deserves to be quoted in length: 
In Thailand-ground zero for the crisis-the collapse of the economy not only 
called into question the advisability and sustainability of the Thai economic 
strategy; it also served as the catalyst for significant political and institutional 
reform. In the Philippines, by contrast, the comparatively mild economic 
downturn was viewed in many quarters as a vindication of a set of economic 
reforms undertaken by the Fidel Ramos administration. The economic crisis did 
not generate a political crisis, nor did it lead, in any significant way, to major 
political and economic reforms...Ironically, however, because the crisis did not 
engender the depth of political angst in the Philippines that it did in Thailand, the 
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impetus for further reform, economic or political, was lacking.1 
THAILAND: RELEVANT HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
Thailand's history since 1997 is actually pretty clear-cut and simple. It was 
dominated by four sequential events: the economic collapse of June 1997 led to the 
radical restructuring of the Thai Constitution just a few months later in October 1997; 
which was followed by the election in 2001 of President Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai 
Rak Thai party. Thaksin Shinawatra simultaneously sought to consolidate his power, 
suppress his enemies and pursue real, effective reform.2 This potent combination led to 
the military coup of September 19, 2006, by which the new Constitution was repealed. 
The radical anti-corruption aspects of the Constitution were a function of the fact that 
ordinary citizens and elites alike viewed the economic collapse as largely caused by 
corruption.4 And these same citizens found themselves empowered in the wake of the 
collapse. 
According to Munger, 
In Thailand, the 1997 constitutional reform sprang not from elites' concerns about 
the legitimacy of a government that served their interests, but from widespread 
concerns about a government that, at times, served neither elite nor popular 
interests due to corruption and the absence of effective democracy. 
From this we can clearly see the political opportunity brought by the 'creatively 
destructive' economic collapse of 1997. 
1
 Allen Hicken, "Politics of Economic Recovery in Thailand and the Philippines," in Crisis as 
Catalyst: Asia's Dynamic Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) 206-207. 
2Allen Hicken, "Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai," Journal 
of East Asian Studies 6 (2006): 381-407. 
3
 Frank Munger, "Constitutional Reform, Legal Consciousness, and Citizen Participation in 
Thailand," Cornell International Law Journal 40 (2007): 455-475. 
4
 Ibid, 462. 
5Ibid, 464. 
RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
I have identified 12 programs and incidents relevant to this analysis. This 
continues something of a trend-successful countries seem to engage in fewer reform 
programs than unsuccessful countries. This would seem to support the common sense 
notion that it's about quality, not quantity. In this section I will provide details for and 
analysis of six of the most telling and important programs. As with my previous cases, a 
full list of programs and associated variables can be found in Appendix E. 
Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact 
The first and biggest example of the lack of programs is the fact that Thailand has 
no MCC Compact activity whatsoever. This is because, according to the rules governing 
the MCC, "Thailand is subject to section 508 of the FY 2006 FOAA which prohibits 
assistance to the government of a country whose duly elected head of government is 
deposed by decree or military coup."6 As such, there is little here to report other than that 
this could be recorded as either an absence or instance of external influence. It is absence 
in one sense, obviously, because the money that could otherwise be available from the 
MCC simply is not. It is an instance of external influence in that this is MCC up-front 
conditionally in its strictest form-Thailand very well might qualify for funding were it 
not for this (clearly reasonable) stipulation. It is too early, however, to tell what effects, if 
any, this strict conditionality will have on Thai reform. 
1997 Constitution 
Colombian success was significantly a factor of Plan Colombia, which itself was 
a function of Colombia's complex civil conflict. If anything, the Thai case is more 
6
 William G. Anderson, Jr. Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 29, February 13, 2007. Accessed at 
http://www.mcc.gov/about/reports/quarterly/report-fy07-quarterly-ql.pdfon March 16, 2009. 
extreme and clear-cut-its success is almost entirely derived from the Constitutional 
reform of 1997, which itself was a function of the collapse of the Thai economy. 
Virtually all of my sources discuss the Constitution; while there is disagreement 
on its effects and effectiveness, there is a strong consensus that the radical rewrite was 
made possible by the economic collapse, that civil society was strongly involved in the 
creation of and writing, and the new Constitution was a significant departure from the 
old. Whereas Plan Colombia was mentioned in several of my Colombian sources, the 
Constitution of 1997 was mentioned in virtually every source I encountered. It was very 
broadly and deeply designed, affecting most of my variables, one way or another and 
many of the programs I researched were born from the Constitution. At least seven of the 
eleven other programs were created or affected by it: the Structural Reform Law, the 
National Counter Corruption Commission, the Administrative Reform Law, the 
Constitution Court and Administrative Court, the Election Commission, the 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen, and the Public Finance Audit Commission (formerly Auditor 
General). According to Warsta, "Every province had a member in the group forming the 
new constitution and hearings took place all over the country." Not only was it made 
possible by an empowered Thai civil society but some of the strongest provisions in it 
were intended to strengthen civil society further. According to Phongpaichit, the 
Constitution had four motivations: to encourage the 'right to know' (applicable here to 
accountability and transparency in the civil service and civil society); 'removal from 
office' (civil service reform, civil society); freedom of press (directly equivalent to one of 
7
 Matias Warsta, "Corruption in Thailand," Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (April 22, 
2004), 13. < http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/TH/Corruption_in_Thailand.pdf> (accessed April 1, 
2009). 
my variables); and decentralization (in limited, specific situations, applicable to civil 
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service reform and civil society). 
National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) 
The Constitution contained a provision changing the old, largely ineffective 
Counter Corruption Commission (CCC) that was dependent on the executive, into a new, 
more independent and capable NCCC.9 According to Phongpaichit, 
The new NCCC has been given more power. Its main duty is to investigate 
corruption problems among MPs, senators, cabinet members, and high 
government officials, including the members of the independent government 
bodies and law courts.10 
From this we can detect relevance to the Civil Service Reform and Judicial 
Reform IVs. This change is clearly aimed at reducing high-level corruption as well as 
high-level opposition to corruption reform. The results are mixed. Heilbrunn is strongly 
critical of the NCCC's ability to affect real reform: 
Perhaps the single greatest impediment to resolving crony capitalism in Thailand 
is that the Senate is subservient to the executive who has a decisive influence in 
determining the commission's composition. This reporting structure prevents any 
independence of the NCCC from the executive and calls into question any 
effectiveness of Thailand's anti-corruption efforts. While parliamentary oversight 
is a potential control on the NCCC, the constitutional weakness of the Thai 
parliament makes it doubtful that it will ever exert much influence.11 
However, Phongpaichit documents a number of successful cases. According to 
Pasuk Phongpaichit, "Good Governance: Thailand's Experience," Paper for Asia Pacific Finance 
Association (APFA) annual conference, Bangkok, July 2001. 
<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ei=A4vTScLXAtLrlQfSwZn7Cw&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct 
=result&cd=l&q=GOOD+GOVERNANCE%3 A+THAILAND+EXPERIENCE&spell= 1> (accessed April 
1,2009): 1-11. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid, 4. 
11
 John R. Heilbrunn, "Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight 
Corruption?" World Bank Institute (2004), 12. 
<http://74.125.93.104/search?q=cache:137OyzZ38xEJ:siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi372 
34Heilbrurm.pdf+jolm+heilbrurm+anti-cormption+commissions&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl==us> (accessed 
April 1, 2009). 
him, 
The minister of interior in the last government was barred from politics for five 
years, as he was found to have lied to the NCCC on his asset declaration. The 
present prime minister was also found guilty of intentionally concealing some of 
his assets from the NCCC as well, but was acquitted by the Constitutional Court 
on a split decision. These two incidents indicate that the new NCCC is making a 
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mark in its new role to combat corruption among politicians. 
Administrative and Constitution Courts 
There were many judicial elements to the Constitution. Among them was the 
creation of two separate types of courts: Administrative and Constitution. The 
11 
Administrative Courts were designed to "oversee the vast entrenched bureaucracy" ; the 
Constitution Courts were intended "to rule on the constitutionality of bills or laws 
referred to it and rule on disputes over constitutional interpretation."14 More specifically, 
the Administrative Courts are to "try cases arising from disputes among government 
agencies, local administration and officials involving the performance of a duty or failure 
to perform a duty..." and that "For the first time, an ordinary Thai citizen has the right to 
sue government agencies through this administrative court."15 From this we can see the 
relevance to civil service reform and civil society. The Constitutional Court "has made 
several landmark rulings and has rapidly become a central fixture of the political 
landscape."16 
Autonomization 
Thai 'autonomization', according to Bowornwathana, is "the creation of 
12
 Phongpaichit, 4. 
13
 Munger, 463. 
14
 Hicken, 386. 
15
 Phongpaichit, 5. 
16
 Ibid, 4. 
autonomous organisations within the Thai bureaucracy." 
Autonomisation should in the long run dismantle the government system 
based on a single large hierarchy into a more complex one consisting of a smaller 
core pyramid with numerous types of autonomous public organisations located 
outside the hierarchy. 
According to Bowornwathana, it has not worked at all as planned-in fact, the 
Thai bureaucracy seems to have grown.19 Elsewhere, Bowornwathana sees 
autonomization as part of a political strategy by Thaksin to bring the bureaucracy under 
his control, rather than making it more efficient and smaller, arguing that, "Instead of 
autonomization of the state, Thaksin tsunami has reversed the process with prime 
ministerialization."20 Painter agrees and states, "Only a handful of relatively insignificant 
bodies were 'autonomized' under this provision..." Levy argues that the attempts to 
reform the bureaucracy were designed to balance between the simultaneous, 
contradictory need for decentralization and effective control and, ultimately, failed due to 
resistance by entrenched bureaucrats.22 Part of this broad civil service reform effort is 
aimed at improving governance and reducing corruption. 
Corporate governance 
Corporate governance as a principal focus of Thai constitutional reform was a 
function of the economic collapse, which was deemed by many to have been caused by 
17
 Bidhya Bowornwathana, "Autonomisation of the Thai State: Some Observations," Public 
Administration and Development 26, no. 1 (2006): 27. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid, 27-34. 
20
 Bidhya Bowornwathana, "Administrative Reform and Tidal Waves from Regime Shifts: 
Reverse Effects of Thaksin's Tsunami on Autonomization," Paper delivered to SCANCOR-SOG/IPSA 
Workshop (Stanford, 1-2 April 2005): 2. 
21
 Martin Painter, "Managerial Reform and Political Control: the Case of Thaksin and the Thai 
Bureaucracy," (Undated), 20. < http://www.sog-rc27.org/Paper/Scancor/Martin_Painter.doc> (accessed 
April 1,2009). 
22
 Brian Levy, Governance Reform: Bridging Monitoring and Action (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2007), 102-103. 
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corruption specifically. More generally, it is very clear that the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the private sector was a major factor in the economic catastrophe. It was 
one of the components all but forced on Thailand by the IMF. So there were significant 
resources allocated to reforming corporate governance. Consequently, there is a lot of 
available information on these efforts. The verdict on these efforts is generally negative. 
According to White, corporate governance has been a miserable failure.24 Other sources 
are more positive about these efforts. This type of reform does not fit easily into any of 
my eight IVs. I purposefully chose (as described above), due to its contentious nature, to 
leave privatization out of the mix. In addition to External Influence, I have included it as 
part of civil service reform, since much of civil service reform concerns increasing 
accountability and transparency. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Political leadership 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Improvement in IV minor and in dispute.' 
Of all my successful cases, Thailand's success is the least dependent on political 
leadership. As discussed both above and below, this has to do-in part-with the relatively 
strong importance that civil society and citizens at large played in demanding reform. It is 
also due to the political rollercoaster ride Thailand has been on. This reform, which appears 
to have been the primary cause of Thai's modest success, occurred despite, rather than due 
to, political leadership. The radical rewrite of the Constitution was as much, if not much 
more, a function of an odd combination between external actors, especially, the IMF, and 
23
 Steven White, "Stakeholders, Structure and the Failure of Corporate Governance Reform 
Initiatives in Post-Crisis Thailand," Asia Pacific Journal of Management 21 (2004): 103-122. 
24White. 
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ordinary citizens rather than the political leadership. And Thaksin's autocratic leadership led 
to the successful coup of 2006, which appears to have been intended, in large part, to undo 
reform. Thaksin did take on the bureaucracy, in an effort to pull it under his political control, 
but he does not seem to have done much to the intent of the reforms. This is rated a 1 due to 
the flawed but real support that Thaksin did provide to the reforms. 
Civil service reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
The result here is decidedly mixed. As described above, the attempts to 
'autonomize' the state largely failed. This was arguably the biggest factor in Thai civil 
service reform. But it was not the only factor-there was a collection of reforms aimed at 
improving and empowering civil society and promoting accountability and transparency, 
which seem to have been quite effective. Warsta specifically points out two important 
provisions applicable to civil service in this context: the right of citizens to remove high-
level public officials from office, which affects civil service accountability; and the 'right 
to know', which is designed to increase accountability. And the creation and 
implementation of the Electoral Commission has provisions in it applicable to 
accountability as well. This receives a rating of 2 due to these decidedly mixed results. 
Civil society groups 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant.' 
Of all my cases, Thailand stands out as easily the biggest positively influenced by 
civil society. Thai civil society was instrumental in promoting Constitutional reform in the 
first place and a significant chunk of this constitutional reform was intended to further 
Warsta. 
Hicken. 
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strengthen civil society in Thailand. These reforms have been at all levels of society. 
Reforms to local governance, designed to get local stakeholders involved in government and 
reform are truly impressive.27 Civil society was involved in, first and foremost, the creation 
and implementation of the Constitution. And from the Constitutional reform came many 
further civil society provisions, which appear to have been relatively quite effective. For all 
these reasons, this category can safely be scored a 3. 
Media freedom 
Rated a ' -3 ' for 'Decrease in IV clear and significant.' 
This has played a surprisingly minimal role thus far and the case of Thailand supports 
this trend-and then some. As can be seen in Graph 9, Thailand began this period with a 
relatively free media and ended it with a fairly closed media, with its rank almost doubling 
from 31 to 56. This constituted the largest, starkest change by far of all my countries. 
27
 See for example, Orapin Sopchokchai, "Good Local Governance and Anti-Corruption through 
People's Participation: A Case of Thailand," The Office of Civil Service Commission (October 8,2001). < 
http://74.125.93.104/search?q=cache:tDDRL0PSa7oJ:www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/prague_ora 
pin.ppt+Orapin+Sopchokchai,+%E2%80%9CGood+Local+Governance+and+Anti-
Corruption+through+People%E2%80%99s+Participation:+A&cd=l&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> (accessed 
April 1,2009). 
28
 For a detailed analysis of the impact of civil society on Thai reform, see Phongpaichit. 
29
 Freedom House, Freedom of Press data for Asia Pacific. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/historical/SSAsia.xls> (accessed April 1,2009). 
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Graph 9. Thailand Freedom House rankings. 
This is pretty easy to explain, qualitatively. The Thaksin regime became 
increasingly authoritarian, which led to an equally, if not more, authoritarian military 
coup, restrictions under which continue today. This category can safely be scored a -3. 
Judicial reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest. 
The two biggest aspects of Thai judicial reform were the creation of twin courts-
Constitution and Administrative (as described above)-by the 1997 Constitution. The 
evidence suggests, again as mentioned above, that the courts have been reasonably, if 
very imperfectly, effective. The Constitution Court, before being shut down after the 
coup, was quite prominently flexing its muscles against other institutions.30 The fact that 
the military, in its efforts to roll back reform, closed down the Constitution Court is sad 
indication of its success. Due to the fact that the Constitution Court has been shut down 
and the existence of some criticism otherwise against the two courts, this receives a rating 
of 2 instead of 3. 
30
 Bowornwathana, 2006, 6. 
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Anti-corruption organization or ombudsman 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
The constitutionally mandated reform of the NCC into the NCCC was the biggest 
component of this IV. And it is somewhat in dispute how effective it has been, as detailed 
above. A Parliamentary Ombudsman was also created with seemingly significant powers 
but few results due, perhaps, to its lack of promotion. Third, the Office of Auditor 
General was reorganized into the Public Finance Audit Commission (PFAC) and given 
more independence and greater powers.32 Its effectiveness is unclear. Due to the fact that 
these organizations have been formed and the NCCC has obtained important convictions, 
contrasted against its critics, this merits a rating of 2. 
External influence 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in TV probably and modest.' 
When it comes to external influence, the evidence is oddly mixed. There was quite a 
bit of heavy-handed, controversial and 'front-loaded' external influence as the IMF and other 
IOs were heavily involved in response to the '97 economic collapse. But after that, change 
appears to have been disproportionately driven by domestic forces. However we should not 
dismiss the importance played by international organizations in urging, implementing and 
controlling so many aspects of these reforms from the beginning. Because of the 
overwhelming (and controversial) role played by the IMF, this category receives a rating of 
2. 
Openness to trade 
Rated a ' 3 ' for 'Improvement in IV clear and significant.' 
31
 Phongpaichit, 4. 
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Our evidence indicates that Thailand went from being relatively very open to trade to 
even more so during our time period. WTO data regarding merchandise imports and exports 
between 1998 and 2007 each almost tripled in absolute numbers. Additionally, Graph 10 
confirms this with data showing Thailand's merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP 
growing from an already impressive 107 in 2000 to 120 in 2007.34 In percentage terms, this 
roughly kept pace with world averages. 
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Graph 10. Thai trade. 
So while the relative percentage gains are not that impressive, the absolute values 
are. Because of this, this receives a rating of 3. 
Having examined the details of the topsy-turvy and fragile Thai success story, it is 
time to examine the sordid details of failure in the Philippines. 
PHILIPPINES: RELEVANT HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
If Malawi provided our most typical case of failure and Peru provided us our 
saddest case, the Philippines perhaps provides our sleaziest case. The Philippines was 
WTO trade data. 
World Bank data. 
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embroiled in one high-level scandal after another, including one that eventually brought 
down a president after a media-exposed corruption scandal that fomented nation-wide 
protests and eventually led to his impeachment and ouster. Philippines anti-corruption 
efforts have been as large scale and ambitiously designed as any other country I have 
encountered. In addition to this, the Philippines had some significant preexisting 
capabilities, especially in the areas of civil society and the media. These efforts have 
been killed by the one-two punch of political elites who both oppose the efforts and are 
pretty clearly deeply corrupt themselves. 
Philippine reform has some interesting similarities to that of Thailand. For 
example, the Philippines also has a history of strong and successful civil society demands 
for reform, specifically, spontaneous mass movements intended to overthrow leaders. 
But, in contrast to Thailand and keeping with the trend in my findings thus far, the 
Philippines appears to suffer from an excess of quantity and dearth of quality.36 I have 
located 23 programs, compared to Thailand's 12. There is little holding together the 
mish-mash of programs. In fact, as will be discussed, one recent programmatic effort was 
designed to consolidate efforts. None of which is to say that nothing worked. In fact, the 
most interesting aspect of this is that many of the programs were implemented, it would 
seem, exactly as they were imagined. Yet there are few tangible results to show from it 
and the Philippines' corruption scores, meanwhile, have worsened. 
Since the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in 1987 and the beginning of the time 
35
 Sheila Coronel, "The Philippines: Corruption Notebook," Global Integrity Report 2004. 
<http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2004/2004/country3a40.html?cc=ph&act=notebook> (accessed 
April 5, 2009). 
36
 For an impressive list of just programs involving international organizations, see Transparency 
International, "National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Philippines 
2006," 17. <http://www.transparency.org/content/download/15149/162858> (accessed April 5, 2009). 
37
 See Appendix F for a list of Philippine programs and related IVs. 
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period being investigated here, the Philippines implemented a lot of corruption-related 
reform. So they began with some apparent pre-existing institutional capability, if only 
formal in nature. The Philippines have had two presidents during this time period-Joseph 
Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001) and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001 to present). Estrada-
an actor turned politician-was elected in 1998 but later ousted, after being impeached, in 
2001 as a result of the 2001 mass movement in response to corruption charges and 
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allegations against him. Arroyo had resigned as Vice President and joined the anti-
Estrada movement and, as a result, was rewarded with the presidency. She was elected in 
2004 under circumstances that remain controversial to this day.39 She has herself been the 
target of consistent accusations of corruption and abuse of power and has withstood 
multiple impeachment attempts. In short, both Estrada and Arroyo have been the exact 
type of political leader one would not want or expect to lead effective corruption reform 
movements. 
RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
For the Philippines, I will examine five programs, which best exemplify the failed 
reform efforts. In each of these programs (except the MCC) we see, as we have 
throughout this dissertation and in perfect alignment with my Reverse Karenina 
argument, a seemingly well-intended, well-designed and often well-financed program 
gets implemented in a promising fashion only to produce next to no results. For most of 
these cases, there just is no capability of enforcing the provisions most in need of 
38
 Freedom House, "Countries at the Crossroads, Country Reports - Philippines," (2007). 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/templatexfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrpage=37&ccrcountry=165> 
(accessed April). 
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enforcement and, relatedly, no force promulgating the program. And more often than not, 
that lack of a driving force equates to a lack of high-level (especially Presidential) 
support. As with each of my previous cases, I will begin the discussion with the slightly 
one-off issue of the MCC Compact. 
Millenium Challenge Corporation Compact 
The first thing to note here is the Philippines was approved in June 2006 for the 
threshhold program, which is indication of both success and failure. They are not yet 
capable enough, not surprisingly, to receive full MCC compact funding but promising 
enough to receive funding from the limbo-like threshhold program. In 2006, the 
Philippines was approved to receive US$ 21 million. The funds are intended to be used 
largely for poverty relief, anti-corruption efforts and tax collection improvement.40 Much 
of this money will be funneled through the Ombudsman and President Arroyo has also 
set aside Philippine 1 billion to be used by the Ombudsman in efforts to become a MCC 
Compact-eligible country.41 
Office Of The Ombudsman 
The Office of the Ombudsman was established in 1987, like many Philippine 
reform programs, and was made independent and given broad powers; it was 
strengthened in the Ombudsman Act of 1989. According to Transparency International, 
the Office of the Ombudsman "is the country's premiere anti-corruption body, lead 
government agency, and primary integrity institution responsible for curbing graft and 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Millennium Challenge Corporation Board Approves Anti-
Corruption Initiative in Philippines," Press Release (June 16, 2006). 
<http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/2006/release-061606-boardapprovesphilippines.php> (accessed April 
5,2009). 
41
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corruption."42 As such, it had something of an institutional head start heading into this 
period. It made sense, then, for many reform efforts during the current period to originate 
or land with the Ombudsman. And, in fact, the Philippine Ombudsman was, during the 
period in question, an active recipient and funds and focal point for reform programs. 
Several projects, including the MCC as mentioned above, were related to or run out of 
the Ombudsman's office. One project was entirely devoted to funding the Ombudsman to 
make up for the resource shortage.43 As such, the Ombudsman was both a target and 
mover of reform efforts. It was a target because of its traditionally weak track record in 
achieving successful prosecutions.4 But how effective have these efforts been? Well, not 
terribly it seems. The reforms were implemented exactly as imagined but there just have 
not been that many tangible results to show for it. It has recently, under a new director, 
obtained some convictions but it seems to still have a long way to go to become a truly 
efficient organization.45 
Procurement reform 
Procurement reform was a major goal of Philippine programs during this time 
period. Procurement appears to be a particularly important and vexing problem in the 
Philippines. Two civil society organizations-the Makati Business Club and Procurement 
Watch-were very active in developing and pushing procurement reform. The 
Ombudsman, as well, was involved. A number of international actors were involved in 
this area (the World Bank, Canada, and USAID). This all led, eventually, to the 
42
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Government Procurement Act of 2002. According to Transparency International, 
It was enacted primarily to reduce graft and corruption and to achieve economy 
and efficiency in procurement. Among its salient features are the adoption of 
consistent rules across all government agencies, including local government; 
increased transparency through civil society observers in the bid evaluation and 
award process; establishment of the Government Procurement Policy Board 
(GPPB) as the principal body responsible for procurement policy formulation and 
the implementation and monitoring of effective public procurement reform, to 
promote transparency, accountability and effectiveness; publication of bid 
invitations and outcomes on the GPPB website; and harmonisation of 
procurement procedures between government and international financing 
agencies'47 
Then in 2004, the Act was revised significantly for the better in several different 
aspects, including a whistleblower protection item that has to date resulted in no 
convictions. So, like the related Ombudsman item, procurement reform seems to have 
had everything fall into place but the bottom line: tangible results. Nonetheless, it should 
be stressed that on the surface recent Philippine procurement reform was apparently well 
done. 
National Anti-Corruption Program of Action (NACPA) 
As briefly mentioned above, modern Philippine reform has been not atypically 
negatively affected by an excess of programs and lack of focus. The NACPA was 
designed to address this deficiency. Putting together an effective, centralized focal point 
to promote and coordinate reform would be an important achievement. The Ombudsman 
was put in charge of the program. The stated objectives of the NACPA were to foster 
communication and consultation between the various actors (including government 
officials, civil society actors of various types, and external actors); make anti-corruption 
Transparency International, "National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country 
Study Report: Philippines 2006," 27-28. 
47
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48
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reforms more effective and efficient; create a system of performance metrics; and market 
these reforms.49 It is funded by the ADB, OECD, Asia Foundation and European 
Commission.50 The Ombudsman has "set up the NACPA secretariat and is currently 
organising the Multi-Sectoral Advisory Council."51 While it is early, it appears that the 
NACPA's work has been mostly limited to public marketing events. This does, however, 
show some promise. Whether or not it will spur results as intended remains to be seen. 
Presidential Anti-Graft Provision (PAGC) 
The PAGC was created by President Arroyo in 2001 through executive order in 
response to criticism. According to Transparency International, 
PAGC's mandate is to investigate or hear administrative complaints against 
presidential appointees; to investigate administrative cases against non-
presidential appointees conspiring with presidential appointees alleged to have 
done irregular acts; and to assist the president in the campaign against graft and 
corruption.52 
As such, it is a potential force for good and bad as it gives the executive strong 
capabilities and leeway in investigations against high-level appointees. And in the 
Philippines with its long history (including that being studied here) of corrupt presidents, 
that is no small matter. On first glance, this dependence to the executive, though, does not 
seem to rule out its potential importance given the existence of other, seemingly much 
more independent national agencies, in particular the Office of the Ombudsman. In 
practice, however, it does seem to have helped limit the results. Less than 10% of the 
cases begun by commission have resulted in recommendations of prosecutions, a fact 
ADB/OECD, "Philippines Project Summary: The National Anti-Corruption Program of Action 
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which has led President Arroyo to introduce an extremely dodgy-sounding quota 
system.53 In a civil society-related item, the PAGC has been going across the Philippines 
in an attempt to raise awareness regarding reform and corruption. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Political leadership 
Rated a ' -3 ' for 'Decrease in the IV clear and significant.' 
This is by far the most apparent, important, and oft-cited reason for the lack of 
success in recent Philippine reform efforts. Not only has there been a clear lack of 
support from presidents Estrada and now Arroyo, but Estrada was himself certainly 
corrupt, having been impeached from office on corruption allegations and, later, 
convicted as described above. And Arroyo has also come under a lot of criticism herself, 
nearly being impeached multiple times, although she has at least begun to 'talk the talk.' 
Both Estrada and Arroyo have behaved like stereotypical authoritarian leaders of 
underdeveloped nations with weak states, doing what they can to benefit themselves and 
stay in power. Estrada did next to nothing to promote reform, which is not terribly 
surprising considering that he was deeply corrupt himself. Arroyo's recent anti-
corruption activities began only recently and, seemingly, as just another way to hang onto 
power. Regardless of intention, her PAGC pet project has delivered very few results as of 
yet. She has committed money to anti-corruption efforts as part of the Philippines' MCC 
efforts, as noted above. Still, this is not nearly enough to overcome the poor start. This 
item, therefore, can safely be scored a -3. 
53
 Transparency International, "National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country 
Study Report: Philippines 2006," 30. 
159 
Civil service reform 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
Civil Service Reform generally was a highly targeted category-18 out of the 23 
identified programs had this as a component. As discussed, above, procurement reform was a 
large subcategory during this period. And, as argued above, many impressive advances were 
made in procurement. There were other programs as well, such as the PAGC, described 
above, and the Transparent Accountable Governance (TAG) program, both of which fall, in 
part, into this category. In short, multiple related but separate civil service reforms were 
implemented pretty much according to plan but with very few tangible results to date. The 
laws appear to be enforceable but largely unenforced. Because of this paradox, I am 
awarding a rating of 2. 
Civil society groups 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
As with the case of Thailand, the Philippines has a strong tradition of civil society 
involvement in politics. So there is some significant preexisting capability in this arena. And 
civil society was heavily involved throughout the period in question in traditional Philippine 
fashion, in protesting high-level corruption with results. But how are we to rate a mass 
protest movement that helps bring down a President or two but fails to affect real reform? It 
should count for something but is it improvement? I think this is something of an open 
question. But there were other reforms that involved using and strengthening civil society, 
such as the procurement-related actions of the Makati Business Club and Procurement Watch 
and the 'traveling road shows' of the PAGC. The influential involvement of citizens in the 
impeachment of Estrada and these other reforms are enough to merit a rating of 2. 
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Media freedom 
Rated a ' -3 ' for 'Decrease in IV clear and significant.' 
The Freedom House media freedom rankings for the Philippines are pretty clear-cut-
they have clearly, significantly worsened in this regard over the last 5 years or so. Like a 
milder version of Thailand, the Philippines went from having a fairly open media to having a 
somewhat closed one, with their rating going from 30 to 45. Graph 11 shows its year-to-year 
rankings.54 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Graph 11. Philippines Freedom House rankings. 
This is consistent with the available qualitative evidence. According to Freedom 
House, "press freedom is undermined by killings of journalists and a poor record of 
prosecuting those responsible. A more recent trend involves increasing numbers of libel 
suits against journalists by people close to the current administration."55 There is strong 
reason, given this clear-cut evidence, to rate this category a -3. 
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Judicial reform 
Rated a ' 1' for 'Increase in IV minor and in dispute.' 
The judiciary was not as much of a target of reform as it has been in some other 
cases. There have been a number of reform efforts including an American Bar 
Association/US AID legal reform project; the Judicial Reform Support Project; and the New 
Code of Judicial Conduct. There are very few results to show from them, in part, due to 
active resistance by the judiciary to reform that are intended to put a dent injudicial 
corruption.56 Because of these limitations, this category receives a rating of 1. 
National anti-corruption organization 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Increase in IV probable and modest.' 
This was a very active category in Philippine reform over the last ten years. As 
detailed and discussed above, the Ombudsman was a prime focal point of reform during 
this period. Many reforms were successfully implemented, but with few tangible results 
to date. The NACPA, run out of the Office of the Ombudsman, is intended to function as 
something of a coordinating policy unit. While neither one of these organizations has yet 
brought results as envisioned, they appear to have been implemented as intended. 
Because of the aggressive, proactive nature of these reforms, mixed with the lack of 
tangible results, this category receives a rating of 2. 
External influence 
Rated a '2 ' for 'Improvement in IV probable and modest.' 
As noted above, external actors have been pretty heavily involved in Philippine 
reform throughout the time period in question. There was external influence on four out of 
56
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five programs detailed here as well as four others researched here (see Appendix F). But it 
has been a typical type of international development external involvement. US AID has had 
multiple projects; the MCC has approved a threshold program for the Philippines; and the 
OECD and ADB have been quite active as well. Because the Philippine economic crisis was 
not nearly as severe as that in Thailand, there was relatively very little upfront, top-down 
reform mandated by the IMF and others. Again, there just has not been much to show as of 
yet from these efforts. 
Openness to trade 
Rated a '-2' for 'Decrease in IV probable and modest.' 
Philippine trade went from being relatively very open to significantly less so. The 
absolute trade numbers did rise from imports of $US 31 million in 1998 to 58 million in 2007 
and exports of 29 million in 1998 to 50 million in 2007.57 But percentage-wise, there was a 
relative drop-off. While world merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP was rising, from 41 
to 51, that of the Philippines fell from 101 down to 75.58 
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Graph 12. Philippines trade. 
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This lines up with available qualitative data. These factors combined merit a 
rating of-2. 
COMPARING THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES 
Putting these scores into our score sheet, we get the following results. 
Table 10. Thailand and P 
Independent Variable 
Political Leadership 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
Media Freedom 
Judicial Capabilities 
Nat'l Anti-Corruption 
Organization 
External influence 
Openness to Trade 
lilippines scoresheet 
Thailand 
1 
2 
3 
-3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
Philippines 
-3 
2 
2 
-3 
1 
2 
2 
-2 
Difference 
(Thailand-
Philippines) 
4 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
5 
Again, we see a strong confirmation of the Reverse Karenina hypothesis. The non-
institutional/idiosyncratic items are of more import generally, once again, than the 
institutional items. The two major differences (four points each) are found in Political 
Leadership and Openness to Trade. And while External Influence is a wash, the type of 
external influence is importantly and intriguingly different. One thing to note is that the four-
point difference in Political Leadership is a function of Philippine weakness, rather than Thai 
strength. The second point to note is the continued unimportance of a free media-Thailand 
significantly improved despite a severe decrease in media freedom. What we have in this 
paired case, then, is essentially a negative correlation. The institutional variables, once again, 
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yielded some modest differences only, as the reforms as planned and instituted have much 
more in common than apart. Having finished my paired cases, it is now time to pull 
everything together and comment on the policy and theoretical implications of my findings. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I have sought to answer some questions begged by gaps in the 
existing literature regarding (and everyday practice of) corruption reform in highly 
corrupt countries. Guided by the Reverse Karenina argument, which posits that failed 
corruption reform should all look alike while successful corruption reform programs 
should each be unique, I have conducted a structured, focus comparison of three paired 
cases from around the globe among the sadly ample population of underdeveloped and 
highly corrupt countries. My expectation was that idiosyncratic details are the 
determining factor in successful corruption reform programs. This case study approach 
has overwhelmingly confirmed by hypothesis that there is no systematic knowledge of or 
relationship between the factors normally thought to constitute successful corruption 
reform and real corruption reform efforts. Of course, nothing has been proven here-these 
finding merely shift the burden of proof to those tied to the practical validity of the 
Laundry List, in part or whole. In this final chapter I will summarize these findings, 
discuss the theoretical and policy implications, and make a few concluding remarks. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
For each of my paired cases-Tanzania and Malawi, Colombia and Peru, and 
Thailand and the Philippines-I examined differences in corruption reform success in 
terms of 8 independent variables: Political Leadership, Openness to Trade, External 
Influence, Civil Service Reform, Civil Society, Media Freedom, National Anti-
Corruption Agencies, and Judicial Reform. These independent variables were chosen 
carefully as being generally agreed upon by academic and policy experts alike to be 
important, even prerequisite, components in successful corruption reform programs. 
These IVs can be distinguished in two ways: non-institutional v. institutional and 
idiosyncratic v. non-idiosyncratic. Political Leadership, Openness to Trade and External 
Influence are the non-institutional IVs. Political Leadership is the only idiosyncratic IV. 
Political leadership 
Political Leadership-my only by-nature idiosyncratic independent variable-is the 
big winner. As can be seen in Graph 13, there was a difference of between 3 and 5 points 
in every paired case. None of the improving countries scored below 1 while none of the 
declining countries scored above 0. On first glance, this appears to be strong confirmation 
of the increasingly popular theory that political leadership is a prerequisite for successful 
reform. And it is similarly strong confirmation of the idea that reform must be tailored to 
specific local conditions, including individual politicians. It should be noted, though, that 
only in Tanzania was this political leadership seen as the primary factor in the difference 
between countries. In Colombia, political leadership was strong but an apparent function, 
in some significant part, of the complex civil war. And in Thailand, leadership was not 
particularly strong, just much stronger than that of the Philippines. Thai success was 
more a function of the severity of the economic crisis. What stands out in this category is 
the consistent lack of leadership in the declining countries. This points to the clear 
applicability of the Reverse Karenina argument. 
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Graph 13. Political leadership. 
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Openness to trade 
Openness to trade as an independent variable is much more of a mixed bag 
(Graph 14). Every improving country scored a 2 or 3 and one of the declining countries 
scored a -2. It should be noted, up front, that my first two paired cases present somewhat 
of a wash. So from this alone one might conclude that openness to trade certainly does 
not hurt. I suspect that this muddiness may be a function of the scope of my research-
openness to trade is perhaps more likely to be a component of large scale, permanent 
change rather than short-term modest change under examination here. This provides no 
indication in favor of the Reverse Karenina hypothesis. 
OSuccesses 
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Graph 14. Openness to trade. 
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External influence 
In terms of External Influence, all countries improved. In my first two cases, the 
improving country improved somewhat more (Graph 15). Thailand and the Philippines 
each scored a 1 in this category but the type of external influence in Thailand was tailor-
made for the economic crisis and not at all typical of modern international development 
aid. And the external influence in Colombia was preposterously high due to the drug war. 
And all three of the declining countries scored either a 1 or 2. Readers can draw their own 
conclusions from this but it would seem to be as much a function of the idiosyncratic 
details of countries more than anything. 
DSuccesses 
• Failures 
Tanzania/Malawi 
Graph 15. External influence. 
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Media freedom 
In Graph 16, we see our ugliest, most surprising results with the first of our 
institutional variables. For the improving countries, Tanzania held even while Colombia 
and Thailand both declined significantly. This would indicate that not only is increasing 
media freedom not a necessary part of reform but that decreasing it might help! This 
would support 'strong state' or authoritarian notions of reform on the surface. But that 
did not really appear to be the case-for both Colombia and Thailand the media 
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crackdowns seemed to be more coincidental than causative. In both cases it seems to be a 
function of the large-scale idiosyncratic events taking place in the country. And it should 
be noted that for two of the declining countries-Malawi and the Philippines-there were 
strong declines in media freedom as well. But in Peru it strongly increased. 
• Successes 
• Failures 
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Graph 16. Media freedom. 
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Civil service reform 
As can be seen in Graph 17, every improving country scored a 2 while two 
declining countries scored a 1 and the other a two. On the surface one might conclude 
that civil service reform may matter somewhat. In all of my cases it seemed to be more of 
an effect than a cause-local idiosyncratic conditions either provided the opportunities for 
advance or they did not. 
• Successes 
• Failures 
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Graph 17. Civil service reform. 
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Civil society 
Civil Society looks to be on a little more solid ground that Civil Service Reform 
(Graph 18). In all three cases, the improving country performed one point higher than the 
declining country. So in none of the cases was there a major difference, as all six 
countries improved. And like with many other IVs, the nature of this improvement in 
Colombia and Thailand was a function of the drug war and economic crisis, respectively. 
Again, we see improved civil society as an effect rather than cause and yet more 
confirmation for the Reverse Karenina hypothesis. 
DSuccesses 
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Graph 18. Civil society. 
National anti-corruption agencies 
This category was something of a dud, although not nearly as dramatically 
unsuccessful as Media Freedom (Graph 19). The range for all six countries was between 
0 and 2. In two cases there was no difference in the ranking and in the third-Colombia 
and Peru-the declining country outperformed in this IV. 
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Graph 19. National anti-corruption agencies. 
Judicial reform 
Like Civil Society, Judicial Reform is an institutional category in which every 
improving country outperformed its match by one point. So, on the surface, this would 
seem to be somewhat important. But, again, this difference in the cases of Colombia and 
Thailand can pretty clearly be traced to their respective, extreme, and arguably unique 
situations. Judicial Reform, then, like other institutional variables, appears to be 
important but not causative. 
• Successes 
• Failures 
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Graph 20. Judicial reform. 
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In sum, the more institutional a variable is, the less it generally seems to directly, 
positively affect corruption reform success. The variable that appears most influential is 
Political Leadership (by a large margin); the variable that appears least influential (again, by 
a large margin) is Media Freedom. But the factor that appears to matter the most, showing up 
in grand fashion on multiple occasions, are the idiosyncratic details of the individual 
improving countries. By subtracting the failure scores from the success scores per case and 
summing these numbers per paired case per variable, we can get a handle on the varying 
importance of the eight independent variables. Graph 21 illustrates these net differences per 
IV. 
Political Trade Judicial Civil Civil External National AC Media 
Society Service 
Graph 21. Comparing independent variables. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
What is the appropriate analytical framework from which to examine corruption 
and corruption reform? What discipline does corruption belong to? What level of detail is 
necessary in examining corruption reform? In what senses is corruption (and its reform) 
universal and in what senses is it culturally-specific? These are some of the theoretical 
questions that have motivated and guided my research. I have attempted to fill in some 
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gaps in the existing literature and build some bridges between academic disciplines and 
sub-disciplines. Now that this research is finished and examined, it is time to revisit these 
questions and pull out some preliminary answers. 
First, the approach taken here validates the need for both generalizable theory and 
detail. It was important to craft an approach that would allow me to make some sense of 
and bring order to the incredible amount of detail available on a country-by-country and, 
even, program-by-program detail. But, given the confirmation of the Reverse Karenina 
argument, it is as equally important to ascertain the specific nature of the idiosyncratic 
details countries face in order to understand the best way forward in practical, policy 
terms. 
It is my opinion that corruption and the organic, complex mishmash industry that 
has grown over the years in response to analyze and reform it can benefit from this 
structured, focused and global comparison. It is complex and cross-disciplinary by nature. 
By setting up a methodological structure that incorporates elements of various 
disciplines, it is my hope that this project can be of use to academics in the various 
disciplines that corruption is relevant to. This same methodological structure, hopefully, 
provides something of a bypass to avoid some of the boggy debates that haunt the social 
sciences, especially detail v. theory and rational choice v. culture. By building something 
of a bridge between theory and method on one side and policy implementation on the 
other, it is my hope that this can be of use to both academics and technical professionals 
as well. 
Building a new foundation 
It is not enough to state simply that success is a function of idiosyncracies. There 
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must be a role for theory in setting a new, more solid foundation to replace the cracking 
Corruption Consensus. Otherwise, the devil must be in the details. What explains the lack 
of importance of media freedom in explaining modestly successful corruption reform? In 
what theoretical way is political leadership important? Is there something to be 
determined here other than the importance of the individual in domestic politics? And, 
more fundamentally, how can we move from the description-oriented idiosyncratic 
findings to something generalizable? These are all questions for further research but it is 
time to make some suggestions regarding the most intriguing findings. Perhaps political 
leadership is a function of changing incentive structures. Perhaps Historical 
Institutionalism could provide an analytic framework that would accommodate the 
somewhat complicated task of taking into account both institutions and the incentive 
structures facing leaders. 
Two of my cases, crises appeared to play a significant role-this could certainly 
result in changing incentive structures. But not all crises result in successful corruption 
reform-what about is it about crises that is conducive to reform and how best to 
implement it are two unresolved points that would benefit from future research. Perhaps 
the possible negative importance of media freedom in the short run is due to the need for 
leadership to take control in order to effectively implement rule of law initiatives. 
Certainly we should consider the role the state plays in providing incentives for strong 
political leadership. What type of state is most conducive to corruption and corruption 
reform? For this, a State and Society framework might prove analytically useful. 
Limitations and other possibilities for future research 
This dissertation has significant limitations. These results are intriguing but do not 
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prove anything, of course. They do perhaps shift the burden of proof back to supporters 
of the Corruption Consensus and Laundry List. They also provide an opportunity for 
future research projects (in addition to those detailed above), as well as the strong 
indicative conclusions detailed above. I think, in particular, further studies regarding the 
differences between traditional, long-term, large-scale success and recent, short-term 
modest success and, obviously, how to make the leap between would be very worthwhile. 
While I have shed some light on what it means to make modest improvements, much 
work remains to be done on this. A number of questions of interest to me have yielded 
interesting but shaky and difficult-to-interpret results. This is particularly true of the role 
of external events, external actors and conditionality. What role do external events play 
(such as the Asian economic crisis)? For reasons of scope, this dissertation stuck to first-
and second-level analyses-it could obviously be useful to expand this to the third level. 
What is about the IMF conditionality in Thailand and the EU upfront conditionality with 
EU entrants that spurred results and is it at all replicable? Now, having fleshed out some 
of the theoretical implications, it is time to look at the more important substantive, real-
world policy implications. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
What is to be done to fix corruption reform? What are the practical, policy lessons of 
my findings? How can the lessons be converted into useful policy steps? First, there are a 
number of common sense, perhaps banal, implications that support the existing or emerging 
conventional wisdom. One size does not, in fact, fit all. To the extent that there are still 
technocrats out there somewhere trying to use ready-made formulas for corruption reform, 
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this can serve as yet another request to cease and desist. Local experts need to be enlisted and 
empowered in this fight to leverage knowledge of local idiosyncrasies in order to maximize 
efficiency in reform efforts. Second, political leadership matters. This is also already well 
documented and, essentially, stipulated by both academic and policy experts. Third, on the 
Santa Claus v. Scrooge continuum, the optimum solution is somewhere square in between. 
Successful corruption reform does exist-to the extent that we can locate and fund it, we 
should do so. Yet, much corruption reform is extremely cost-inefficient. To the extent that 
the inefficient nations with poor political leadership can be pinpointed, we should be very 
wary of continuing to fund them, at least in the lavish manner they have become accustomed 
to. 
Then there are the somewhat more novel implications. This would seem to be 
something of a vindication of George Bush's Millennium Challenge Corporation. One 
wonders if the MCC isn't in a rather difficult situation vis-a-vis getting proper respect and 
support for its groundbreaking concept. The relatively few people most likely to still support 
Bush and his legacy are not generally supportive of foreign aid; conversely, the people most 
supportive of foreign aid are, to put it mildly, not likely to openly support a Bush program. It 
would be a shame if the MCC were to die out now-its upfront conditionality seems just about 
the right approach. The threshhold program seems like something of a sop to the 
development community. It is also an unstated recognition of the Catch-22 involved: 
countries capable of spending aid wisely generally don't much need aid and vice versa. 
Related to this is the notion of agility of funding. I have shown that successful 
corruption reform is more a function of idiosyncratic country details. These details are 
inherently difficult to predict and subject to change. Political leadership can change overnight 
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and crises come and go. On the surface, this certainly does not lend immediate hope to the 
cause of improving the success rate of international development programs. But there does 
some to be an opening here for introducing an agile funding mechanism that would allow 
international development professionals to increase and decrease funding flows as events on 
the ground become more or less conducive to real reform. This applies as much, if not more, 
to the MCC as the World Bank and other IOs and national government programs. The MCC 
is set up as an alternative model to international development funding but the steps involved 
in the funding process look just as ponderously bureaucratic as those of the World Bank. 
From start to finish, it can take years for funding to be approved and meted out. But the 
lesson of this research is that idiosyncratic details conducive to successful reform are 
relatively unpredictable and dynamic. The MCC and other international development 
organizations should consider switching to an agile funding mechanism in which a decision 
to fund can be triggered quickly by in-country events rather than by jumping through a 
prerequisite series of formal bureaucratic hoops. 
I have noted above the theoretical potential in distinguishing further between current 
modest reform and traditional large-scale reform. This would seem to have practical use as 
well. Modest success, in short, looks much different than large-scale success. It is messy, 
incomplete, not enough, fragile, difficult to recognize, oft-criticized, and difficult to 
maintain. More work needs to be done in understanding just what modest success is, how it 
happens, what it looks like; and how it can be strengthened and prolonged. 
Finally, success seems to come with the right kind of crisis. But not automatically, of 
course, so more research in this area is warranted. Colombia's civil war may be messy and 
bloody but it is not altogether unique. There are plenty of countries in more dire 
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circumstances that do nothing to reduce corruption. And while Thailand certainly was 
devastated by the Asian economic collapse, they seem to be the only country that responded 
in such a fashion. And these were not the only two countries among my cases facing crises: 
the collapse of the Fujimori regime seemed to create an opening for real reform. Why wasn't 
this enough? I have tried to shed some light on this but this certainly deserves more attention 
given the enormous gap between the resources and results in international development. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Corruption is a deeply complex subject and has proven a very difficult problem to 
solve. But we have seen deeply corrupt countries over time win their internal struggles to 
control corruption and, as a result, reap the economic, political and social benefits. The 
difficulties inherent to corruption reform should not be underestimated but neither should 
we let them stop us. There is an understandable, growing frustration with and reaction 
against the resources being thrown at this intractable problem. It would be tempting to 
give up and let nature take its course. But there are billions of people who suffer on a 
daily basis for the sin of being born into a corrupt society. They deserve better. It is my 
hope that this dissertation has shed a little glimmer of light onto this frustratingly 
enigmatic yet important problem. 
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National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
External Influence 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
Civil Service Reform 
Judicial 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
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Remuneration 
Law for Transparency 
and Access to Public 
Information (Law 
27806) 
The Law on 
Responsibilities and 
Incompatibilities 
The Superior Council for 
State Procurement and 
Contracting 
The SEACE -- the 
Electronic System of 
Procurement and 
Contracting for Peru 
The Integrated System 
for Public Financial 
Management (SIAF-SP) 
PROINVERSION Law 
on Transparency and 
Access to Public 
Information 
Improving Justice 
Administration Services 
Support for the Reform 
of Peru's Judicial 
System 
Judicial Branch Plan of 
Action 2006-2008 
Criminal Procedure 
Code 
Commercial Courts 
National Anti-
Corruption System (Act 
No. 27378) 
Law on the Public 
Service Code of Ethic 
Dircacor 
FEDADOI 
EITI 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Judicial Reform 
Judicial Reform 
External Influence 
Judicial Reform 
External Influence 
Judicial Reform 
Judicial Reform 
Judicial Reform 
Judicial Reform 
Political Leadership 
Civil Service Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Judicial Reform 
Political Leadership 
Civil Service Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Judicial Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
Thailand 
Program 
Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Compact 
1997 Constitution 
Constitution and Administrative 
Courts 
National Counter Corruption 
Commission 
Autonomization 
Corporate Governance 
Structural Reform Law 
Administrative Reform Law 
Election Commission 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen 
Public Finance Audit Commission 
(formerly Auditor General) 
Information Act 
Relevant Variables 
Political Leadership 
Judicial Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Society 
Media Freedom 
Open Trade 
Political Leadership 
Judicial Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Society 
Media Freedom 
External Influence 
Civil Service Reform 
Political Leadership 
Judicial Reform 
Civil Society 
Civil Service Reform 
Judicial Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Society 
Civil Service Reform 
External Influence 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Society Judicial Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Philippines 
Program 
Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Compact 
Ombudsman 
Procurement 
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission 
(PAGC) 
National Anti-Corruption Program of 
Action (NACPA) 
TAG 
ABA/USAID legal reform 
World Bank E-customs project 
Medium Term Philippine 
Development Plan (MTPDP) 
Lifestyle Check Coalition 
Electronic Information Exchange 
Customs Integrity Action Plan 
Anti-Corruption Working Group 
Coalition on Corruption and Makati 
business club 
Commission of Audit 
New Code of Judicial Conduct 
Philippine National Police (PNP) 
Reform Act of 1998 
Judicial Reform Support Project 
Government Procurement Act of 2002 
USAID Mindanao program 
Relevant Variables 
Political Leadership 
Judicial Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Society 
Media Freedom 
Open Trade 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
Political Leadership 
External Influence 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Political Leadership 
External Influence 
Political Leadership 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil Service Reform 
External Influence 
Judicial Reform 
External Influence 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil Service Reform 
External Influence 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Civil Society Groups 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Judicial Reform 
Judicial Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Judicial Reform 
Civil Service Reform 
Judicial Reform 
ADB/OECD Ombudsman Project 
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good 
Governance (CCAGG) 
PWI procurement 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil Service Reform 
External Influence 
National Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Civil Service Reform 
External Influence 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil Service Reform 
APPENDIX B 
Quantitative Data 
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Quantitative 
Country 
Albania 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Banglades 
h 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'lv'e 
Croatia 
Czech R 
Dominican 
Data, CI 
CP
I
 
19
98
 
3 
3.9 
5.4 
2.8 
4 
2.9 
1.4 
3.5 
2.2 
5.6 
3.1 
4.8 
>I Scores 
CP
I
 
19
99
 
2.3 
3 
2.5 
1.7 
3.4 
5.3 
2.5 
4.1 
3.3 
1.5 
3.4 
2.9 
5.1 
2.6 
2.7 
4.6 
CP
I
 
20
00
 
1.7 
3.5 
2.5 
1.5 
4.1 
6.1 
2.7 
3.9 
3.5 
2 
3.1 
3.2 
5.4 
2.7 
3.7 
4.3 
CP
I
 
20
01
 
3.5 
2 
0.4 
6.6 
2 
4 
3.9 
2 
3.5 
3.8 
4.5 
2.4 
3.9 
3.9 
3.1 
CP
I
 
20
02
 
2.5 
1.7 
2.8 
2 
1.2 
4.8 
7.1 
2.2 
4 
4 
2.2 
3.5 
3.6 
4.5 
2.7 
3.8 
3.7 
3.5 
CP
I
 
20
03
 
2.5 
1.8 
2.5 
3 
1.8 
1.3 
4.2 
7.6 
2.3 
3.9 
3.9 
1.8 
3.4 
3.7 
4.3 
2.1 
3.7 
3.9 
3.3 
CP
I
 
20
04
 
2.5 
2 
2.5 
3.1 
1.9 
1.5 
3.3 
7.5 
2.2 
3.9 
4.1 
2.1 
3.4 
3.8 
4.9 
2 
3.5 
4.2 
2.9 
CP
I
 
20
05
 
2.4 
2 
2.8 
2.9 
2.2 
1.7 
2.6 
7.4 
2.5 
3.7 
4 
2.2 
3.2 
4 
4.2 
1.9 
3.4 
4.3 
3 
CP
I
 
20
06
 
2.6 
2.2 
2.9 
2.9 
2.4 
2 
2.1 
7.3 
2.7 
3.3 
4 
2.3 
3.3 
3.9 
4.1 
2.1 
3.4 
4.8 
2.8 
CP
I
 
20
07
 
2.9 
2.2 
2.9 
3 
2.1 
2 
2.1 
7.1 
2.9 
3.5 
4.1 
2.4 
3.5 
3.8 
5 
2.1 
4.1 
5.2 
3 
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Country 
R 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El 
Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhsta 
n 
Kenya 
Latvia 
CP
I
 
19
98
 
2.3 
2.9 
3.6 
5.7 
3.3 
4.9 
3.1 
1.7 
5 
2.9 
2 
4.6 
3.8 
5.8 
4.7 
2.5 
2.7 
CP
I
 
19
99
 
2.4 
3.3 
3.9 
5.7 
2.3 
3.3 
4.9 
3.2 
1.8 
5.2 
2.9 
1.7 
4.7 
3.8 
6 
4.4 
2.3 
2 
3.4 
CP
I
 
20
00
 
2.6 
3.1 
4.1 
5.7 
3.2 
3.5 
4.9 
5.2 
2.8 
1.7 
4.6 
6.4 
4.6 
3 
2.1 
3.4 
CP
I
 
20
01
 
2.3 
3.6 
3.6 
5.6 
3.4 
4.2 
2.9 
2.7 
5.3 
2.7 
1.9 
5.5 
7.1 
4.9 
2.7 
2 
3.4 
CP
I
 
20
02
 
2.2 
3.4 
3.4 
5.6 
3.5 
2.4 
3.9 
4.2 
2.5 
2.7 
4.9 
2.7 
1.9 
5.2 
4 
7.1 
4.5 
2.3 
1.9 
3.7 
CP
I
 
20
03
 
2.2 
3.3 
3.7 
5.5 
2.5 
1.8 
3.3 
4.3 
2.4 
2.3 
4.8 
2.8 
1.9 
5.3 
3.8 
7 
4.6 
2.4 
1.9 
3.8 
CP
I
 
20
04
 
2.4 
3.2 
4.2 
6 
2.3 
2 
3.6 
4.3 
2.2 
2.3 
4.8 
2.8 
2 
4.8 
3.3 
6.9 
5.3 
2.2 
2.1 
4 
CP
I
 
20
05
 
2.5 
3.4 
4.2 
6.4 
2.2 
2.3 
3.5 
4.3 
2.5 
2.6 
5 
2.9 
2.2 
5 
3.6 
7.3 
5.7 
2.6 
2,1 
4.2 
CP
I
 
20
06
 
2.3 
3.3 
4 
6.7 
2.4 
2.8 
3.3 
4.4 
2.6 
2.5 
5.2 
3.3 
2.4 
4.9 
3.7 
7.6 
5.3 
2.6 
2.2 
4.7 
CP
I
 
20
07
 
2.1 
2.9 
4 
6.5 
2.4 
3.4 
3.7 
4.6 
2.8 
2.5 
5.3 
3.5 
2.3 
5.2 
3.3 
7.5 
4.7 
2.1 
2.1 
4.8 
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Country 
Lithuania 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Mozamb'e 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Slovak R 
Slovenia 
CP
I
 
19
98
 
4.1 
5.3 
5 
3.3 
3.7 
5.3 
3 
1.9 
2.7 
1.5 
4.5 
3.3 
4.6 
3 
2.4 
3.3 
3.9 
CP
I
 
19
99
 
3.8 
4.1 
5.1 
4.9 
3.4 
2.6 
4.1 
3.5 
5.3 
3.1 
1.6 
2.2 
2 
4.5 
3.6 
4.2 
3.3 
2.4 
3.4 
3.7 
6 
CP
I
 
20
00
 
4.1 
4.1 
4.8 
4.7 
3.3 
2.6 
4.7 
2.2 
5.4 
1.2 
4.4 
2.8 
4.1 
2.9 
2.1 
3.5 
3.5 
5.5 
CP
I
 
20
01
 
4.8 
3.2 
5 
4.5 
3.7 
3.1 
5.4 
2.4 
1 
2.3 
3.7 
4.1 
2.9 
4.1 
2.8 
2.3 
2.9 
3.7 
5.2 
CP
I
 
20
02
 
4.8 
2.9 
4.9 
4.5 
3.6 
2.1 
3.7 
5.7 
2.5 
1.6 
2.6 
3 
1.7 
4 
2.6 
4 
2.6 
2.7 
3.1 
3.7 
6 
CP
I
 
20
03
 
4.7 
2.8 
5.2 
4.4 
3.6 
2.4 
3.3 
2.7 
4.7 
2.6 
1.4 
2.5 
3.4 
1.6 
3.7 
2.5 
3.6 
2.8 
2.7 
3.2 
3.7 
5.9 
CP
I
 
20
04
 
4.6 
2.8 
5 
4.1 
3.6 
2.3 
3.2 
2.8 
4.1 
2.7 
1.6 
2.1 
3.7 
1.9 
3.5 
2.6 
3.5 
2.9 
2.8 
3 
4 
6 
CP
I
 
20
05
 
4.8 
2.8 
5.1 
4.2 
3.5 
2.9 
3.2 
2.8 
4.3 
2.6 
1.9 
2.1 
3.5 
2.1 
3.5 
2.5 
3.4 
3 
2.4 
3.2 
4.3 
6.1 
CP
I
 
20
06
 
4.8 
2.7 
5 
5.1 
3.3 
3.2 
3.2 
2.8 
4.1 
2.6 
2.2 
2.2 
3.1 
2.6 
3.3 
2.5 
3.7 
3.1 
2.5 
3.3 
4.7 
6.4 
CP
I
 
20
07
 
4.8 
2.7 
5.1 
4.7 
3.5 
2.8 
3.5 
2.8 
4.5 
2.6 
2.2 
2.4 
3.2 
2.4 
3.5 
2.5 
4.2 
3.7 
2.3 
3.6 
4.9 
6.6 
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Country 
South A'a 
South K'a 
Taiwan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
CP
I
 
19
98
 
5.2 
4.2 
5.3 
1.9 
3 
5 
3.4 
2.6 
2.8 
4.3 
2.3 
2.5 
3.5 
4.2 
CP
I
 
19
99
 
5 
3.8 
5.6 
1.9 
3.2 
5 
3.6 
2.2 
2.6 
4.4 
1.8 
2.6 
2.6 
3.5 
4.1 
CP
I
 
20
00
 
5 
4 
5.5 
2.5 
3.2 
5.2 
3.8 
2.3 
1.5 
2.4 
2.7 
2.5 
3.4 
3 
CP
I
 
20
01
 
4.8 
4.2 
5.9 
2.2 
3.2 
5.3 
5.3 
3.6 
1.9 
2.1 
5.1 
2.7 
2.8 
2.6 
2.6 
2.9 
CP
I
 
20
02
 
4.8 
4.5 
5.6 
2.7 
3.2 
4.9 
4.8 
3.2 
2.1 
2.4 
5.1 
2.9 
2.5 
2.4 
2.6 
2.7 
CP
I
 
20
03
 
4.4 
4.3 
5.7 
2.5 
3.3 
4.6 
4.9 
3.1 
2.2 
2.3 
5.5 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
2.5 
2.3 
CP
I
 
20
04
 
4.6 
4.5 
5.6 
2.8 
3.6 
4.2 
5 
3.2 
2.6 
2.2 
6.2 
2.3 
2.3 
2.6 
2.6 
2.3 
CP
I
 
20
05
 
4.5 
5 
5.9 
2.9 
3.8 
3.8 
4.9 
3.5 
2.5 
2.6 
5.9 
2.2 
2.3 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
CP
I
 
20
06
 
4.6 
5.1 
5.9 
2.9 
3.6 
3.2 
4.6 
3.8 
2.7 
2.8 
6.4 
2.1 
2.2 
2.6 
2.6 
2.4 
CP
I
 
20
07
 
5.1 
5.1 
5.7 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
4.2 
4.1 
2.8 
2.7 
6.7 
1.7 
2 
2.6 
2.6 
2.1 
Quantitative Data, Continued 
Country 
Albania 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'lv'e 
Croatia 
Czech R 
Dominican 
R 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
19
98
-
20
02
 
av
g 
2.4 
1.7 
3.16 
2.5 
1.8 
0.8 
3.98 
6.2 
2.48 
4 
3.54 
1.74 
3.5 
3.06 
5.1 
2.68 
3.53 
4.3 
3.3 
2.3 
3.28 
20
03
-
20
07
 
av
g 
2.58 
2.04 
2.72 
2.98 
2.08 
1.7 
2.86 
7.38 
2.52 
3.66 
4.02 
2.16 
3.36 
3.84 
4.5 
2.04 
3.62 
4.48 
3 
2.3 
3.22 
D
el
ta
 
0.18 
0.34 
-0.44 
0.48 
0.28 
0.9 
-1.12 
1.18 
0.04 
-0.34 
0.48 
0.42 
-0.14 
0.78 
-0.6 
-0.64 
0.09 
0.18 
-0.3 
0 
-0.06 
G
D
P 
pe
r 
Ca
pi
ta
 
5728 
3543 
16080 
5177 
6476 
2130 
9143 
34749 
2931 
10073 
10022 
2188 
7722 
8260 
11862 
1680 
14523 
23399 
9377 
4835 
4895 
D
em
 
fre
ed
om
s 
4 
6 
2.5 
4.5 
5 
3 
6 
1.5 
2 
3.5 
2.5 
6 
7 
4 
1.5 
5 
4 
1.5 
3 
3 
6 
In
t'l
 
A
id
 
104 
22 
1 
70 
17 
9 
4 
57 
1 
39 
26 
1 
4 
3 
21 
15 
43 
7 
12 
20 
Ec
on
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
53.9 
24.9 
70.9 
49.6 
43.1 
52 
38 
64.7 
68.8 
52.3 
45.7 
48 
53.1 
65.5 
65.6 
51.3 
51.7 
68.4 
58.1 
62.8 
55.8 
EU
 
En
tra
nt
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Ru
le
 
o
f 
La
w
 
-1.23 
-1.56 
0.03 
-0.42 
-1.02 
-0.85 
-0.73 
1.34 
-0.41 
-0.26 
-0.27 
-1.18 
-0.4 
-0.73 
0.6 
-0.9 
-0.16 
0.83 
-0.5 
-0.67 
-0.08 
213 
Country 
El 
Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
19
98
-
20
02
 
av
g 
3.8 
5.72 
3.35 
2.35 
3.42 
4.64 
2.9 
2.23 
5.18 
2.8 
1.84 
4.92 
3.87 
6.48 
4.62 
2.58 
2.1 
3.32 
4.38 
3.68 
5.02 
20
03
-
20
07
 
av
g 
4.02 
6.22 
2.36 
2.46 
3.48 
4.38 
2.5 
2.44 
5.02 
3.06 
2.16 
5.04 
3.54 
7.26 
5.12 
2.38 
2.08 
4.3 
4.74 
2.76 
5.08 
D
el
ta
 
0.22 
0.5 
-0.99 
0.11 
0.06 
-0.26 
-0.4 
0.21 
-0.16 
0.26 
0.32 
0.12 
-0.33 
0.78 
0.5 
-0.2 
-0.02 
0.98 
0.36 
-0.92 
0.06 
G
D
P 
pe
r 
Ca
pi
ta
 
5600 
19692 
1123 
3642 
2786 
33004 
4335 
3199 
20047 
3802 
4356 
31051 
4494 
32530 
5611 
9568 
1357 
15806 
16373 
707 
11957 
D
em
 
fre
ed
om
s 
2.5 
1.5 
4.5 
3.5 
3 
2 
3.5 
2.5 
1.5 
3 
6 
1.5 
2.5 
1.5 
4 
5.5 
6 
1.5 
1.5 
2.5 
4.5 
i—
 
In
t'l
 
A
id
 
29 
47 
11 
36 
30 
24 
70 
25 
1 
8 
4 
114 
13 
17 
38 
28 
39 
2 
Ec
on
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
70.2 
72.5 
49.2 
47.9 
57 
60.6 
65.8 
56.2 
56.9 
49.7 
63.4 
59.1 
67.1 
70.2 
66.8 
41.7 
58.4 
63.4 
59.4 
54.1 
68.2 
EU
 
En
tra
nt
 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Ru
le
 
o
f 
La
w
 
-0.54 
0.49 
-0.7 
-1.18 
-0.44 
0.68 
-0.92 
-0.85 
0.76 
0.16 
-0.77 
0.85 
-0.35 
1.5 
0.41 
-0.91 
-1.11 
0.18 
0.4 
-0.52 
0.43 
214 
Country 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Mozamb'e 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Slovak R 
Slovenia 
South A'a 
South K'a 
Taiwan 
19
98
-
20
02
 
av
g 
4.72 
3.46 
2.63 
4.05 
2.85 
5.42 
2.63 
1.46 
2.45 
3.35 
1.73 
4.3 
3.04 
4.2 
2.92 
2.38 
3.24 
3.7 
5.68 
4.96 
4.14 
5.58 
20
03
-
20
07
 
av
g 
4.5 
3.5 
2.72 
3.48 
2.78 
4.34 
2.62 
1.86 
2.26 
3.38 
2.12 
3.5 
2.52 
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-0.8 
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Tanzania 
Thailand 
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-1 
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3 
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0 
0 
Ru
le
 
o
f 
La
w
 
-0.43 
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-0.6 
-0.47 
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